Fuerzas de frenado en el sistema de frenos principal

The second labour-supply approach I will consider was presented by Dworkin as a possible solution to the problem of unequal earning talent. This is the idea of including the future labour power of all islanders as resources in the equal auction.388 Islanders would have to bid against the others for their own labour in order to control it, otherwise their labour decisions would be out of their hands. This would be much more expensive for some than others, leaving the more highly talented with a lesser ability to

387 _{See also Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 90.} 388

140 purchase other resources. This would put the less talented on a more equal footing with the more talented.389

Dworkin rejects the proposal to include labour power in the auction because it would still result in a form of ‘slavery of the talented.’ Dworkin gives the example of Adrian, who would have to use all his resources to purchase his labour, which he would then have to perform full-time, thus restricting his options.390 This would enslave the talented because they would either be unable to afford their own labour, or they would have to expend a lot of resources to obtain it. In the former case, their labour time would literally be owned by others. In the latter case, the talented would have no choice but to earn their maximum amount of income in order to pay for their self- purchase. In both cases, they would have restricted choice—or even none at all—over the type and duration of their work. As a result, the talented would envy the freedom of occupation that the less talented would have, which violates the envy-freeness required to ensure that everyone is shown equal concern.

Miriam Cohen Christofidis challenges Dworkin’s argument against including labour in the initial auction.391 She argues that Dworkin is too favourable to the more talented, as Dworkin applies the envy test at the wrong place; it is supposed to apply to the

389 _{This would perhaps coincide with Rawls’ notion that we should regard ‘the distribution of natural}

talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution.’ Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition at 87.

390

Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 90.

391

Miriam Cohen Christofidis, 'Talent, Slavery and Envy', in Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics : With Replies by Dworkin (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004), 30-44. Also published as Miriam Cohen Christofidis, 'Talent, Slavery and Envy in Dworkin's Equality of Resources', Utilitas,

16/3 (2004 ), 267-85. Cohen Christofidis also argues that Dworkin misuses the label slavery. She argues that it would be more correct to say that the inclusion of labour power in the auction would leave the more talented with restricted choice, rather than in a state of slavery; Cohen Christofidis, 'Talent, Slavery and Envy', at 32. Perhaps in some cases restricted choice is a fair description of what would happen if labour were included in the auction. Someone might have to work slightly longer than others in order to pay their additional ownership premium, for example. However, slavery is still a possibility for those with highly valued skills and talents where they are unable to afford their own labour in the auction. A proposal that effectively resulted in third party ownership of labour power appears to warrant the term slavery even if this extreme outcome would not occur in most cases.

141 ‘resources that individuals have’, not to be applied at an ex ante stage.392 Dworkin’s argument is that Adrian is worse-off when his labour is included in the auction because he loses his option to choose to work less and have more leisure time, or alternatively that he no longer has any choice of occupation. In both of these cases, Adrian could envy those who do have such free choice, and this is certainly problematic. However, the proposals considered in this chapter respond to the envy felt by less talented persons for the additional leisure, income and career paths open to the more talented. Is this envy by the less talented not as problematic as Adrian’s envy when his labour is auctioned, showing that Dworkin is prejudiced towards the talented?

Cohen Christofidis seems to imply that including talent in the auction is acceptable to the extent that it would result in an actual-envy-reducing approach.393 Since unequal talents upsets ex post envy-freeness the best available option is to reduce the amount of envy felt throughout society, by apportioning income, leisure and preferred jobs in such a way that no one would envy the package of another. She finds this to be more attractive than the ex ante approach. Indeed, Cohen Christofidis suggests that rival resource-distributions would have to be judged based on the envy-reduction created under different proposals, when attacking Dworkin’s reliance on a single example to count against the labour-auction proposal.394

However, this envy-reduction approach is not an envy-freeness view of the same kind as that used by equality of resources. It requires us to judge between the levels of different people’s envy instead of the binary distinction between envy and envy- freeness which enables the equal valuation of resources in a way that all can contribute to. This alternative envy-reduction approach would require the valuation of envy, which does not seem feasible. However, even if it were feasible, the valuation of envy would require a valuation of different kinds of thing, and will therefore introduce

392 _{Cohen Christofidis, 'Talent, Slavery and Envy', at 33.} 393 _{I mentioned such a view above, on page 139.} 394

142 controversial comparisons. I imagine that such comparisons would have to be welfare- based, but—whatever form they take—they would require the imposition of a particular valuation that is unlikely to reflect the valuations of all those affected.395 It is possible to explain the rejection of this actual-envy-reduction strategy differently. The actual-envy-reduction approach is appealing because it would appear that there would be less ex post envy than on alternative approaches. However, equality of resources is not motivated by the thought that envy is a terrible thing, but rather that people are valuing resources from an equal position and in accordance with their own plans of life.396 There is a difference therefore, between attempting to equalize ex post

envy of resource-bundles, and equalizing ex ante envy of resource-bundles. To anticipate the arguments of the following chapter, the ex post approach does not determine ex post envy compensation levels in a way that is fair to all. This is because it may provide more compensation than all parties would have chosen from a hypothetically equal position. Furthermore, people in the ex ante position can choose whether or not to include talents in the scheme, rather than having this decision made for them, since such a decision would take place without knowledge of talent, it will show equal respect for all.

The above argument is further bolstered by highlighting the difference between Adrian’s complaint at the elimination of Claude’s ex post envy and Claude’s initial complaint of ex ante envy. Adrian’s complaint that his life would be limited in order to benefit Claude—whether or not he would in the end envy Claude—is stronger than Claude’s initial complaint that he had bad luck. Firstly, Claude’s envy is based on a natural difference, while Adrian’s claim is based on a socially induced difference. Second, there is no way to separate people from their talents, and so if talents are

395 _{Cohen Christofidis responds to this challenge by insisting that Dworkin includes the fulfillingness}

of occupations—along with preferences over wines—in the resource bundle, Ibid. at 36. However, these factors are not directly compared, but rather when individuals are comparing their envy for the resource-bundles of others.

396

143 included in the auction, then Adrian’s choices are determined in a way that Claude’s are not. We have more sympathy with Adrian’s complaint because it appears that he is being used a means to Claude’s ends where he is asked to do more for Claude than either he or Claude would have chosen to do in a hypothetically equal position.397 The worry here is that Adrian is having his body usurped,398 and used in ways that he could choose to do himself—or not. The troubling claim that people are being used as a means applies to the endowment-inclusive ex post responses to talent inequality but does not apply to the ex ante response.399 This provides a further reason to think there is a difference between altering Adrian’s choices in order to remove Claude’s envy and finding another method which would still allow the calculation of equal opportunity costs.

In conclusion, including labour power in the auction is unacceptable for similar reasons to those against the Stalinist approach. The move from centralised-state forcing to de- centralised forcing via market ownership does not solve the problem of enslaving the talented. I will explain in further detail why Dworkin’s ex ante approach is superior to

ex post envy-reduction proposals such as that proposed by Cohen Christofidis in section 4.7.

397

The means principle is explained and defended in Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm : The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at Ch 6. I thank Victor for discussion about the means principle and taxation.

398

Dworkin discusses the notion of usurpation with regard to his second principle of dignity—that people should have sovereignty over their bodies—in Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs at 295-6.

399

Of course, I do not mean that the morality of taxation should be built up from the means principle. After all, I have not mentioned the means principle up until this point. Doubts about the fundamental place of the means principle in morality are expressed in Scanlon, Moral Dimensions at (in particular) 109-21. Furthermore, I should emphasise that my use of the means principle would not rule out taxation entirely. It merely rules out forms of taxation that may result in the usurpation of someone’s body. Ex post talent-inclusive proposals are troubling since the talented may be enslaved and envy the position of the less-talented, but this may be more acceptable to the talented if they would have chosen such a policy from an ex ante equal position. I briefly consider and reject endowment taxation in section 7.1, though it seems Dworkin would outright reject such taxation for the same reason that he would rule out voluntary enslavement; it would violate bodily dignity, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs at 298.

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