FUNCIÓN SEMÁNTICA

FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of

Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.

On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property.

On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta Quilala.

HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.

Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.

In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

Hemedes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.

FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children.

On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner.

Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements are being built.

ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes valid.

HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan. It was found that the deed of

property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support.

Siguan v. Lim

G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725 Davide, Jr., C.J.

FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the Contract, but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged creditor.

HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts which are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them."

The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was constituted. In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM

in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. It is, therefore, "essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 _{Petitioner neither alleged nor}

proved that she did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."

Noceda vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504