Funcionamiento del Acondicionador

Here is where we are. I began section 3 by saying that we have reason to think the Coun-terfactual Account fails because it appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for one to be harmed that one be worse off than they otherwise would have been. This was the problem posed by preempted harm and the Problem of Omission respectively. We then examined whether there are any accounts that can take the place of the Counterfactual Account. We saw that of the two accounts considered, neither comes without its own troubles. I pressed at each stage that both accounts are limited because they fail to recognise that one can be harmed or benefited by another’s action in virtue of the difference the event makes to how one would otherwise have fared. Because of this, even if there was nothing else that could be said on behalf of the Counterfactual Account in reply to the problem posed by preemption and the Problem of Omission, I think we would be best placed to stick with the Counterfactual Account.¹³³

In the following chapter, I argue that the Problem of Preemption can be solved for the Interest Theory. This means even if individuals are not harmed when what otherwise would be harmful is preempted by another would-be harmful event, there is no problem in our having rights against these actions. (I also argue this is a more plausible way to go than tinkering further with the Counterfactual Account.) That still leaves us with the Prob-lem of Omission and the ProbProb-lem of the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry. Though I said we are best placed to stick with the Counterfactual Account despite these problems,

133 For example, Placebo showed that the Temporal Account cannot recognise preventative harms: Naughty harms Badly-Off through preventing Badly-Off from receiving a benefit (Hanser 2008, 429). Boonin sug-gests we ought to be more worried if our account of harm cannot recognise preventative harms as harms (as the Temporal Account cannot) than if our account cannot recognise preempted harms as harms (as the Counterfactual Account cannot) (Boonin 2014, 60).

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we could bolster this claim if there was something else we could say in reply to the Problem of Omission and the Problem of the Harm/Failure to Benefit Asymmetry.

Space does not permit me to say too much. I focus on the Problem of Omission. If we find some differences between what are, intuitively, harms and what are, intuitively, ben-efits, we could use this to try to explain the putative asymmetry between harm and failure to benefit.

First, recall our more basic definition of the Counterfactual Account, on which, an event, e, harms someone, X, iff X is worse off than she would have been had e not occurred.¹³⁴ For the vast majority of failures to benefit, it is not the case that there is some event that, had that event not occurred, X would have been better off in the closest counterfactual world. For example, while writing this thesis, I could have benefited my friend Sean in Canada. But it is not the case that, had most of the events that have occurred over that time not occurred, then Sean would have been better off in the closest counterfactual world.¹³⁵

Now, this does not help us with Golf Clubs.¹³⁶ In that case there are events that, had those events not occurred, Robin would have been better off in the closest counterfactual world.

For example, had Batman not put the clubs back into the Batmobile, we can suppose Robin would have been better off as Batman would have gone on to give him the clubs.

Yet, the preceding point does lessen the Problem of Omission when it comes to other cases.

Next, though Batman may harm Robin by failing to give him the golf clubs, he does not do harm to Robin in the sense that is familiar from discussion of the doctrine of doing and allowing harm. Rather, he allows harm. For example, on Warren Quinn’s account, Y does harm to X iff Y’s most direct contribution to the harm to X is an action (Quinn 1989b).

But it is unlikely our theory of action will have it that Batman’s most direct contribution

134 Chapter 3, section 3.2.

135 For relevant discussion, see (Hanser 2008, 427; Klocksiem 2012, 294; Hanna 2016, 252–53; Feit 2017, 3–5).

136 Hanna and Feit note this (see previous note).

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to Robin’s not getting the golf clubs will be an action. Similarly, Jonathan Bennett’s ac-count says Y does harm to X iff most of the ways Y could have moved her body would have led to the harm (Bennett 1995). But most of the ways Batman could have moved his body when failing to give the golf clubs to Robin would not have led to the harm. What this means is that, even if a defender of the Counterfactual Account is committed to saying some of Y’s failures to benefit X are harmful for X, they are not committed to saying that Y does harm to X in this case. (We could even say, Y harms X only if she does harm to X;

so, Batman does not harm Robin.)

Finally, even if there are events that, had those events not occurred, Robin would have been better off, there are only these events because of other things that Batman has done;

for example, his buying the golf clubs with the intention of giving them to Robin. And it is not obvious that had those events not occurred, there would have been some other event which, had that event not occurred, then Robin would have been better off in the closest counterfactual world. For example, let us take events associated with Batman’s deciding to head into the golf shop where he formed the intention to gift Robin the clubs. True, if Batman goes into the shop and forms the intention to buy Robin the clubs, Robin might be worse off if Batman decides not to give him the clubs. But had Batman not gone into the shop, it is not the case that there is some event the non-occurrence of which leaves Robin worse off than he would otherwise have been in the closest counterfactual world.

We can learn two things from this. First, roughly, had Batman not bought the golf clubs with the intention of giving them to Robin, then he would not have harmed Robin by not giving him the clubs (Klocksiem 2012, 294). Second, the harm to Robin that occurs when Batman does not give him the clubs results from the removal of a benefit that Batman himself is responsible for. But we have independent reason from the growing literature on the removal of benefits to think this already confuses things (McMahan 1993; Hanser 1999).

The remarks in this final section have by no means meant to be conclusive. However, I hope to have shown there is more to be said on behalf of the Counterfactual Account to resist the Problem of Omission.

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