La diferencia entre estos dos términos se basa en el mecanismo en el que la molécula vuelve a su estado fundamental y por el tiempo
2. FUNDAMENTO DE LOS PROCESOS LUMINISCENTES
22
The wording of the Proclamation would not have disabused the». Basks
wrote that the Sarotoagans did not sees to understand the nature of
23
annexation. But it appears also that until they received newspapers and
Hansards in the following «sail, the European settlers were themselves 24
uncertain.
What evidence survives therefore strongly suggests a continued reluctance by Gudgeon, and now by Ranfurly also, to spell out to the islanders the full implications of tbe territory's change of status. In this respect the situation differed fro» the circumstances of the Treaty
19 Gudgeon, 'Autobiography', p.20G, Ranfurly to Gudgeon, 8 Oct. 1900 (1).
20 NZB. 22 Oct. 1900. Despite this report, the paper's editorial on the
same day assumed that tbe ariki had agreed to the planned inclusion
of the islands within New Zealand's boundaries.
21 AJEB. 1901, A-l, p.27.
22 ibid., p,28. The Proclamation stated that *••• the said islands shall
form part of her Majesty's dominions and tbe fhll and absolute sovereignty thereof shall be vested in Her majesty and Her Heirs for ever*.
23 m \ 215, Banks to Moss, 14 Oct. 1900.
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of Haitangi by the element of deliberate deception, and by the fact that none of the conditions the arik l understood to be the basis for annexation wore w ritten into the formal documents. There were s im ila ritie s in that
both transactions were complicated by the d iffic u lty of conveying the «.leaning of European constitutional concepts. Like ^iost of the New Zealand
■\
chiefs, the ariki could not conceive that th e ir eetm m y would come to an end, nor indeed that they would not gain from the move.
\
The v is its of the o ffic ia l party to the other islands were not without
\ \
d iffic u lty . On Hangaia, i n i t i a l doubts were overcome by Ranfurly's assurances that land would not be alienated. At Hanifiiki, the people
I v
opposed annexation because they were fu lly s a tisfie d with the advantages of B ritish protection which allowed them freedom to run theiri\own a f f a irs ,
f u - \ X,.
including freedom to trade with the French.*’0 Ia sp ite of the e a rlie r casual approach by the Colonial Office to Niuean reaction, there was some
uneasiness about the party 's reception in Niue. Gudgeon advised Sanfurly to 'tak e the bull by the horns and declare that he had come at the instance of the people and a t th e ir request*. The Resident reported that th is
served well enough and that the chiefs signed while he kept out of the 27
way.
Gudgeon returned to New Zealand with Ran fur ly and both were interviewed in Christchurch. Gudgeon said th at with annexation the 'a u th o ritie s could a s sist by advice, general direction and moral influence*, lie stressed the importance of th is la s t poiat, defining i t as 'pressure, gently and steadily
28 applied* that would eventually bring about some re s u lts .
25 jujus, 1901, A-i, p .26-27. At Manihiki, Gudgeon was shocked by the consumption of absinthe and the administration of the island. He said the a rik l was an imbecile who was manipulated by corrupt men. Be therefore concluded his report by reeommimdieg th at Haiti hi ki be annexed by the extension of New Zealand boundaries, ib id ., p.33. Technically, Maaihiki was already annexed.
26 Gadget», 'Autobiography', p.135. Sudden to Gudgeon, 30 Sept. 1900 (1). 27 ib id ., 136, See the account give« io AJÜR. 1901, A-I, p.27. Sanfurly
said the Niueans were strongly against control from 'Tonga' and that they wanted a 'B ritish Resident*.
28 54i. 2 Nov. 1900. This contrasts with a private comment, a fte r the a rik l had signed the September p e titio n , to a group of people
including two missionaries, that the a rik i would have 'nothing to say following annexation* and that he would 's i t on them', HP, 215, Banks to Hots, 29 Oct. 1900.
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Seddon had hoped to secure the annexation in time to herald the 29
new century with this evidence of New Zealand's expansion. Hie presence
of Royalty was sosae compensation for this failure when, in June 1901« the Duke and Duchess of York attended a ceremony for the reading of the
^reclamation which extended New Zealand's boundaries to Include the Cook Islands.^0
The Principal*
In the events which culminated in annexation there had been, in
addition to Seddon three principals - Gudgeon, Ron furl y and Makea - each
of wlios had their own reasons for the stance they took.
Gudgeon had already enunciated bis own views on the future of the Islands. The question arises whether there were other motives and what rewards, if any, he expected for his part in resolving the issue in favour of New Zealand. Bis accent on economic development postulated a
rationalisation of the use of land which would have repercussions on the authority structure within the islands. Annexation was therefore essential for the realisation of this undertaking. At the same time. Gudgeon's
desire to make the Cook Islands the 'most prosperous nation in the Pacific* revealed not only strong ambition hut personal views moulded by frontier experience and a clitaste of national assertiveness.
Gudgeon shared Seddon*s impatience with British toleration of an 31
expanding French and German presence in the Pacific. Be was not content
that the Islands should merely be British but believed that Britain should provide an outlet for eolonial enterprise, initiative and leadership.
These attitudes were influenced considerably by his resentment of British military attitudes to colonist troops during the Aaglo-Baori wars and by British reluctance at the time to give unqualified support to the settler
32 cause.
29 CO 309/260, Seddon to CO, 16 Dec. 1900 (cable).
30 CO 209/262, Gov. to CO, ami Seddon to Agent-General for New Zealand
in London (cables), 7 March 1901, and CO minutes.
31 60/43, Gudgeon to Seddon, 4 Sept. 1900.
- s a -
out he «ras of necessity fiercely pro-Ifflperiallst la the face of any threat to the Empire, as his energy during the Boer War had demonstrated.
la this respect be «ras typical of many Near Zealanders whose twin loyalties
33 to their own country and to Britain were not felt to be incompatible. By the 1390*s a new kind of national feeling was emerging, la its
attachment to the past, its tentativeness and aggressiveness, it parallels on a different scale, the current image of the Maori bestride two worlds. To socae extent Gudgeon was recognisably part of this transition. In another sense he represented the antithesis of its ideals. Bis views are apparent in the attitude of the freeholders attracted to Massey*s Reform party rather than in the ideals which were given political fora by Grey, Onllance and Beeves. It was the freeholders, not the nation, who inherited the frontier struggle for land. It was taen like Gudgeon who provided the stuff of ?4ew Zealand frontier legends and whose strength of purpose was called upon by leaders la n new age in difficult situations.
Zn many respects Gudgeon was *anti-establishment* and therefore
opposed to the highly educated, conservative, landed elite who had dominated government almost to the advent of the Liberals. Having discarded orthodox religious affiliation at an early age he was raucously contemptuous of
34
organized religion and 'cant*. He admired the adaptability and
versatility that were products of colonial life and was a resolute defender of specifically New Zealand values. All this was underwritten by a stem
sense of duty, industry and self-help - in fact, by aost of the virtues 35
stunned up by the tens 'protestant ethic*• At the sane tine Gudgeon was
a military «an who retained the outlook of a profession he had chosen in defence of a settler future in Neu Zealand. His experience as a colonial soldier fighting Maoris for their stubboraess over laud and 'insurgency* in the eyes of the law, followed by his activities as a Laud Court Judge in disposing of Maori land, emphasised a conception of HaoH needs in
33 Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p.226. See also, generally, Oi.4,
•New Zealanders and Britons*.
34 Information from an interview with ihr. E. Craig. Gudgeon also believed
that the State should remove children fro® their parents and see to their upbringing.
35 Gudgeon was therefore opposed to the deoands of Onions tad spoke
- 09 -
terns of colonial requirements. Despite his considerable in te re st in ^aori ethnography, his personal b eliefs and experience, together with his d ista ste for autocracy, predisposed bin towards a p articu lar vie» of island society and i t s future. Be »as therefore wholeheartedly behind the sieves for annexation of »hick he »as the instrument.
Ranfurly*s position is more problematic. He had shared some of
Glasgow's reservations about Ne» Zealand ambitions and, i f his correspondence with the Colonial Office is any indication, did not fin a lly change his
mind u n til a fte r his v is it to the islands in 1999. Nevertheless, from the tiiae of his a rriv a l in Rarotonga, Gudgeon corresponded with him and pushed the idea of annexation. Ranfurly's early extant le tte r s , as d is tin c t fron Gudgeon's reports of his utterances, do not mention th is and, though marked 'private*, »ere concerned mainly with the careful
36 exercise of the R esident's powers and anxiety over the Hess enquiry.
7et, on his own evidence. Gudgeon regarded himself as the Governor's 37
* trouble-shooter' from the beginning. I f Charles Trevelyan's observations are accurate, i t could have been that Ranfuriy's position »as store flexible
38
than had been the case » ith previous Governors. Knowing that annexation
36 Ranfurly Letters in Gudgeon, 'Autobiography*. In his l e tte r of 24 Oct, 1899 Ranfurly mentioned that he had sot thought that annexation could be expected ns soon as Gudgeon had indicated. He pointed out that he tod no power in the n a tte r of annexation but would now 'put the n a tte r stro n g ly ', presumably to the Colonial O ffice. By 10 April 1900 he had w ritten confidentially to Gudgeon on the conditions under which the B ritish Government would permit annexation. In another private l e t t e r , 23 August 1900, he thought i t likely that there would be changes in the government of the Cook Islands and the Resident's duties a t which time the question of Gudgeon's salary would be negotiated.
37 Information from Rr. E. Craig.
38 See a 'L etter from Charles Trevelyan to tf.Peaber Reeves, August 22 1898*, Appendix I I , £ebb, o p .c i t., p.37-38. Though the powers of the Governors tod by th is time become almost negligible, Ranfurly appeared to have had a fa ir ly close relationship with Seddoe in the matter of the Cook Islands. Compare the situ atio n outlined by S ir Arthur Gordon in his description of his position in private le tte r s to Lord Selbourne, 1881, MacIntyre and Gardiner, o p .c it., pp.240-3. 'Hr. Hall the Premier and I are on the best possible terms . . . but he makes no secret of his conviction that he, or any other m inister, would be considered by the public to betray his tru s t i f he discussed aov matter with the Governor
90 -
*8S deli ite :,olie*' he “as 1“ a position to manipulate circumstances
and to gain time for the islanders to accept the inevitable. Until bis
fastidiousness „as upset by a first hand encounter with islands'
administration and justice, and until he „as exposed to Gudgeon's personality he „as a bystander sympathetic to Cook Islands' aspirations and above the urgent motives that drove Seddon or the ambition that inspired Gudgeon.
V ter that visit he did not choose to stand in the »ay of annexation;
indeed, be became a willing advocate. He was anxious to clear up a messy
situation by finding an alternative to the Protectorate acceptable to the “EliO. without recourse to the costive processes of the Imperial Treasury, dhetever course was decided upon it would have to be one that did not damage Uritish prestige or set the colonies baying at the heels of the Colonial Office.
In these negotiations, the role of Hakes is a complex one about
Ü Ji there is all too little information. Gudgeon admitted his dependence
on her influence. I« this respeet he allowed her the importance, if not
the deference, which official visitors accorded her. He did not use the
i’.e \ueeo' nut referred to her as the 'leading Ariki*. I« private, he
despised the missionary influence that bad elevated the weak Hakes title,
a ns he declared Iskua herself to have been a« illegitimate cuckoo in the
Hakea oest and a foolish old woran with an inflated sense of her own
Importance. 9 Nevertheless, even if he hoped it would be for the last time,
he could not ignore her standing, strengthened as it was by her marriage
to H g m u m and his outer-island connections. That she was able to overcome
the reservations of the other arijd and persuade them to follow her lead attested to Gudgeon's estimation of her personal influence and the fact that, as the longest-reigning and most experienced ariki. she was accorded
a respect that transcetuded her regional title.
Physically Hakes T*kua was a large and imposing woman. Contemporary photographs taken with visiting dignitaries shots her sitting stolidly among the sartorially crumpled men and corset-stiffened women - her ample
igurc draped in a fine-stuff oother-hubbard and the heavy, passive though
• 91
sad cast of her features truncated by a flattened boater-style bat. Few contemporary references give ra re than passing insights ia to her character. Though she ruled her own people with a strong band. Banks <iain ta ile d th at she ted complained of feeliag harrassed, frightened and helpless in the face of Gudgeon’s demands m ay of which she did sot understand. Of much of the business conducted in her sura, she told her friends she was not consulted but was merely required to give her
signature. She also detested some of the Resident's white o ffic ia ls whose 40
appointments she ted endeavoured to oppose.
Yet she supported Gudgeon in aany things and often used his commanding 41
presence to further her own rads. Fear« respect aad the expectation of increased prestige were lik e ly elements in her relationship with him. I t is probably true that her very long reign had made her unduly imperious« while changing circumstances and the unique authority structure is her teuere made her unmindful of some of her obligations and freed her from some of the re s tra in ts imposed upon the other arik i by th e ir sataiapo. F lattery may have eroded her previously highly c r iti c a l assessment of European actions in the Pacific while the hope of advantage« and
considerable pressure« led her to place undue reliance upon the promises made by Sadden and the guarantees outlined by Gudgeon. Yet she believed them to be honourable men and treated them with due respect. Finally« since she placed some importance on her position v is-a-v is the other a r ik i. aad as there were English and Hawaiian queens as her contemporaries« i t may have occurred to her th at her part in annexation« with the benefits i t would bring to the people« might enable the Cooks to gain what had so far escaped i t - the assured pararaustcy of the liakea lin e .
I f Gudgeon f e lt momentarily uneasy at the g u llib ility of the arik i and th e ir tru s t in him« Seddon** approbation confirmed his b e lie f th at he
40 KP, 215« Banks to Stoss. 15 Sept. 1899; 7 Oct. 1899, 27 Nov. 1899. 25 &arch 1900. 22 April 1900. Kafcea was credited with possessing
’the evil eye* and other occult powers. BP, 188/51, ’Rulers of Rarotonga *•
41 See, for example, 215, Banks to Moss, 27 Mov. 1899, in which he reported that Kakea ted threatened to take away liakea Daniela’s lands and t i t l e s a fte r he was convicted by Gudgeon
• 92 -
42
had done his duty and acted in the best interests of the islands« He
felt also that he had more than fulfilled the expectations of his superiors. He said:
sffcen I left New Zealand Lord Banfurly said to oe if you can settle the present troubles and above all bring about annexation you will not only deserve well of the Imperial Government but 1 should have no doubt that you will receive a much better appointment afterwards
down here. He told me that I should receive * o m order as a mark
of appreciation of the services 1 had rendered.43
There was a suggestion too, that his work in the Cooks would lead to a 44
position in Tonga. Though expectant. Gudgeon was cautious about placing
too ouch faith in the protestations of public figures. Be felt that Ranfurly was 'all Irishman and says more than he means ...'. • Gudgeon had enjoyed a close relationship with Seddon based on the conspiracy of their joint endeavour. But he was wary of the Premier, indicating on the one band that
46 be could be 'used* and os the other that he could sot be entirely trusted, lor all that, Seddon remained the chief vehicle for preferment and a barrier against hostile politicians and those who «rare not prepared to see the
welfare of the islands is the same light. Seddon and Ranfurly had relied heavily upon Gudgeon in the final stages of cession and the Premier bad