DOMINIOS BASAL 2 meses 4 meses
FUENTES DE INFORMACIÓN
As the discussion below on multiple commodification suggests,
valuing individuality
will
require some redistribution of money, of
opportunity, and of power—at least at first. Anumber of contemporary
citizensareintrinsicallysuperior to others.” Id. at 43. 192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
193. FATHY, supra note 73, at xiii (“Ironically, mostpublic housinginthe world today is done without the cooperation of either the architect or the people. It is a bureaucratic decision built bycontractors, and, whether horizontalor vertical, italmost immediately becomesa slum.”).
194. The work of Mockbee Coker has been described as demonstrating “the opportunities, dignity, andjoyto be foundinplaces like a bendin the BlackWarrior River, andthe paradoxicaland impoverished conditionofour publicenvironment as the setting for incredible private wealth.” Buege, supra note 84, at 32. In addition, Mockbee stated that such work“can create anopportunityevenfor the comparatively advantaged painter and architect to step into the open and expressthe simple andactual ratherthanthe grand andostentatious.” Bates, supra note 165, at 101(describing the murals in the homeof low-incomeclientLizzieBaldwin). He goes on to state, “I don’t thinkarchitecture thatispreoccupiedwithaffluencecaninitiate anythingthat ishumanly sustaining.” Id.
195. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1098–1114 (introducing the concept of valuing individuality).
theorists agree with this point: Ackerman, for example, makesacase for
what he calls “initial equality,” a state that might even countenance the
right to housing.
196Rawls, similarly,describes justice asrequiring what
he calls an “original position” of equality that provides an equal initial
assignment to all members of basic rights and duties.
197Walzer, too,
asserts
that some form of redistribution is required because
the market
does not, on its own, provide acomplete system
of distribution.
198He
goes so far as to assert that community
provision is always
redistributive.
199He is
critical, however, of what he calls
“simple
equality” as failingtobe sustainable.
200Young’s model wouldrequire the
196. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 53–59 (“The Case for Initial Equality”).
Ackerman describesthe“liberal assertion of equality”as thefollowing conversational move:
1. I am a person with a conception of the good.
2. Simply byvirtue ofbeing such a person, I’m at least as good asyou are. 3. This is reason enough for me to get as much manna [Ackerman’sname for
the universal human good]asyou do—solongas youhavenothing more tosay that will Neutrallyjustify a claim toadditional manna.
Id. at 66–67.
197. RAWLS, supra note 61, at14 (describingtheoriginalpositionof“equalityin the assignment of basic rights and duties”). Rawls continuesby asserting that “[i]n justice as fairness the original position of equalitycorresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theoryofthesocialcontract.” Id. at 12. Furtherexplaining, Rawls states, “Offhand ithardly seemslikely thatpersonswhoview themselvesasequals, entitledto press theirclaimsupon one another, would agree to aprinciple which mayrequire lesser life prospects for some simplyfor the sake ofa greatersum ofadvantages enjoyedby others.” Id. at 14. He describesfour branchesofgovernment—allocation, stabilization, transfer, anddistribution—that are responsible for overseeing the systemheproposes. Id. at 275–79(describingthese four divisions andaddingthat “[t]hese divisionsdo not overlapwith the usual organization of government but are tobeunderstood as different functions”).
198. WALZER, supra note 13, at 4(“Throughout history, the market has beenone of themost importantmechanisms forthe distribution of social goods; but it has never been, it nowhere is today, a complete distributive system.”).
199. Id. at 82(“The truth is that everyseriouseffort at communal provision . . . is redistributive in character. Thebenefitsit providesare not,strictly speaking, mutual.”) (footnoteomitted); see also id. at 65–66 (defining general and particular community provision).
200. Id. at 13–17. “Simple equality” is described as a situation in which “everything is up for sale andeverycitizen has as much moneyasevery other.” Id. at 14. Walzer states as follows:
The regimeof simple equalitywon’t lastfor long, becausethefurtherprocess of conversion,free exchange in the market, is certainto bringinequalities in its train. Ifonewanted to sustainsimple equalityover time, onewould require a “monetary law” like the agrarian laws of ancient times or the Hebrew sabbatical, providing for a periodic returnto the original condition.
most significant changes to society: Sheasserts thatmereredistribution is
a meaningless exercise, because distribution is naturally in accordance
with power, and power is relational, rather
than a “thing” that
can be
distributed like a good.
201The redistributive model is consistent only with those theories of
justice that would countenance this level of government involvement
and would besquarelyat odds with those that support onlythe “minimal
state,” as Robert Nozick defined that term.
202There
are legitimacy
advantages to any government that emerges fromsocietal consent,
203and
this consideration is perhapsparticularlyimportant if the government thus
developed is what has come to be called a “welfare
state.”
204Dworkin
finds support for redistribution in community rather than in contract.
205incipient monopolies and to repress new forms of dominance.” Id. at 15.
201. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 30–33 (“Problems with Talk of Distributing Power”). Young states that “regardingsuch social valuesas rights, opportunities, and self-respect as distributableobscures the institutional andsocialbasesofthesevalues.” Id. at 30. “A distributive understanding of power, which treats power as some kind of stuff thatcanbetraded,exchanged,anddistributed,missesthe structural phenomena of domination.” Id. at 31. She goes on to state, “By domination I mean structural or systemic phenomena which exclude people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions oftheir actions.” Id.
202. See DavidMiller,The Justification of Political Authority, in ROBERT NOZICK
10, 10(David Schmidtz ed., 2002). In characterizing the theory of Robert Nozick, Millerstates,“[Nozick]argues thatstates thatdomorethan theminimal statedoes—for instance, redistribute resources between their citizens, supplypublic goods bymeans of compulsorytaxation, orforce citizens to contribute to schemesof socialsecurity—are not justified.” Id. Miller continues as follows:
Nozick’s central argument is that state activities beyond the minimummust necessarilyviolate thefundamental rights of theircitizens. A central point of contention has been whether the Lockean rights defended by Nozick have either the weight orthedeterminacyto trump the ethical valuesappealed to by defenders of the more-than-minimal state, such as social justice, protection against poverty, or the public interest.
Id.
203. Id. at 16–17, 19 (attempting to show that social contract theoryjustifications of political authority are more powerful than invisible hand theories). Theessayist also asserts that Nozick has chosen a relatively weak form of invisible hand theory: “His invisible hand explanation is an account of how a certain form of state might arise, not an account of how any existing state hasactuallyarisen.” Id. at 19.
204. WALZER, supra note 13, at 68 (stressing that “everypolitical communityis in principle a ‘welfare state’”).
205. Dworkin states as follows, in setting forth his own theory of political legitimacy:
Philosophers make several kinds of arguments for the legitimacy of modern democracies. One argumentusesthe idea ofasocial contract, but we must not confuse itwitharguments that use thatideato establish the character orcontent of justice. . . . [S]ome politicalphilosophers have been temptedto say that we have in fact agreed toasocial contractofthatkind tacitly,byjust not emigrating when we reach the age of consent. But no one can arguethat verylong witha straight face. Consent cannot bebinding on people, in the waythis argument requires, unless it is given more freely,andwith more genuinealternative choice,
Promise Enforcement, as a model for affordable housing policy, is
consistent with Dworkin’s
community-based concept of “equality of
resources.”
206Promise Enforcement also accepts Dworkin’s
claimthat
valuing individuality requires equality of resources.
207Rawls and
Ackerman are in agreement with Dworkin on this point. Rawls has
asserted that
inequality
can be justified only
insofar as
it betters the
position of the worst-off-class.
208Ackerman, similarly, acknowledges
the current state of societal inequality,
and responds that such
imperfection requires an equal sacrifice
of ideal rights by
all
persons,
rather than requiring
low-income persons to shoulder
the entire
burden
alone.
209The United States
clearly
has not reached this ideal at this
time; one estimate is that forty
percent of Americans currently
lack
decent housing.
210In addition, low-income housing often requires a
than just by declining to build a life from nothing under a foreign flag.
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 192–93. Consistent with this emphasis, some architectshave stressed the social nature of mankind in developing low-income housing. FATHY, supra
note 73, at ix (“The cost ofhousingmust be broken down into itscomponent parts. These are, Isuggest, three: economic, social, and aesthetic.”); id. at x (“[A]s social animals, black men, like white, brown, and yellow men, reached out to attempt totouch their neighbors and to reassert two basic urges of all mankind, territorialityand society.”).
206. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 297. “[E]quality of resources,” according to Dworkin, “requires [government]to make anequal shareofresources available for each [citizen]toconsume or invest ashe wishes.” Id. “The practical elaborationofequality of resources . . . requires compensating for unequal inheritance ofwealth and health and talent through redistribution. . . .” Id. at 301.
207. As Dworkin states,
Under equality of resources, people have rights that protect fundamental interests ... . Theyalso haverights securing each person’s independence from other people’s prejudices and dislikes which, ifthese were allowed to influence market transactions, would defeat rather than advance the goal of making distributionsensitiveto the true costs of people’s choices.
Id. at 307.
208. RAWLS, supra note 61, at 14–15 (“[S]ocial and economic inequalities, for exampleinequalitiesofwealthand authority,arejustonly ifthey result incompensating benefits for everyone, and in particular fortheleast advantaged members of society.”).
209. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 238–39. This iscalled second-best theory,as
Ackerman definesthat term. Id. at 232 (defining“second-best” as “a description of the way a citizenry committed to [the process of Neutral dialogue] will deal with the problem of technological imperfection”).
210. MACDONALD, supra note 48, at 165. Other countries have enjoyed more
success in equalizing the living conditions of citizens. Ancient Greek democracy attempted to establish—and convey the appearance of—equality through dwelling design. GALLION &EISNER, supra note 12, at 19, 23 (noting that these efforts achieved somemeasure of success,at least initially). Greek emphasisonthe temple rather than the palaceasthecenterof city lifehadthesamedemocraticpurpose. Id. at15. Rome’s Forum Romanum was intendedto instill the samepridein citizenship,andIrving Gill’s