6.2.4 Formato de Inspección
6.2.6. Formato de Orden de Trabajo
The relationship between the government and opposition changes in the EAC because the government usually enjoys support from Parliament’s pro-EU groups (often referred to as the yes-parties). The yes-parties comprise the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Conservative People’s Party, Socialist People’s Party, and the Social Liberal Party.
The consensus among the pro-EU parties is surprising given that EU integration has been and still is contentious for many Danish parties and has been a cause of internal conflict. It is,
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therefore, interesting that internal party conflict on EU affairs is not reflected in the behaviour of the EAC members (Damgaard and Jensen, 2005). This suggests that these parties value solidarity to further Danish interests in the EU rather than let internal party politics get in the way of Denmark’s abilityto exert influence in the Council (Christensen 2015; 2016).
The Danish government usually secures a majority from the pro-European parties ahead of the EAC
meetings, which contributes to depoliticising EU debates in the EAC. The mandate is de facto given behind closed doors ahead of committee meetings. This makes the debates in the EAC rather theatrical and puts a cap on the ability to have an open and genuine debate on EU issues during committee meetings.
Consequently, the most active
members in the EAC meetings are fringe parties. Those who challenge the government’s position in the EAC (which could be termed the real opposition) are the two most Eurosceptic parties in the Danish Parliament: the Danish People’s Party and the Unity List. Figure 8.1 shows how often parliamentarians from different parties take the floor (out of everyone taking the floor) during EAC meetings between September 2015 and
August 2018. A clear picture emerges: the two most Eurosceptic parties in the Danish Parliament (the left-wing Red-Green Alliance and the right-wing Danish People’s Party) are among the most active parties in the EAC. Even though the Red-
Green Alliance only has one member of the EAC, it is the most active party in the EAC.
The Danish government usually secures a majority from the pro- EU parties ahead of the
EAC meetings, which contributes to depoliticising EU debates in the EAC.
The two most Eurosceptic parties in the
Danish Parliament are among the most active
134HOW FUNCTIONAL IS THEDANISH REPRESENTATIVE MODEL? Figure 8.1 Party activity in the Danish EAC
How often party representatives1take the floor, 4 September 2015 and 28 August 2018 (N=726 taking the floor in total)
Note: The head of the EAC and the members from Greenland and the Faroe
Islands are excluded.
Source: Think Tank Europa’s own compilation.
The Social Democratic Party has the second highest activity score, which is unsurprising given that it is the largest parliamentary party, with seven EAC members and the main opposition party. Even though the government often secures the support of the Social Democratic Party ahead of EAC meetings, its party members still feel theneed to assert themselves inthemeetings.
The governing parties – the Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance, and the Conservative People’s Party – take the floor to varying degrees. The Liberal Party (the biggest governing party) ranks middle, while the two remaining small governing parties are at the very bottom. Perhaps the Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People’s Party feel that their voices are already heardand therefore have less of a need to take the floor. However, their inactivity masks the ideological differences between them. The Liberal Party wants to move Denmark as close to the EU core as possible and to abolish the Danish EU opt-outs. The Liberal Alliance, however, wants to
1The number of seats of each of the parties in the EAC is as follows: Social
Democrats (7), the Liberal Party (6), Danish People’s Party (6), Red-Green Alliance (3), Liberal Alliance (2), The Alternative (2), The Social Liberal Party (1), The Liberal Alliance (1), and Conservative People’s party (1).
1% 2% 5% 9% 11% 16% 17% 18% 21%
Conservative People's Party The Liberal Alliance The Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) Socialist People's Party The Liberal Party (Venstre) The Alternative Danish People's Party Social Democrats Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)
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maintain Denmark’s euro opt-out and has an unclear position on the other opt-outs. Before entering into government in 2016, it was a soft Eurosceptic party that wanted to reinvent the EU based on free trade. The party also advised Danish voters to vote against changing the Danish opt-out in justice and home affairs to an opt-in model in the referendum in December 2015. After entering into government, the party appears to have moderated its public criticism of the EU.
The most pro-European party in Parliament – the Social Liberal Party – is also oneof the least active parties in taking the floor during EAC meetings, probably because its views are reflected in the government’s mandates.
A common complaint from EAC chairs is that only few parliamentarians show up to the meetings in the EAC other than the parties’ spokespersons.This is seen to be a combination of a busy parliamentary agenda, in which EU matters are not prioritised (Bræmer, 2014).
The broad pro-EU consensus in the Danish EAC does not mean that the Eurosceptic parties’ voices are not heard. The Danish People’s Party is a supporting party in the Danish minority government and has an indirect influence on the government’s EU views. For example, the major governing party, Venstre (the Liberal Party) moderated its public enthusiasm for further EU integration after it became dependent on the Danish People’s Party for support. The Danish People’s Party has had an indirect but profound effect on the Liberal Party’s view on immigration and refugees (such as refugee burden-sharing in the EU). Before the Liberal Party came to power in June 2015, it announced that it wanted to place Denmark as close to the core of the EU as possible. After 2015, the party has not used this rhetoric publicly. At the same time, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen has been vocal in reiterating that he does not want to enter into government with a party (i.e. the Danish People’s Party) that advocates a referendum on Denmark’s EU membership.
8.1.3
Challenges to the Danish model
The increase of early agreements in the EU challenges the Danish EU scrutiny model.Early agreements are concluded at first reading or early second readingduring the ordinary legislative procedure and the compromise is reached during trilogue meetings (Dionigi
136HOW FUNCTIONAL IS THEDANISH REPRESENTATIVE MODEL?
and Koop, 2017). The work of the EAC has traditionally focused on mandating the government prior to Council meetings, which is often too lateif the Danish Parliament wants to influence the Council’s position and the compromise between the institutions.
The Danish EAC hastried toadapt its scrutiny model to the increase of early agreements by introducing the possibility of giving an early mandate, where ministers must seek a mandate from the EAC before the Danish position is firmly established. In these cases, the government may need to come back to the EAC later in the process to seek a new mandate if the proposal changes fundamentally during EU negotiations. The problem with early mandates is that they give the government a lot of discretion because they are very loosely defined (Jensen and Martinsen, 2012). Despite all the good intentions, the EAC is often involved either too early in the EU’s decision-making process to tie the hands of the government (and ministers may forget to come back for a renewed mandate later in the process), or too late to change the compromise in the Council (Christensen, 2015).
In 2015, the EAC asked the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide an overview of when the mandates are sought from the EAC. This request came about because the EAC chairman at the time was concerned about the committee’s late involvement in EU decision-making. The response from the government showed that 25% of all parliamentary mandates were given less than a week before negotiations in the Council at ministerial levelin the period between 2010 and 2014. In some cases, the mandate was sought after negotiations had already started with the EP (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).
Other EU developments, most notably the European Semester, sits uneasily with the Danish mandate-basedmodel. The nature of the European Semester makes parliamentary oversight more difficult because of the mix of decision-making modes and the disembodiment of political authority. Because the European Semester follows an iterative step-by-step process, it is difficult to assess when significant decisions are taken and by whom (Dawson, 2015).
The increase of early agreements in the EU challenges the Danish EU scrutiny model.
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Initially, the Danish EAC, in collaboration with the Finance Committee, wanted the mandating system to apply to the European Semester, but the government disagreed. Indeed, it is difficult to see when a mandate should be given in the process. The annual growth survey,published by the Commission, does not entail any binding government negotiations. The national reform programmes (NRPs) and stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) are already based on national budgetary negotiations agreed by Parliament. The country-specific negotiations, adopted by the Council later in the process, are not binding on Denmark. It therefore makes little sense to go against them by refusing to give a mandate (Rasmussen, 2018).
The Danish Parliament had to introduce new levels of EU scrutiny in order not to lose out in the European Semester. The Parliament and the government agreed to make a new scrutiny procedure called the national semester, in which the EAC and the Finance Committee hold three joint annual consultations with the government to discuss the annual growth survey, the NRPs and SCPs, and the country-specific recommendations. Unlike the mandate-based model, the national semester looks more like a document-based system, where Parliament is informed but cannot bind the government (Rasmussen, 2018).
The introduction of the national semester as a new scrutiny model shows the flexibility of Denmark’s EU scrutiny model. Because it is based on political agreements between the government and the EAC, it can easily be adapted to new EU developments.
8.2
Links to Members of the European Parliament
The link between the Danish Parliament and the European Parliament (EP) is not particularly strong.The only institutionalised contact between the Danish Parliamentand the EP is a monthly meeting between the EAC and the Danish Members of the EP (MEPs). Contacts between MEPs and national parliamentarians from sectoral
committees are uncommon and usually the result of personal relationships. This again underlines the centralisation of EU-matters in the EAC.
The link between the Danish Parliament and the European Parliament is not particularly strong.
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Coordination between Danish MEPs and national politicians is further complicated by the fact thatthe Danish Parliamentdeals with the same cases much later than the EP. MEPs are involved from the very beginning of a proposal’s life, whereas the Danish Parliament is often involved when compromises between the institutions have already been found (Christensen, Roederer- Rynning, and Scheelke, 2013).
At the level of political parties, the contact varies between national politicians and MEPs depending on the party in question and whether the party is in government or in opposition. Research on Danish national parties’ link to their MEPs shows that the majority of MEPs from opposition parties are more or less left to themselves (see Christensen, 2015). The party at home does not generally seek to proactively influence their MEPs’ voting behaviour when they are in opposition domestically. A different picture emerges from governing parties. Here the contact is much more frequent and the government makessure that their MEPs toe the party line. MEPs from governing parties will often be in daily contact with Danish civil servants, particularly from Denmark’s permanent representation to the EU, to be informed about the government’s views on pending legislation. Often, MEPs from governing parties will receive voting instructions from the government on cases of special national interest(Christensen 2015; 2016).
The representation of Danish national parties largely mirrors the Danish Parliament, with the Social Democratic Party and the Danish People’s Party also being the largest Danish parties in the EP. However, the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre) as the main governing party fared badly in the 2014-EP elections.