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FUENTES ORALES

6.3.1 Thebasics

Jobseeker’s Allowance113 is paid to unemployed jobseekers who do not have

sufficient contributions based on previous employment to qualify for JB or whose period of entitlement to JB is exhausted. The payment is made up of a personal rate and increases for recognised adult and child dependants that are at the same level as for JB (except that JA now pays a lower personal rates to young claimants aged under twenty-five). The most crucial differences with JB, however, are that JA is, potentially, of indefinite duration and is means tested. What claimants are paid is affected by any other income they have and by the earnings of other household members. As it is means-tested, JA is not taxable. The intricacies affecting the amount of JA a claimant will be paid, therefore, are:

s The total payment due the claimant’s household (i.e., full personal rate, plus

full increases for adult and child dependants) is reduced by 60 per cent of any earnings above a €60 weekly maximum that arise from the claimant’s own

part-time work or work by their spouse/ partner;

s Lower personal rates apply if they are aged eighteen to twenty-one or twenty-

two to twenty-four;114

s The personal rate is lowered if they are under 24 and living in their parents’

home (the ‘benefit and privilege’ rule).

It is funded out of general taxation, not taxable, and administered uniformly for the state by the DSP. There is no regional or local government involvement in its administration, unlike the social assistance programmes on which the non-insured unemployed rely in many other EU member states. Two issues deserve particular attention here.

6.3.2 Changingthetreatmentofpart-timework

The ability to claim compensation for part-time unemployment is constrained by the criterion that, to do so, a person must be wholly unemployed on three days out of six. This results in hugely uneven treatment. For example, a person with one regular hour of work per day on each of four working days (a total of four paid hours a week) does not qualify, while a person with full-time work on three working days (a total of twenty-one paid hours) does. It can be argued that this interpretation of what constitutes availability for work is based on the patterns in working hours of the economy in the past, and does not reflect the more service-based, customer-focused and globally engaged economy of today. In the Netherlands, for example, workers are entitled to some unemployment insurance benefits if they lose their earnings for at least five or half of their working hours (van Ours & Tuit, 2010). The opportunity of occasional or temporary work can be particularly valuable to JA recipients. A thorough simplification and modernisation of the

113 It was called Unemployment Assistance until October 2006. 114 In 2011 rates, €100 and €144 respectively instead of €188.

maintain attachment to the workforce and reduce the size of the black economy, freeing administrative resources as a consequence.

6.3.3 Advancingtowardsasinglepaymentforallpeopleofworkingage

A major reform being signalled for Ireland’s welfare state is a phased but steady movement towards having one single social assistance payment for all people of working age. This was explored by NESC as a ‘participation income’ (The Developmental Welfare State, 2005) and what it would entail for the Irish public system has recently been mapped out by the DSP (Report on the desirability and feasibility of introducing a single social assistance payment for people of working age, November 2010).115 The basic rationale is clear: any person of working age

in need of social assistance (with or without a disability, with or without caring responsibilities, etc.) is assessed in a similar fashion for the contribution they can potentially make (usually some capacity for employment but not always taking the form of paid work) and the manner in which the necessary income support is provided them must not block but should encourage them in making that contribution. As the DSP makes clear, the successful introduction of such Single Payment will require developed capabilities and a high level of co-ordination across the entire public system (including all and any service providers in receipt of public funding). In the context of this report, it should be noted that such a reform will not be quick or produce savings in the short term. However, its perspectives on the purpose of social welfare, on the obligations of the state and their implications for service providers, and on the context and inevitability of activation should reinforce and guide the imperative for savings that the current crisis is forcing on the social welfare budget. These same considerations should also increase co-operation with, and participation in, the implementation of current reform strategies for specific social assistance schemes (the One Parent Family Payment, Disability Allowance, etc.).

As in other areas, hindsight suggests that earlier and swifter movement on this front would have ensured unemployed people received a more comprehensive and effective range of supports than is currently the case. For example, a single payment would have given them access to a payment more quickly and under more transparent and stable conditions; it would have reduced the hazards and negated the advantages of transferring to a different welfare payment; and it would have lessened poverty and unemployment traps. Above all, it would have ensured that accessing the payments that provide the more secure income support (One Parent Family Payment, Disability Allowance) was not facilitated by demonstrating an inability to prepare for or seek employment. The current crisis, thus, should reinforce the strategic direction that the DSP is taking and bring added support from the other key departments and agencies integral to its success. It should further accelerate and guide the business transformation and organisation restructuring ongoing within the DSP. It should strengthen consultation with the community and voluntary sector in order that as widely shared as possible

understanding of activation and its requirements is embraced (see next chapter). It will need exceptional political commitment if exceptions and special measures are not to accompany the introduction of a Single Payment to such an extent that its intended simplicity is lost.

6.4 Control Measures that do not Penalise