To be fair, for the scholars that do not believe in a common denominator of all
religions, it is quite reasonable for looking at religious matters from the perspective of
the religions they belong to. There is nothing wrong with suggesting a philosophical
description that explains the world religious situation from a Buddhist-centred
perspective, as long as that the assumption involved is possible and meaningful.
more thoroughly than all the other religions57. We shouldn’t criticise his model merely
because it puts Christianity in a more superior position – it could be the reality that
Christianity has given the most thorough description of the Ultimate Reality. The
actual problem is that we do not know which of these assumptions is true, because all
of them are currently unverifiable. That is why the critics we discussed tend to
evaluate a model based on whether it is helpful, desirable or practicable rather than
whether its assumption is likely.
In fact, pluralists also tend to oppose the exclusivist position not because it is
believed to be false or unlikely, but because it is less helpful to the solving of
interreligious conflicts. That is, we are still unable to tell which religious claims are
true, and hence we can only pick the one that is most likely to help. However, if a
religious belief is true, then even if it will bring the worst kind of disaster to our world,
it is still true. It is therefore arbitrary to accuse Hick for proposing the possibility of a
common denominator, unless one can prove this hypothesis false.
Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, these assumptions are very often unverifiable,
thus we can only examine if they have ‘misunderstood’ the teachings of a particular
religion or if they have failed to offer much to the solving of interreligious conflicts.
This seems to be the only criterion one can apply while evaluating a model of
57 Besides Makransky’s criticism mentioned previously, please see Heim (2001, pp.174-197) for the
particular part of his theory that affirms the superior position of Christianity in reflecting the Trinitarian Ultimate Reality.
religious pluralism, but what if there is a model that does not assume the unverifiable?
Is it possible to have a model that does not involve any unverifiable assumption, yet is
able to fulfil the desirable function of a pluralist theory? Why must a pluralist model
assume any religious belief to be true anyway? If the main purpose of promoting the
pluralist position is to make genuine interreligious dialogue possible or to encourage
interreligious tolerance, would a model be more widely applicable if it is offered as a
mere practical suggestion that is even more neutral and non-religious than the one
Hick proposes? As we attempt to develop a model that can respect Chinese Folk
Religion equally, we will come back to these questions and discuss if it is possible and
preferable to have an even more neutral and, so to speak, ‘agnostic’ pluralist
assumption.
Assuming the unverifiable is an inevitable standpoint for the Buddhist scholars
mentioned, for they have to at least assume some Buddhist teachings to be true.
Moreover, for the ones who engage in interreligious dialogue, it is commonly
assumed that it would only be fair if they also consider the teachings of other religions
true. For instance, as he compares Augustine’s theology with Buddhist teachings,
Makransky (2005b) has attempted to show how Buddhist key ideas can also be found
in Christian doctrines, written in Christian languages58. Similarly, although Senauke
58
For example, while discussing the source of the salvific power, Makransky (2005b) argues, “Although, as we have seen, Buddhist anthropology differs considerably from Augustine’s, a Buddhist
still affirms that there are theological differences between Buddhism and Christianity,
he nonetheless expresses that the spiritual roots of the two religions are one59.
Together with the examples given previously, it is obvious that the Buddhist
scholars do assume at least some Christian teachings to be true – for the ones who
believe in Buddhism, claiming that some Christian ideas are consistent with Buddhist
doctrines is no different from claiming that those Christian ideas are true. On the same
page, Christian scholars who engage in interreligious dialogue also tend to assume
some Buddhist teachings to be true, thus the idea that we may have a more thorough
understanding of the Ultimate Reality by learning from the others. Fernando (2005),
for instance, strongly believes that Buddhism can also lead one to salvation
(pp.223-224). O’Leary (2002) also explicitly claims that the existence of double
religious belongings has already “demonstrated that there is no fundamental
contradiction between the gospel and the Buddha’s path” (p.29). And although they
may not totally agree with the statements, Harris and Cornille are at least certain that
we can understand the Absolute Truth more thoroughly by studying the teachings of
response to this problem is profoundly similar in one respect. For Buddhists, as for Augustine, there can be no freedom from bondage unless something transcendent intervenes. Only someone beyond such conditioning can point the way beyond it. Only someone who fully embodies that transcendent, unconditioned dimension of being could reveal it to others, and demonstrate the way for others to be released unto it” (p.9).
59
In response to Fernando’s (2005) criticism, Senauke (2005b) makes the following conclusion, “And yet… in my heart, I feel that the distinction I am drawing between my view and Kenneth Fernando’s view is merely a theological difference. We hold our faith quite differently, and could compare and contrast from now until the cows come home. But I feel that our common spiritual root is selfless love. The teachings of Christ and Buddha go beyond words and ideas to the heart of things… Either way is the path of peace, if only we give of ourselves completely” (pp.256-257).
other religions60, not to mention Christian pluralists such as Hick or Heim who would
most certainly affirm the validity of other non-Christian beliefs.
It seems to be the only right thing to do – to assume that other religions also
teach something true – although there are significant contrasts between them. But
what if some of them are actually false? If a pluralist model is to really treat all
equally and consider all assumptions possible, wouldn’t assuming a belief to be true
reject the possibility that it is false? To be more precise, is it essentially necessary for
a pluralist to assume the naturalist or atheist belief to be false? Are we saying that it is
unnecessary to establish genuine dialogue with the naturalists and solve the conflicts
between us, or that the naturalist assumption is simply too unlikely and immoral to
deserve a position in a pluralist model? If it is the latter, then Dawkins (2006,
pp.317-348) or Hitchens (2007, pp.173-194) would strongly beg to differ.
In Chapter 3, we learned that although some of Hick’s assumptions are religious
in a sense, his major idea is generally regarded as a ‘second-order’ philosophical
explanation, and is criticised by Cheetham (2003) for being unexcited, not useful, and
failing to give anyone passion to adopt his pluralist position (p.167). Supposedly, then,
60 After discussing Rodrigo and Pieris’s experiences/comments on multiple religious belonging, Harris
(2002) concludes, “Peiris in fact holds together the need for rootedness in one religious tradition and the need for plurality of insights into Truth. It is not a case of multiple belonging or dual belonging but a search for the Word that goes beyond structures, mediated through the language of one’s own faith in encounter with that of others” (pp.90-91). Also consistent with this idea, Cornille (2008) writes, “These differences may offer a promising opportunity for genuine dialogue and growth… It is thus not surprising that many Christians engaged in the dialogue with Buddhism experience little conflict between the Buddhist and the Christian spiritual paths and find in Buddhist practices an occasion to enrich their own spiritual growth” (p.53).
if a model is even more non-religious than Hick’s and attempts to give equal weight to
the naturalist position, it would be criticised more strongly for these reasons. It is not
my intention to go as far as proposing a completely non-religious model, but if one
wishes to at least suggest to consider a ‘pre-axial’ tradition to be equally preferable
and authentic, he not only has to respond to the question as to why the said model is
necessary or beneficial, but also why the existing models did not treat these traditions
equally. That being said, if one can successfully offer equal status to such traditions,
others may then adopt the approach and attempt to take on the more difficult task, that
is, to treat naturalism or atheism equally.
Apart from assuming that the Buddhist doctrines must be true, the scholars
engaging in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue also tend to stress more on the
consistencies between the two religions than the differences. For example, although
Schmidt-Leukel (2005b) is aware that Buddhists and Christians perceive the roles of
religious mediators differently, he nonetheless believes that there is something
consistent on the higher level61 – the Buddhist idea of non-attachment and the
Christian idea of loving involvement are not necessarily conflicting, for they can be
complementary and mutually qualifying. By recognising both Buddha and Christ to
be “authentic mediators of salvific transcendent reality,” a theory may “transform and
61 As he argues, “In any case, the fact that the criteriological emphasis of Buddhism and Christianity in
their assessment of other potential mediators of transcendence is different, does not necessarily entail a claim to superiority” (Schmidt-Leukel, 2005b, p.175).
enrich the followers of both” (ibid, p.175).
However, as Heim (2001) argues, although it could be true that the two religions
are consistent in some ways, it should definitely not be forgotten that very often it is
the unresolvable contradictions that cause the conflicts between religions (p.27). For
the pluralists who are already tolerant, they would most certainly have little problem
in accepting the Hindu claim that Jesus is merely one of the many avatara
(Schmidt-Leukel, 2005b, p.171), but for other Christians who hold an exclusivist
position, the claim would be quite difficult to bear, for it has seemingly insulted the
uniqueness and transcendency of Christ. On the other hand, the Christian claim that
Jesus is on the same level of divinity with God is in turn one of the many reasons why
some Muslims consider Christianity false, or, at the very least, not entirely true. It
seems to lead us back to the more basic question: why do we promote religious
pluralism in the first place? And whom do we intend to persuade?
If the mission of promoting religious pluralism is to entertain not only the elites,
but also the general public, then celebrating the consistencies between the world
religions is not necessarily the best approach, for it is not the main concern for general
religious believers – general Christians, for example, are not rejecting the fact that
Buddhism can also bring peace to the world (e.g., Fernando, 2005, pp.222-225), or
are rejecting Buddhism as a religion because some of its truth-claims are considered
inconsistent with certain Christian doctrines. Even Heim’s confessional ideas may be
considered unacceptable by some, for it seems to have explicitly contradicted the
Christian belief that there are only two outcomes when the judgement day comes –
you either go to the Christian Heaven or you do not. And if you do not go to the
Christian Heaven, then wherever you may go, it is supposed to be the limitlessly
worst religious-end. This traditional idea, however, is quite clearly inconsistent with
Heim’s claim that all promoted religious-ends are equally desirable. From a pluralist
perspective, Heim’s assumption is likely and fairly desirable, but is the promotion of
religious pluralism intended to persuade those who are already liberal and tolerant, or
the others who are relatively traditional, especially the most extreme exclusivists?