Fuentes estadísticas

A good number of writings have emerged over the years either criticising almost all aspects of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere or enumerating and reiterating the various criticisms of the text by other Writers. The intent has always been to either offer a fresh dose of criticisms and debate on Habermas previous works, critique the existing criticisms or provide a backgrounding information so as to empirically assess the tenability of the idealistic conceptualization of the term versus its realism in contemporary polycentric democratic societies, with their inherent peculiarities. My intent coincides with the latter group of Writers. While Writers such as Garnham (1992), Calhoun (1992a), Kellner (2000), Johnson (2001), Susen (2011), and Ziolkowski-Trzak (2013), provide what looks close to full

criticism of all aspects of the Habermasian public sphere, others prefer to dwell on an aspect of it which we shall discuss. The main criticisms are on the neglect of the plebeian and promotion of gender inequality, the degeneration of the public sphere, the gradual replacement of reasoning and rationality with rhetoric and the promotion of bracketing.

Studies on the general criticisms of the public sphere include: (Darlgren, 1995; Goodnight, 1992; Habermas 1984, 1989a, 1990, 1992, 1994 & [1989b], 2006; Susen, 2009b & 2010;

Thompson, 1995).

Despite the public sphere’s potentials viz a viz the provision of platform for public participation and debate, its initial ideals have been criticised over the years by a lot of writers. Habermas responded to some of his critics by conceding to some of the flaws his initial work had generated. Refer to his (1992) work as well as his ‘A Reply to my Critics’

(Habermas in Finlayson and Freyenhagen, 2011).

The first accusation against Habermas is what his critics describe as his neglect of the plebeians and the promotion of gender inequality (Habermas, [1962] 1989, 1992; Fraser, [1990] 1992; Ryan, 1992; Golding and Murdock, 1973, 1991; Negt and Kludge, 1993;

Cameron, 1998; Rendall, 1999; Ku, 2000; Moore, 2003; Brettschneider, 2007). The criticism stems from the bourgeois public sphere’s lack of inclusivity, that is, the domination of the public sphere by professionals or bourgeoisies and the absence of working class as well as women (Frazer, 1992; Ryan, 1992; Kellner, 2000; Susen, 2011). This was noted to encourage inequality which democratic ideals frown at. While the idea of liberalism, public sphere and democracy champions the tenets of diversity, inclusivity, equality, debate, consensus, freedom and tolerance, ‘the bourgeois sphere was dominated by white, property-owning males (Kellner 2000, p.5)’ the working class, plebeian, and women’s sphere spheres developed alongside of the bourgeois public sphere to represent voices and interest excluded in the forum (ibid)’, which is the mainstream public sphere.

In her Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to Critique of Actually Existing Democracy (1992), Nancy Frazer criticizes Habermas’ early idea of the public sphere, confronting it with modern day approach to dealing with the concept. Frazer referred to the work of the likes of Mary P. Ryan (1992) and Geoff Eley (1992), Joan Landes (1988), in arguing that the professional or bourgeois public sphere was made up of a good number of exclusions and hegemonic dominance as against Habermas’s support and regard for equality and statusless convergence in his later works (Calhoun, 1992; Habermas, 1990, 1992). Frazer not only claims the exclusion of lower social strata or the working class but women in

particular who were then excluded from participating in not only political activities but in various meetings in which matters of general public concern are debated upon and decisions taken. The result is a hegemonic male dominated bourgeois public sphere. This, she stresses, was at the cost of alternative publics comprising marginalised groups who were averted from expressing their senses of selves and contributing to the articulation of views on matters of public concern. What Frazer fails to admit is that women were not entirely relegated to the sphere of the home as carers and heads of household chores, but were also visible in the old public sphere, such as the French salons.

Arguing along this line, Douglas Kellner (2003) observes that Habermas was criticized by Negt and Kludge (1993) for neglecting this important public sphere. In a related study, Edgar (2006), towing a similar line of enquiry, notes that the problem with the then political public sphere is the absence of working class. He criticises it for being homogeneous in terms of power and economic interests, while noting that the ‘conflict of economic interests that existed between the working classes and the bourgeoisie is neither debated nor politically recognised’ (p.126) in the public sphere and its discourse. Simply put, only the working class or professionals were recognised. That notwithstanding, the advent of modernity with its inherent liberal ideologies and the idea of welfare state, questions the legitimacy and efficacy of such a public sphere and resolves this controversy, paving the way for an all-inclusive public sphere, as Edgar later notes, ‘ideally, the public sphere should be open to all (2006, p.126)’. Similarly, Frazer further opines that in modern democracies, this idea of equal representation and participation hold sway, and the rights of the minority is protected, if not in reality, in principle.

Reacting to this criticism, Habermas acknowledges and admits that he ‘’underestimated the significance of oppositional and non-bourgeois public spheres (1992, p. 430) by overlooking that aspect from the onset of the history of the bourgeois public sphere, ‘a dominant bourgeois public collides with a plebeian one (ibid)’. This, I will argue, is not restricted to the bourgeois era but the ‘divide’ has its roots from the early public sphere of the Aristocrats versus the general public. To this end, Habermas did not only embrace the inclusion of all and sundry in the contemporary public sphere in his later works but encourages the advancement of an all-inclusive public sphere.

Another criticism of the public sphere is that it has degenerated which has been admitted by Habermas himself in his (1962; 1989) text. He noted the structural transformation of the public sphere propelled by the twentieth century establishment of the welfare state which

heralded capitalism and led to the expansion of franchise and inclusion of other groups. He criticised the welfare state for not expanding the scope of the arena, instead, it disintegrated what he called the old ‘effective’ bourgeois public sphere. The bone of contention here is that it undermines public debate and the bourgeoisie’s sense of self, which was grounded on self-articulation and the expression of one’s taste, preferences, and personal opinion. For it has been noted that ‘individuals shy away from the public defence of their tastes and opinions and rather relied on administrative economic structure to define their sense of self (Edgar, 2006, p.126). These have been supported by (Baker, 1992; Garnham, 1992; Habermas, 1992;

Hohendarl, 1992; Schudson, 1992; Thompson, 1995; Kellner, 2000; Goode, 2005; Susen, 2011).

What most of the critics of this point fail to recognise and admit is that the degeneration of the public sphere is a blessing in disguise in the sense that while it has opened up more doors for smaller groups to emerge, it has set a motion in place by creating a platform which had given voice to ‘other’ silent groups whose existence were hitherto declared to be non-existent and are seldom mentioned in any discussion on mainstream platforms. Legally, they were not recognised too. Such groups like the gay, lesbian, queer movements and societies, the animal rights, and the movement for the recognition of women in higher religious organizations.

Before the Enlightenment Era and the dawn of Industrial Revolution, heterosexuality and patriarchy were the hegemonic order recognised, backed and upheld by the law. Even though contemporary democracy has challenged this status quo, the struggle to achieve equality in these areas look like a gradual process and a long way ahead. The triumph though, is the fact that if not for anything, such groups have been recognised officially as dissenters by modern day Western democracies. As long as they exist and continue to champion their causes, their voices would be raised to higher levels just the way women have been liberated from their former position as second-class citizens in the bourgeois public sphere to First class citizens;

from Heads of house chores to breadwinners; and have been given their pride of place in different spheres across democratic societies.

Secondly, Habermas’ critique of the degeneration of the sphere fails to recognise the significant structural transformation of the public sphere, which the advent of the information super high way made possible. This structural transformation is the conception of the world as a global village and the prediction of the emergence of the World Wide Web by Marshall McLuhan (1962, 1964; Berners-Lee, 1989). Funny enough, while McLuhan was conceiving

his idea of the global village through information technology (internet), Habermas was conceiving his public sphere bestseller. Both ideas were published in the same year, 1962.

Paul Grosswiler’s (2001) ‘Jurgen Habermas: Media Ecologist?’ is one of the emerging studies on the relationship between the works of these two Philosophers. For more on emerging studies on these concepts (see Grosswiler, 2010; Hands, 2010; Durham and Kellner, 2001; Moreno, 2013; Zelinka, 2014). I would therefore propose that further criticisms on the degeneration of the public sphere as fuelled by capitalism leading to massive structural change should tilt more towards Habermas inability to envisage the ‘other side’ of the structural transformation of the public sphere discourse in terms of the expansion of its scope and not only its disintegration. The global village and its inherent World Wide Web, no doubt has produced a ‘public sphere of public spheres’, a grandmaster of all public spheres.

This is in terms of its scope, though. It should be noted that I do not wish to insinuate that the large scope of the internet as a public sphere is a guarantee of the quality of discourse therein.

Moreover, whether such massive sphere guarantees ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ is an area that is still enigmatic with ongoing debate and discourse.

Habermas has been widely criticised for idealizing the bourgeois public sphere and presenting a universal conceptualization of it (Calhoun, 1992; Ziolkowski-Trzak, n.d; Susen 2011). He presents what looks like a universal conceptualization of public sphere by focusing so much on it and by criticising the degeneration of the sphere and the proliferation of many groups and bogus structures through the liberal welfare state system. He idealizes and normalises the concept to be capable of fitting into different societies. What he fails to look at is that by the very nature of communication, the inequality in development, and the difference in democratic consolidations across societies, makes it impossible to idealise and generalise a public sphere. Public sphere has to be relative for there is no mediated state that can be free from relativism. To relativize is to place into context that which is to be discussed (Lyotard, 1993, p.126).

Thus, as Thompson (1995, p.711) argues, democratic societies need contextualised the public sphere to mean different things in reality and across different societies. Whatever becomes the in-house tenets of a certain sovereign realm of discuss thus, should represent the type of public sphere inherent in such a society. The principle of particularity should as such be applied to empirical analysis and assessment of the particular groups and spheres in each society for just as countries differ in terms of development, there can never be the same outcome of the efficacy of the public sphere across societies.

Some schools of thought also criticise the actually existing public sphere for replacing reasoning and rationality with rhetoric (Calhoun, 1992, Fraser, 1992; Garnham, 1992;

Kellner, 2000; McKee, 2005; Susen, 2011). In contemporary politics for instance, politicians use adverts and public relations to repackage their senses of self in order to win the hearts of delegates during primaries. Once selected or elected as flag bearers, Edgar (2006) argues, the reason for the choice of such a party flag bearer and his personality is suppressed by the party and subverted. Adverts and public relations are some of the tools used to suppress real intents, and media is the vehicle used to communicate politicians’ packaged intents at the altar of true representation. Public debate is also substituted by mass voting anchored by political parties, who give out only that which they think would win them the votes. In a similar vein, public debate is said to be substituted by mass voting championed by political parties who give out only that which they think would win them the votes. Reacting to this, McNair stresses the need for individuals to act collectively in making decisions about who will govern them as demanded by the political process (2011, p.17). This private political opinion of the people as a whole can then be reflected in voting and treated as collective opinion and in the form of advice given to political leaders. Also, since democracy demands that electorates make their political choices on the basis of rational decisions. The electorates must therefore be armed with information that circulate freely, if they are to be knowledgeable enough to critically debate on issues and form public opinion. This should be provided by the public sphere freely as part of its Social Responsibility, in the case of a mediated sphere and be available to all members of the society.

Fraser (1992) also notes the existence and promotion of bracketing in the public sphere. The public sphere is made up of different groups and social movements, comprising people with both similar and divergent interest. While some groups are made up of powerful individuals of like minds and social status, others are made up of lower or subordinate group of people who cannot wine and dine with the high class. This feature of the public sphere further enhances bracketing and inequality. The same applies to the use of the media as a public sphere. Although in theory, the media system encourages equal distribution of media time and space, in practice, inequality created by capitalism and enhanced by commercialism means those with economic power are endowed with the weapon to not only occupy more of the public sphere and frame what is to be considered as general public opinion but their views are more likely to be heard and treated as hegemonic (Habermas, 1992; Kellner, 2000;

Goode, 2005; Eriksen and Weigard, 2003; McNair, 2011).

Thus, reflecting over these criticisms, I would conclude by emphasising that ‘the public sphere should be open to all, and agreement should be secured through the force of better argument, rather than through any exercise or threats of physical force (Edgar, 2006, p.12). I will also admonish the expansion of franchise, equality, and an open public sphere in the light of the ever-expanding contemporary liberal democratic societies and the recognition of the peculiarity of individual public realm distinct to sovereign states than accepting the normativity of Habermas’s public sphere as universal. Habermas’s idealised public sphere can nonetheless serve as a yardstick for the assessment of distinctly public spheres across democratic societies. I will also add that the recognition of the place and importance of the public sphere in contemporary democracy and the expansion of its scope in today’s globalised world can best be enhanced and achieved through the mass media, with its great potentials and unimaginable reach. Thus, the study will concentrate on the media as a public sphere.