Fortalezas y oportunidades de actores y actoras para participar en la ENEML

GR No. 156034 October 1, 2003 FACTS:

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.[9] He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent;

2. If yes, whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable under for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?

RULING:

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did

nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested.

The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was no weather disturbance yet.

Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. Whenever an employee‘s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer of Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.

Page 85 of 745 PCIB VS. CA

GR No. 121413 January 29, 2001 FACTS:

The plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41, in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payment of plaintiff‘s percentage or manufacturer‘s sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977. The aforesaid check was deposited with the defendant IBAA (now PCIBank) and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to IBAA as collecting or depository bank. The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff was never paid to or received by the payee thereof, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As a consequence, upon demand of the Bureau and/or Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment to the Bureau of Internal Revenue of its

percentage/manufacturers‘ sales taxes for the third quarter of 1977 and that said second payment of plaintiff in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was duly received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

The Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue addressed to the plaintiff that its check in the amount of P4,746,114.41 was not paid to the government or its authorized agent and instead encashed by unauthorized persons, hence, plaintiff has to pay the said amount within fifteen days from receipt of the letter. Upon advice of the plaintiff‘s lawyers, plaintiff paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the amount of P4,746,114.41, representing payment of plaintiff‘s percentage tax for the third quarter of 1977. Plaintiff demanded defendant to reimburse him of the said amount paid for the second time to BIR but the latter refused.

ISSUE:

Whether PCIB is liable to Ford Philippines the amount of several checks which were allegedly embezzled by a syndicate group.

RULING:

The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter‘s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior‘s action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.

It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford‘s negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.

Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Check before paying the amount of the proceeds thereof to the collecting bank of the BIR. One thing is clear from the record: the

clearing stamps at the back of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508 do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. Had this been duly

examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Check Nos. 10597 and 16508 would have been discovered in time. For this reason, Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee. The fact that the drawee bank did not discover the irregularity seasonably, in our view, constitutes negligence in carrying out the bank‘s duty to its depositors. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.

Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks because of the contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter.

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