(PNP); and the Popular Front Party (PFP).
The CPP and PNP belonged to
the Nkrumah(ist)
camp,
while the UGCC, UP, PP and PFP represented the
Busia(ist)
camp.
Al terna tively, they can be seen as cliques (Afrifa and
Kotoka, Afrifa and Busia, the Acheampong group).
Occasionally, people
have changed
camps.
For example, between 1951 and 1956, some people
moved from the Nkrumah
camp
to the Busia
camp
as a r e s u l t of internal
disagreements in the CPP.
These included Kwesi Lamptey, Saki Scheck,
Joe Appiah and Victor Owusu (Austin 1964: 16f, 26f).
During the s i n g l e
party phase of Nkrumah's ru l e , some members from the Busia
camp
were
The e s s e n tia l d iv i d i n g l i n e between the two camps was formed b e t ween 1947 and 1951, the e a r ly period o f n a t i o n a l i s t s tru g g le s f o r inde pendence in Ghana, and is well documented by Austin (1964) and Nkrunah (1957).
Lewis sums up the o r i g i n of the growth of the two camps:
there was an a c tiv e p o l i t i c a l movement going back f i f t y years, run by the middle class w ith the support o f some powerful c h ie f s . I t s leader in 1947 was Dr. Danquah... The movement decided t h a t the time had come to organize a mass p o l i t i c a l p a rty . Ako A d j e i . . . h a d met Kwame Nkrumah in London and had been impressed by h is o r a t o r i c a l and a d m in is tr a tiv e g i f t s . He th e r e fo r e suggested to Danquah th a t Nkrumah, who had been away f o r ten years, should be brought back and made o rg a n iz in g s e c re ta ry o f the p a rty [UGCC] . Danquah agreed to do t h i s , in complete ignorance o f Nkrumah's o p in io n s . Nkrumah came back, and using the money and p re s tig e o f the movement and the p r o te c tio n o f the c h ie f s , b u i l t up a mass movement through the southern h a l f o f Ghana... When the movement r e a lis e d what was happening, they deprived Nkrumah o f h is o f f i c e . But i t was then too l a t e . He took the mass movement w ith him, and i t could not be recaptured (Lewis
1965: 27).
Nkrumah and h is p a r ty , the CPP, com pletely outmaneuvered the UGCC, subsequently winning the 1951, 1954 and 1956 pre-independence e le c tio n s
(A ustin 1964: 103-152) and the post-independence e le c t io n (A ustin 1964: 316-362). The members o f the UGCC, re p re s e n tin g the bulk of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , regarded themselves as the h e irs apparent to the c o lo n ia l state and saw Nkrunah as a usurper (Austin 1976: 23). In fact, 'they never forgave Nkrumah' (Davidson 1973: 87). George (Paa) Grant, one o f the founders o f the UGCC confirmed t h i s .
By June 1949, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, e x p a tria te d by the Convention in 1947 to take up the s e c re ta ry s h ip , had f o r reasons t h a t are now obvious to a l l , so sabotaged the e f f o r t o f the p r in c i p a l leaders o f the Convention and so d is c r e d ite d me and a l l my p r in c i p a l colleagues and he was able to mislead the masses to follow h im . . . He f i l c h e d our name, our SG [ S e l f Government] p o li c y , our branches, and even our colours - to e s ta b lis h a s e p a r a tis t qroup - the Convention People's Party - which, as he f a l s e l y claimed at t h a t tim e , was formed w it h in the Convention in the name of Ghana and of God (quoted in Austin 1976: 29).
Nkrumah's break with the UGCC, coupled with his e le c to ra l v i c t o r ie s before independence, marked the clear d iv is io n between the two p o l i t i c a l camps. A fte r the 1951 e le c tio n s , the UGCC d isin te g ra te d . A fte r the 1956 e le c tio n , Busia put together i t s remnants as the nucleus of the United Party (UP). Under the leadership of Busia, the UP became the sole Opposition party from November 1957 u n t il Nkrumah fo rm a lly dec lared Ghana a one-party state in 1964 (Austin 1964: 384f). The old antagonism between Nkrumah and the UGCC thus became one between Nkrumah and Busia. Since then, the e l i t e s in Ghana have in h e rite d t h e ir p o l i t i c a l po sitions w ith in the camp system. The demise of Nkrumah and Busia 4 has not led to the collapse of the camps which carry t h e ir names.
The camp element in Ghanaian p o l i t i c s has some im plica tio n s fo r the leg itim acy of governments. The camps define p o l i t i c a l enemies and a l l i e s of a government. There is a tendency f o r members of e ith e r camp not to recognise the leg itim acy of a government formed by a party or c liq u e from the opposing camp or with support from th a t camp. For example, as e a rly as 1958, barely one year a ft e r independence, some lea ding members from the Busia camp were involved in a p lo t to overthrow the government of Nkrumah through a coup d 'e ta t (Austin 1964: 424-429), despite the fa c t th a t the 1957 c o n s titu tio n e x p l i c i t l y provided fo r a c o n s titu tio n a l means of changing the government. The CPP's f a i l u r e to enact the regional assemblies th a t had been promised in the independence negotiations with the B r it is h (Austin 1964: 370, 379), confirmed the h o s t i l i t y of the Busia camp - they were not to be allowed to have t h e ir own independent bases of power; so they (or elements of them) began to p lo t to overthrow the CPP. in more recent times, the tendency fo r one
4. A fte r the f a l l of Nkrumah and Busia, the camps w i l l be re ferred to as Nkrumahist and B u s ia is t.
camp to refuse to grant legitim acy to a government formed by the other can s t i l l be discerned. During the 1979 general e le c tio n s , f o r example, many people from the Busia camp openly declared tha t they would leave Ghana i f the Nkrumahist camp formed the government. These people were, in e f f e c t , s ta tin g c a te g o r ic a lly th a t they would not acknowledge the leg itim acy of a government formed by the Nkrumahist camp.
We have seen in chapter one th a t a government th a t becomes increa s in g ly i l l e g i t i m a t e may re s o rt to coercion, thereby fu r th e r weakening i t s leg itim acy. In Ghana the progression of governments to coercion from i n i t i a l to le r a t io n is hastened by the fa c t th a t the out camp is always opposed implacably to the in camp and engages in clandestine a c t i v i t i e s to overthrow the government; w h ils t the government becomes paranoid and in te rp r e ts any dissent to i t s p o lic ie s as o p p o s itio n is t stra te g ie s to overthrow i t . The government becomes more repressive, and in the process, groups whose support i t needs to draw upon to remain le g itim a te are alienated. The in tro d u c tio n of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1958 by the Nkrumah government and i t s repressive response to the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi s t r ik e i l l u s t r a t e th is p o in t. The PDA was p a r t i a l l y Nkrumah's reaction to the c o n s p ira to ria l a tt it u d e of the oppo s it io n (c f Austin 1964: 38; Bing 1968: 443); w h ils t the open i d e n t i f i cation of United Party (UP) leaders with the 1961 s t r ik e was an import ant fa c to r underlying CPP response (c f Drake and Lacy 1966). I t w i l l be argued in the next chapter th a t many of the actions of the Busia govern ment (such as the dismissal of public servants, Busia's stand in the Sal 1 ah case and the diso rga nization of the TUC) which eroded i t s support, occured w ith in the context of the camp s tru c tu re of Ghanaian p o l i t i c s .