I am making a purposeful distinction between the terms ‘influence’ and ‘impact’. The former relates to having their opinions being listened to by policy-makers and/or
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at least informing part of the policy decision-making. Impact, however, would require a qualitative change in society and/or a distinct and sole influence on a specific policy-outcome. I have argued elsewhere, that both concepts are impossible to measure quantitatively in any meaningful manner.604 Thus, this epistemological
stance is also a critique of the focus on ‘outcome’ and the premise of any model, such as Holsti’s model, depicting influence on the basis of linearity and causation.605
I argue it is more plausible to talk about ‘positioning’ (to various degrees; strong to weak continuum) in terms of abilities to influence without having to determine a quantifiable value on the outcome of the influence-seeking process. This does not “solve” the issue of measuring influence, but as my stance is that this cannot be accomplished in any meaningful way, I subsequently do not evaluate the concept of ‘positioning’ within the ontological premise of the former. In this context, think tanks and policy-researchers are indeed possessing such positions to influence, which depends on accumulated capital and structural position within the ‘field’. Thus, the inclusion of thinking in terms of a Bourdieusian ‘field’ shows the dialectical relevance of his “thinking tools” and they further assist in highlighting the applicability of the proposed ‘positioning’ concept.
Furthermore, to think relationally – the foci of applying Bourdieu’s field to the China policy-research community – is also a reminder of that “positioning” in the field’s internal structural system which is based on possessed ‘capital’, is not a fixed, quantifiable amount. Inversely, it is dynamic and transformative due to it depends on
604 See Guttormsen, DSA 2010a, op.cit.; Medina and Guttormsen 2010, “Who Thinks for Me?”, op.cit.
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the positions (and positional changes) of the array of other think tanks and other social agents within the ‘field’. Furthermore, thinking relationally also shows the determining role of capital in “positioning” and the links to the ‘fields of power’. As the activity of ‘influencing’ strongly relates to influencing foreign policy, the power field of politics is particularly relevant. It also assists in explaining why think tanks with the most amount and variation of capital also enjoy the position of the most prominent ones, i.e. Brookings, CSIS, Carnegie and AEI.
Moreover, the position of the Cato Institute is partly determined, and elevated, by the very nature of the faculties of relationality: by having fewer similar (libertarian) think tanks as competitors in the general think tank field, Cato enjoys an almost “free-standing”, outsider role – which is further enhanced due the ‘field’ features more vacant ideological space. This position is accentuated through a perceived conceptual distance to the “beltway”, articulated by Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Cato – but subsequently laughed when I asked him who then is within the beltway.606 For this reason, Cato is often mentioned alongside the
“big four” think tanks (above) albeit not having the same amount or range of capital. It also hints about the prevalent role of ideology in the general think tank field – as the above social categorisation is very much based on a spectrum of ideologies.607
4.4.1.2 Advancing the ‘field’: an hierarchical approach regarding ‘influence’ In addition to thinking contextually, relationally as well as through “positioning”, I am also highlighting the need for a hierarchical perspective on ‘influence’. This corresponds with the notion of sub-fields (aka hierarchy) as a core element of the
606Interview, Justin Logan (Cato Institute), Washington, DC, USA, 27 July, 2011 (044-EEV). 607The facet of ideology is addressed in the two remaining analysis chapters.
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proposed hybrid field. This is empirically warranted by field-data and secondary research, and also takes into account Medvetz’ various ‘social universes’,608
in addition to the fact that the authority exhibited (based on consolidation of capital) depends on the audience in terms of what ‘capital’ is recognised by them. I will not dwell too long on this topic but this facet should be recognised contemplating on that the relationality with other ‘fields – homology – are not fixed either. Again, context is paramount – for example, the shift of balance in the U.S Congress or who holds the Presidency might very well change the distance between various sub-fields (different hierarchical levels). Opposed to popular belief, there is a shared agreement among DC China policy-researchers that this has not been the case with U.S. foreign policies towards China post-Bush Jr.609
However, especially through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who has more adamantly and publically championed China’s poor human rights record,610
has led to increased accumulation of political capital amongst human rights policy-analysts, organisations, and watchers. In terms of homology and relational distance, this sub- field arguably has closed some of the “hierarchical gap” with the economic power- field when economic interests have been placed at the forefront. This means that the constellations of sub-fields at the different levels within the hierarchy also do not have a fixed relationship (aka “distance”), and this can only be grasped through a
608 Medvetz 2008, op.cit.
609 Hathaway, Robert. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), June 14, 2011 (016-P).
610 See article Jeffrey Goldberg, “Hillary Clinton: Chinese System Is Doomed, Leaders on a 'Fool's Errand”, The Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/hillary-clinton-chinese-system-is-doomed- leaders-on-a-fools-errand/238591/, 2011).
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contextualised inquiry where neither materiality nor construction can be allotted primacy.611
In effect, my multidimensional model (based on Medvetz’, unintentionally, one- dimensional heuristic device), can be further improved – by thinking of the hierarchy of fields where each level comprises several sub-fields. This takes form as a tapestry of cross-over sub-fields and these can move both horizontally and vertically in the space between the hierarchical levels. Different sub-levels of ‘fields’ may, thus, interface depending on historic conditions and contextuality. This is not a far-fetched thought, as hierarchy of fields is a very prominent idea in Bourdieu’s social theory. Thus, my contribution is more closely aligned to the advancement of thinking about fields specifically in regard to China policy-research and think tanks in general, in addition to further enhancing Medvetz’ model as a heuristic device.
The multidimensionality of the hybridity of the field, think tanks, and individuals – as practices and movements across fields are neither not necessarily synchronised across individuals and the affiliated think tank, or unison across one think tank. This makes it impossible to count “China-narratives” and number of ‘fields’, in the same vein that determining the populace of think tanks have generated startlingly fluctuating sums.612 As anthropologist Edwin T. Ardener eminently showed in his
ethnographic field-research in Africa relating to population and demographics; a
611 This relates to Bourdieu’s dialecticality, of this thesis and subsequently contrasts with mainstream constructivist views within IR where construction/ideas are assumed to be preceding before structures/materiality.
612 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. – numbers varies between approximately 100 in 1991 (Smith 1991, The Idea
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, op.cit. p. 214), 1,200 in 1996 (Lynn Hellebust, ed.,
Think Tank Directory: A Guide to Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations. Topeka, KS: Government Research Service, 1996), 300 in 2004 (Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise
(Cambridge: University Press, 2004), to “somewhere between 115 and 1400 think tanks in the United States” (McGann, “Academics to Ideologues,” op.cit. p. 738).
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researcher can count human beings, but in terms of meaning, we cannot know what we really are counting if we are not aware of how the individuals socially categorise themselves.613 Thus, a line with ten China policy-researchers mathematically
constitutes 10 people, however, in terms of what sub-fields they ascribe to the sum might be a completely different number.