Fumigación en los buques en tránsito

As well as being active within their own communities, some of the leaders are active within the SOC movement. As a result, some community residents may feel that their leader spends too little time dealing with their own community’s problems, as they instead visit other communities, both in Thailand and abroad. Because some community leaders devote themselves to improving the lot of the urban poor, their interests also lie outside their communities, and many see their work with the SOC as a full-time role, especially once they deem their own community to have finished the bulk of the upgrading process. This is explored further in Chapter 7.

6.8 Conclusion

A number of important points emerge from these case studies. The community leader functions as an agent for the community, and a capable agent must be able to make the most of the community’s social capital for continued productive use, for example by looking for further collective action projects. If these projects are successful, the leaders and their committee will be more likely to stay in power. Thus leaders are a vital component of the circle of participation, mobilising the stocks of social capital. Leaders should know about a community’s needs and what works best. It is in the community residents’ interest to maintain unity in order to ensure successful completion of the project, and the community leader has a large role to play in ensuring this unity is achieved.

The strength of a leadership preceding the upgrading process can be regarded as a stock of social capital. If the leaders show solidarity to the residents, then this will feed through to facilitate the upgrading programme. In Bang Bua, Ruam Samakee and Bonkai, the current leaders were already community heads when the upgrading programme began, and therefore had time to earn the community’s trust. The act of upgrading can further cement the leader’s position as community chief if he or she successfully implements Baan Mankong, though it can also cause a breakdown in trust and respect.

The success of a leader depends largely on how trusted he is, and this trust depends on transparency and accountability, which, along with participation, form the basis of good governance. According to Akin (1975), the community leader acts as the anchorage, the centre of the community’s personal networks. The leader has a role in enforcing rules to avoid the unravelling of cooperation, and for this they need the respect and trust of residents.

However, it seems the whole committee plays this role, not simply the leader. Residents see receiving equal and fair treatment from the committee as important – favouritism is likely to cause discontent, and if people feel like they are being treated unfairly, their willingness to participate will fall. Consequently, Ruam Samakee and Klong Toey 7-12 face difficulties because community management is not regarded as clear or fair. According to Narayan et al., (2000), good governance, for the poor, means achieving recognition, and no corruption.

Corruption is badly regarded at the community level, because it directly affects the residents, especially if their savings go missing, and represents a breach of trust and a lack of respect for fellow residents.

Perhaps the externally-imposed structure of elected community committees should not be required in all communities, as some might benefit from a more equal structure which does not give one person, or team of persons, more power than others. In the past, the voluntary nature of leadership meant power was often held by the privileged few who benefited from strong linkages. However, despite the democratic system, power can still be co-opted by a team, putting those candidates running independently at a disadvantage, as happened in Ruam Samakee. Rather than promoting democratic governance, when elections go wrong it can lead to disillusionment with the democratic system. However, democratic leadership elections mean that unsuccessful leaders who do not promote the community’s interests should not be re-elected, unless there is a dearth of alternatives.

When talking to the leaders themselves, a variety of leadership styles emerge, and one can see how these styles can influence the relationship between the leaders and the community residents. The evidence suggests that “nakleng” gangster characteristics are no longer prevalent, especially as community elections have been introduced, and so the position of leader no longer necessarily goes to the person with most power and prestige. It is important for the leaders to be approachable to the residents, so that concerns can be discussed and mutually agreeable solutions found. Full transparency in community decisions helps to

happens in Klong Toey 7-12, is not conducive in promoting social cohesion, as the residents concerned feel resentment, and embarrassment in the face of their neighbours.

Community leaders are not only the anchor in the community, they also act as the bridge between the community and outside stakeholders, channelling information between the two sides, and representing the community to outsiders. Leaders have been given the authority to act not only by community members, but also by the district office and CODI. They can set their own terms for collaboration, rather than having them imposed from above by outside parties. It seems that leaders are generally on good terms with these external groups. This is essential for ensuring that the communities can get the most out of these vertical linkages – again, if there is a transparent leadership, residents should not need to worry about the possibility of the resultant benefits from these linkages not being shared equally. The strengthening of linkages between community leaders and external organisations such as CODI and district offices are furthering the breakdown of traditional patron-client ties, as it is now easier for communities to collaborate with government agencies. Additionally, slum networks like the SOC are also playing a vital role in breaking the historical vertical patronage ties, as the urban poor increasingly rely on each other through horizontal associations, rather than persons in positions of power, to meet their needs. The role of slum networks will be explored in the following chapter, as are the vertical ties which exist between communities and external agents such as the state.

Chapter 7 – Slum Networks and Institutional Relations 7.1 Inter-community linkages

7.1.1 The SOC

7.1.2 The Four Regions Slum Network 7.1.3 International level networks 7.1.4 Conclusion