G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin J.
Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch which includes the aforementioned agencies. Thus the appointment of is unconstitutional.
Facts:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864) CSC Commissioner Francisco Duque III was appointed as member of the Board of Trustees or Directors in an ex officio capacity of the GSIS, PhilHealth, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Dennis Funa (Funa) assails the constitutionality of EO 864 on the ground that it violates the independence of constitutionally created office of the CSC since the aforementioned agencies are within the control and supervision of the President, thus subjecting Duque under the control and supervision of the President. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether EO 864 is unconstitutional. Ruling:
YES. the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and the Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the
exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
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ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, Austria-Martinez J.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
Facts:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal (Macalintal) herein petitioner, assails the constitutionality of some of the provisions in Republic Act 9189 (RA 9189) or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 on the ground that the aforementioned provisions are in violation of the independence of the constitutionally created office – that is COMELEC. Specifically, Macalintal assails the power of Congress through a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) to review, revise, amend and prove the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for RA 9189 that the COMELEC shall promulgate. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the provisions authorizing the JCOC to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR of RA 9189 to be issued by the COMELEC is valid.
Ruling:
NO. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
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Civil Service Commission (CSC) v Department of Budget and Management (DBM) G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005, Carpio-Morales J.
That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides: Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Facts:
The CSC herein petitioner, seeks to compel the DBM herein respondent, to release the balance of its budget pursuant to the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the fiscal year 2002. Verily, the balance in favor of CSC was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of DBM’s no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of certain documents which CSC allegedly failed to undertake. On its part the CSC contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon an independent constitutional body such as the CSC is a violation of its fiscal autonomy and is therefore void. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the DBM can validly withhold the appropriated balance of funds against the CSC
Ruling:
NO. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.