When Jimmy Carter became the 39th President of the United States of America on January 20, 1977, he had a very precise notion of what kind of foreign policy he wanted to conduct. He sought to improve the global situation in general and strengthen the American position in the world in particular. He did not realize how difficult it would be to navigate through the shallows of the seas of politics of Washington D.C. Despite being narrowly elected after grueling primary battles in both parties, Carter considered his victory a mandate. Yet, he underestimated the importance of gathering allies and resources before beginning work on contentious policy goals. The early stages of his presidency already indicated that the fate of his plan to normalize U.S. relations with the People’s Republic would become a pain- ful political lesson.
In this chapter I examine the internal and external pressures the Carter ad- ministration faced during their first months in office, and how this epxerience shaped the administration’s development of a strategy for its China policy. I will show that, while Sino-American relations had stalled since the establishment of liaison offices in 1973, the former administrations under Nixon and Ford had agreed with the Chinese leaders to a stiff framework. Carter had difficulties to overcome this framework since he had to honor the idea of continuation in Ameri- can foreign policy. Due to the far-reaching promises Nixon and Ford had made concerning future American ties with Taiwan, Carter’s options to assure Taiwan’s security were severely limited. The Chinese inflexibility to allow the United States close relations with Taiwan added further limitations, and made it much harder for the Carter administration to cope with Taiwanese and Congressional demands re- garding the assurance of security to the island.
This Chinese inflexibility and wide-spread pressure, not a lack of purpose by Carter, delayed the formation of a coherent normalization strategy that would have allowed the Carter administration to approach normalization earlier than it eventually did. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues the Carter administration’s China policy was off to a “false start” because the administration was indecisive and una-
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ble to deal with the domestic pressure they faced.339 This observation completely underestimates Carter’s determination to approach China and the Taiwan issue ear- ly in his presidency.
The archival record shows that it took some time for officials of the Carter administration to gain access to the China material from the Nixon and Ford ad- ministrations. As soon as they had worked through the documents, they immediate- ly began working on the process of normalization. In fact, some of Carter’s advi- sors had already begun to assess the administration’s options toward China.
Archival and other material further suggests that Carter and his aides were careful in their approach. Nonetheless, Carter’s China experts had developed a strategy paper for the administration’s China policy no later than May 1977. This paper which became publicly known as Presidential Review Memorandum-24 would outline the principles of the Carter administration’s approach towards Sino- American normalization and the Taiwan issue. PRM-24 considered normalization with the PRC to be an important point in U.S. containment of the Soviet Union. A key difference in PRM-24 from previous strategy papers was the inclusion of min- imum requirements the Chinese had to meet -something neither Nixon nor Ford had included out of fear of alienating Beijing.
By mid-1977, the Carter administration was not only willing but also well- prepared to begin serious talks with the People’s Republic about the normalization. Therefore, Robert Ross’s and Patrick Tyler’s argument that the Carter administra- tion was apparently delaying the process because it was confident with the status- quo is an exaggeration.340 It is true that President Carter did not put all his admin- istration’s efforts into the China initiative due to other objectives in his foreign pol- icy agenda. His administration, however, dealt with the matter continuously, not forcing anything. Since it was so early in Carter’s presidency, it was not feasible for the administration to prioritize normalization more than they currently were.
I argue that Carter’s careful approach was intentional deliberateness rather than delay or acceptance of the status-quo. The White House needed more infor- mation and a better understanding of the Chinese perspective. Consequently it needed preliminary high-level talks to test the administration’s strategy. The visit
339 Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expandable”, 131; idem, „Strait“, 101. 340 Ross, “Negotiating”, 114-115, 119; Tyler, “Wall”, 241.
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of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Beijing in August 1977 would serve as an initial trial-run for Carter’s approach.
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The Great Wall of the Past
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that Jimmy Carter’s China policy was off to a slow start because it took several months before the White House published its first strategy paper on China. It took even longer until the first top official of the Carter administration visited Beijing in order to talk about the possibility of normaliza- tion.341 My research suggests this delay was not the result of a lack of priority. It was rather the consequence of a conundrum of different problems the new admin- istration faced, and which were not easy to overcome. The expectations for further progress in Sino-American relations for the Carter administration were, on the con- trary, very high. A paper of the Democratic Party for the presidential campaign of 1976 stated: “Our [U.S.] relations with China should continue to develop on peace- ful lines, including early movement toward normalizing diplomatic relations […].”342 Carter himself made clear during the first Presidential Campaign Debate with Gerald Ford in October 1976 that he “would certainly pursue the normaliza- tion of relationships with the People's Republic of China.”343 In his memoirs, he repeats that the establishment of official diplomatic relations with Beijing was an important goal for his administration.344
However, normalization was only one of Carter’s foreign policy goals. He pur- sued a multitude of ambitious objectives which were not only supposed to improve the strategic situation of the United States but also to alter the way U.S. foreign policy was conducted. The new president sought to highlight human rights in American foreign policy, promote peace in the Middle East, find a new arrange- ment for the Panama Canal, and revive the détente process with the Soviet Un-
341 Bernkopf-Tucker, “Strait”, 90.
342 Platform, Democratic Party, The American President Project, ‘Democratic Party Platform of
1976’, 07/12/1976, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29606 (accessed: 10/08/2014).
343Debate, The American President Project, ‘Presidential Campaign Debate’, 10/06/1976,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6414&st=China&st1= (accessed: 10/08/2014).
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ion.345 Since Carter could be sure that all of these objectives would lead to domes- tic debates, he required vast political resources both at home and overseas. He could not use this reservoir exclusively for normalization. This underlines the im- portance of the third factor delineated from Neoclassical Realism: the need to legit- imize a certain policy and find acceptance for it at home. The administration had to accumulate enough resources to assert its political goals even against domestic op- position. This was to have a profound and continuing impact on Carter’s China and Taiwan policy.
Carter and his aides were aware that Sino-American normalization was a high- ly delicate matter. The designated Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, indicated as much in a memorandum from before the elections: “The issue of ‘normalization’ is very complex and must be approached with caution […] I do not think we have to rush.” One of the reasons for Vance’s caution was his concern about the leadership struggles in China after Mao’s death.346 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski described the new leadership around Hua Guofeng later as more “tradi- tional” and “somewhat unimaginative”. In his opinion, this made Chinese conces- sions concerning matters of dispute such as the subject of Taiwan very unlikely.347 The uncertainties of the PRC’s leadership situation left Washington also question- ing how reliable China would be in the mid- and long-term. In this situation, the Carter administration recognized that they needed to be patient to see which group among the PRC’s leadership would prevail. In the meantime, the Carter administra- tion could pursue other goals.
Since Carter’s foreign policy agenda was so ambitious, the president had to consider his tactics carefully in order to achieve all of his goals. The administration needed to be patient, and approach each issue step-by-step. Each attempt to achieve one of the president’s objectives, subtracted from the political resources which the administration needed to legitimize its policy. Within Washington’s political sys- tem with its balance between executive and legislative branches, this limitation of
345 For an introductory reading about Carter’s foreign policy in general, see: Betty Glad, An Outsid-
er in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of
the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).
346 Memo, Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions, Cyrus Vance, 10/24/1976, “TL Sensi-
tive Vance/President 12/78-1/79” folder, Box 17, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, RG 59, NARA.
347 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 04/22/1977, “Weekly Reports [to the President].
1-15: [2/77-6/77]” folder, Box 41, Donated Historical Material: Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Jimmy Carter Library.
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resources had a direct impact on the timing of Carter’s China policy and the even- tual delay of normalization. The new administration did not only face the problem of timing its China policy correctly, it also had to account for the legacies of the previous administrations. Mutual historical experience, the second factor from Ne- oclassical Realism, had a strong influence on the White House’s options vis-à-vis the Chinese.
Carter’s predecessors had already made considerable concessions to Beijing that substantially limited the president’s leeway. This problem became clear even before Carter and his aides assumed their new positions. At a reception in Wash- ington, departing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger personally introduced his des- ignated successor Cyrus Vance to China’s Chief of the liaison office Huang Zhen. The meeting happened in Kissinger’s office in the State Department in early Janu- ary, before Vance was officially Secretary. In that meeting, much to Vance’s sur- prise, when Huang stressed the three preconditions his government had set for normalization, Kissinger agreed with Huang.348 The Chinese ambassador also openly criticized some of Carter’s statements concerning Taiwan and the One-
China-principle, claiming his remarks run “counter to the principles of the Shang-
hai Communiqué.” Not yet in office, all Vance could do was to state that Carter stood “firmly behind the implementation of the Shanghai Communiqué as the guid- ing principle which should govern our bilateral relations.”349 What else could he have said since Kissinger’s ‘introduction’ to Huang had severely limited Vance’s options?
The meeting demonstrated that the Carter administration could not expect the Chinese to show much flexibility on the matter of normalization, particularly con- cerning the Taiwan issue. Due to statements and assurances of the previous admin- istrations, the Chinese had precise expectations on what the new American gov- ernment had to do if it wanted to move towards normalization. These expectations based on the historical experience of PRC officials with former administrations and added to the limitations of Carter’s China policy in its early stage.
Vance’s meeting with Kissinger and Huang also demonstrated that the admin- istration had to know what exactly the state of Chinese-American relations was.
348 The United States had to fulfill three conditions. Washington should sever all diplomatic ties
with the regime on Taiwan, withdraw all U.S. troops from the island, and terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty from 1954.
349 Memorandum of Conversation, Henry A. Kissinger, 01/08/1977, “China MR-NLC-98-215 (1)”
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Thus, the first task for the administration’s China experts after assuming office was to search through all available material about the former administration’s handling of Sino-American relations. Since the previous negotiations between Washington and Beijing had not taken place in a public environment, Carter and his aides had to learn the details of the framework, which constituted Washington’s current rela- tionship to the People’s Republic. Michel Oksenberg, a scholar from the University of Michigan appointed as senior staff member of the National Security Council, was assigned to this task. As Patrick Tyler describes in his book, Oksenberg and other officials of the Carter administration had to search different archives and agencies all over the country to get all relevant documents together.350 This alone cost the White House valuable time in its development of a coherent China strate- gy.
After having problems to get complete access to all the necessary material, Oksenberg found the former administration very accommodating on the matter of Taiwan. When Nixon had accepted Beijing’s aforementioned five principles in his meetings with Mao and Zhou, this wide ranging concessions changed former American positions on Taiwan, and was “[a]bsolutely crucial and behind the lan- guage of the Shanghai Communiqué.”351 Unless Carter did not want to harm Amer- ica’s credibility as a negotiating partner, he had to honor the former administra- tion’s concession at least to some extent, although this would further limit his op- tions.
The situation got even worse when the Carter administration realized that Hen- ry Kissinger had already stated U.S. willingness “to complete normalization along the lines of the Japanese solution […].”352 This solution referred to the Japanese
formula that was implemented when Japan and the PRC had established diplomatic
relations in 1972. It had allowed Tokyo to retain economic and cultural relations with Taiwan on the basis of non-governmental people-to-people relations. Kissin- ger’s commitment to the Japanese formula made it far more difficult for the Carter administration to preserve America’s role as the patron of Taiwan’s security. Under these conditions, Beijing could easily decline any American involvement in Tai- wan’s future security. Furthermore, the Japanese formula represented a huge set-
350 Tyler, “Wall”, 236-237.
351 Memo, Michel Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 02/04/1977, “China MR-NLC-98-215 (1)”
folder, Box 40, Vertical Files (VF), Jimmy Carter Library.
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back for any plans the Carter administration had to save certain aspects of its offi- cial relations with the ROC regime like the establishment of a liaison office in Tai- pei.
The record demonstrated that both former administrations, Nixon’s and Ford’s, had established a rigid framework that allowed Carter only limited room to maneu- ver, particularly on the matter of Taiwan. This rigidness caught the members of the Carter administration by surprise, delaying the conception of a strategy concerning the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. However, such a strategy was necessary if the Carter administration was to enter serious talks about normali- zation. The problem for Carter was that not only past decisions added to the Carter administration’s difficulties, but historical experiences as well.
As their predecessors before them, the officials of the Carter administration could not escape the pressure to maintain close relations with Taiwan and to make sure keeping the island out of the grasp of communist China. Otherwise, it would be impossible to legitimize normal relations with the PRC. Some circles within the United States watched vigilantly for any signs of American concessions to Beijing, which could weaken U.S. ties to Taiwan. Just a few weeks in office, Carter’s aides received first warnings of how sensitive this issue was.
A letter written by Yale professor and former Under Secretary of State for Po- litical Affairs in the Johnson administration Eugene V. Rostow was only one ex- ample of attempts to raise the administration’s awareness for the Taiwan issue. Rostow claimed that the end of formal U.S.-Taiwan security relationship would be “a disaster – a global catastrophe, weakening the deterrent credibility of all Ameri- can security commitments.”353 Letters like Rostow’s demonstrated that broad cir- cles in the American elite still sympathized with Taiwan. The ROC regime was not only an ideologically more suitable friend than the communist mainland but also a strategic asset for the American position in Asia. The Carter administration had to be careful what it was going to say in public about its plans for Taiwan. The do- mestic pressure did not leave Carter much flexibility and further limited his op- tions. It would need a major effort to get the American public and Congress to ac- cept Sino-American normalization if this meant any change in Washington’s rela- tionship to Taipei.
353 Letter, Eugene V. Rostow to Cyrus Vance, 02/01/1977, “CO 34-1 Executive 1/20/77-1/20/81”
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Only a few weeks in office, the Carter administration faced a wall of problems whose foundation was built on the decisions and experiences of the past. The need to find acceptance for the president’s normalization plans added to the difficulties. This “Great Wall” consisted of three major problems that would accompany the whole process of normalization. First, the Chinese side did not appear flexible on the matter of Taiwan because Beijing saw the Taiwan issue as an internal affair. Beijing even believed that the U.S. owed the Chinese because Washington had been intervening in Chinese affairs for so long. This position made Chinese con- cessions concerning Taiwan unlikely. Second, the domestic pressure the White House faced was heavy. Taiwan still had many supporters throughout all circles of the American elites. This made it more difficult for Carter himself to make conces- sions to Beijing concerning Taiwan. Finally, Carter discovered that the former ad- ministrations had made far reaching promises to Beijing, particularly on the matter of Taiwan. Those promises had to be taken into account in order to maintain conti- nuity in U.S. foreign policy and to avoid any harm to America’s international cred- ibility. Of course, this further limited the Carter administration’s flexibility.
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The Importance of the Soviet Threat
After the Carter administration had identified the major obstacles to quick progress on the matter of normalization with Beijing, Carter and his aides had to evaluate how they wanted to proceed with their China policy. It was imperative to develop a concept that would allow the administration to pursue the matter at a pace that would be in stride with its general agenda. Yet, as Neoclassical Realism suggests, the first thing the administration had to assess was what impact the normalization of relations with Beijing would have on the international distribution of power and on the global position of the United States. Unfortunately, not all members of the administration agreed in their assessment of China’s importance.
The differences among Carter’s aides became already visible in the higher levels of the administration. Carter’s two most important foreign policy advisors Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski did not agree on the strategic significance of Sino-American normaliza-