Similarly, Cornille (2008) also believes that, although proposing a common
denominator would seem to be able to provide a better ground for interreligious
dialogue, it would in fact discern religious truth and growth39. An idealistic
interreligious dialogue, according to Cornille, should involve a “creative and
constructive engagement of one’s own highest criteria of truth with those of the other”
(ibid, p.124). The common denominator Hick proposes would therefore impoverish
dialogue rather than aiding it, or even “contradict religious self-understanding,” for
his idea has degraded all existing religious truths to something inferior to such
denominator while those truths are traditionally regarded as the most ultimate. Having
an interreligious dialogue would be somewhat pointless or unnecessary if none of the
religious truth-claims held by the world religious traditions is literally true, and we
have already known the only teaching that matters (i.e., the ‘Golden Rule’) anyway.
39 Her argument is quite similar to the question we raised about the assumption that treats one religious
teaching as the sole criterion to judge all religious beliefs, she writes, “Yet whatever plausibility and truth it may have for any believer or group of believers can be derived only from within the normative teachings of their particular religion. If, for instance, Muslims regard the transformation from
self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness a valid criterion in dialogue, this would only be insofar as they can root it in Koranic revelation or in the tradition of the Prophet… To this it should be added that believers are not on the whole inclined to subordinate their own religious criteria to any common religious denominator” (Cornille, 2008, p.124).
Apart from impoverishing interreligious dialogue, Cornille also supports Heim’s
criticism that all existing religious beliefs would “lose their referential value in
reflecting or pursuing particular religious ends” if they are considered to be reflecting
the same, singular ‘Real’ (ibid, pp.122-3). It is because religious teachings and
practices, according to Heim (1995), can only maintain their referential values by
affirming their distinctive beliefs toward salvation, liberation, or certain truth-claims
(pp.23-34). As Heim sees it, it is the reality that most religious believers do not
consider their beliefs merely mythically true, but true in all senses. Hick’s model in
particular would therefore not only diminish the referential values of religious beliefs,
but also be unrealistic and unable to deal with the actual situation. That is, Hick’s
ideas of a common religious-end and that religious truth-claims are not (necessarily)
literally true would probably be considered false and unacceptable by the ones who
strongly believe otherwise.
Similar criticism is raised by Cobb (1999), who argues that the concept of an
all-transcendent, neutral Ultimate Reality would produce “a new form of imperialism”
and thus impair dialogue as well as the significances of all religious traditions and
their beliefs (p.105; 147). Thus, claiming that there is something more ultimate than
any belief proposed by the world religions would make having faith in those beliefs
accurately.
In addition, as D’Costa (2000) believes, by rejecting the ultimacy of the
teachings of world religions, Hick has voluntarily diminished religious beliefs into not
only myths, but also mere ethical concerns or guiding principles (ibid, pp.22-39).
According to his interpretation, this position is not only “ethically agnostic,” but even
“Enlightenment exclusivistic” (ibid, p.26; 30). Most religious traditions, as Hick
believes, have shared some very similar ethical concerns or guiding principles, which
is probably true, but these principles are very often not the core or essence that makes
those religions a religion. The concept of being selfless, for instance, is not that
religious in itself. The guideline for living the rightful life is based on certain religious
beliefs, not the other way around. Believers of the Jeudo-Christian traditions who
oppose homosexuality do not hold that viewpoint because homosexuality is morally
wrong, but because their scriptures say so. To put it differently, as D’Costa implies,
more often than not the moral codes proposed by world religions are accepted not
because they are considered to be consistent to the secular universal values, but
because they are taught by the religious authorities.
Furthermore, there are also critics who believe that diminishing truth-claims into
mere myths is not only undesirable, but also unlikely to be true. Eddy (2002), for
Thus, contrary to Hick’s claim, I would suggest that while his neo-Kantian
noumenon-phenomenon motif is one possible way of trying to explain the
apophatic-cataphatic phenomenon in the Christian tradition, it is neither the
only way nor the best way. A theory that does not inherently privilege one
over the other is to be preferred (p.176).
As he further argues, Hick’s assumption is actually incompatible with the
Christian perception of apophatic-cataphatic relationship, and thus creates a ‘false
dichotomy’ that does not correctly response to the ‘available evidence’ (ibid,
pp.175-6). Similarly, Ward (1994) also criticises Hick’s attempts to detach Ultimate
Reality from any humanly concept and to imply that the existing descriptions of the
Ultimate Reality are not literally true (p.313). These arguments are however based on
the assumptions that traditional Christian thoughts are true, and that traditional
Christians are conceiving God as the Ultimate Reality rather than something
subordinate to the Ultimate Reality (Eddy, 2002, p.175-82). In other words, they reject
Hick’s hypothesis not because of the contribution value it lacks, but because it is
incompatible with their understandings of the reality.
However, it would be unfair to focus only on the negative effect of assuming
beliefs are merely mythologically true is basically an attempt to explain how
conflicting truth-claims can be true simultaneously. Although the confessional
assumptions are said to be able to save more religious referential values, it appears
that they would find it more difficult to offer any equally convincing explanation. As
argued, Heim’s idea of multiple religious-ends is able to explain how the claims that
“only Christians/Muslims will be saved” can be both true, but would fail to deal with
the more exclusivist claim such as “all non-Christians/Muslims will end up in Hell.”
Hick’s theory, on the other hand, would have no problem in explaining the existences
of such exclusivist claims – they are simply not true in the literal sense. In fact,
according to his criteriology, they are not even mythologically true, because these
claims would not effect the soteriological transformation he speaks of, and are
therefore “not authentic responses to the Real” (Hick, 1997, p.162). Accepting the
possibility that some religious beliefs are not literally true is thus inevitable if we wish
to offer a reasonable explanation for the existing of conflicting truth-claims. If it is
inevitable, then it would be unfair to criticise Hick for not being able to affirm the
literal ultimacy of all religious beliefs. It is only the reliability of his absolutistic
assumption about the ‘Golden Rule’ that is questionable, not his basic implication that