Reform abounds in the history of modern Korea. The nineteenth century was a politically turbulent period, including multiple rebellions, wars, and disruptions to Korea’s
established political order. During the mid-nineteenth century, Korea transformed the basis of its economic and international relations in just a few short decades. After rebuffing French and American incursions in the 1860s and early 1870s, in 1876, under shadow of gunboats, Korea signed a treaty with Japan to open its ports to new trade and diplomatic relations.2 Subsequent treaties with the United States, China, Russia, and several European countries followed throughout the 1880s, bringing Korea into fresh contact with global trends. Amid such changes, and building on the domestic discontent expressed in the Hong Kyŏngnae rebellion of 1812 and a string of popular rebellions in the 1860s, numerous groups attempted to persuade Kojong and the central government to
1 Kojong sillok, 33.1.11 (1896).
2 Korean resistance against French and American advances followed the long-held practice of strictly regulating external trade and diplomacy. Although Korea already maintained diplomatic relations with Japan at this time, the 1876 treaty represented a break with established norms on several counts—not least among which the circumstances of the treaty’s signing (under military threat). For an overview of the 1876 treaty, see Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875–
1885 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 35-50.
adopt their favored reform agenda, including among them representatives from Qing China, Meiji Japan, rebellious peasants, and western-inspired “enlightenment” (kaehwa) intellectuals.
That Japan annexed Korea in 1910 has only heightened the significance of reform within the historiography as historians sought to answer the question, why did reform attempts fail to secure Korean independence?3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, answers to this question have been as varied as the late-nineteenth century proponents of reform themselves, as differing opinions over the political and ideological sympathies of reformers divided assessment of their activities. To some, Korea’s best attempt to modernize as a sovereign nation lay with the radical, Western-inspired reform agenda of so-called enlightenment thinkers—a group of elites who drew on their experiences studying conditions abroad (mainly in Japan and the United States) to agitate for democracy and nationalism.4 Others have pointed to the willingness of a few
3 Although this framing is strongest in some of the earliest accounts of the period—including colonial accounts that sought to legitimize colonial rule as a necessary remedy for Korea’s failure to adequately reform itself—it has proved remarkably enduring in a range of scholarship. Even staunch defenders of Korea’s capacity for independent reform have implicitly adopted such a perspective, as seen in the following remarks from one prominent scholar: “The failure of Korea’s modernization was not necessarily its own fault, as is generally believed. On the contrary, Korea was actively trying to enter into the
international society, albeit late, but was impeded by the selfish interests of its neighbors, aggressive Japan and egoistic China.” Despite placing the blame for Korea’s “failure” squarely on outside actors, Yi T’aejin nonetheless perpetuates the notion that Korean reform and modernization efforts should be judged by Korea’s ability to maintain independence and not by any measure related to the content of the reforms themselves. Yi Tae-jin, “Was Early Modern Korea Really a ‘Hermit Kingdom’?” trans. Edward Park, in The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization in Korean History (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2007), 350. For an example of earlier iterations of this argument, see Vipan Chandra,
Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea: Enlightenment and the
Independence Club (Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, University of California, 1988). For a colonial account of Korea’s “failure” to reform, see also Tabohashi Kiyoshi, “Kindai Chōsen ni okeru seijiteki kaikaku,” in Chōsen sōtokufu Chōsenshi henshūkai, Kindai Chōsenshi kenkyū (Keijō: 1944), 1-303.
4 Clarence N. Weems Jr., “The Korean Reform and Independence Movement, 1881–1898,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, 1954; James B. Palais, “Political Participation in Traditional Korea, 1876–1910,” Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1979): 73-121; Chandra, Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform.
enlightenment supporters to work with Japanese politicians to push through reforms to the government, opening a debate onto whether leaders such as Kim Okkyun (1851–
1894) and Pak Yŏnghyo (1861–1939) should be considered as collaborators or merely pragmatic reformers.5 In a similar manner, multiple studies have evaluated and
reevaluated the contributions, both positive and negative, of Qing China, western
advisors to the government, the Tonghak peasant rebellion of 1894, moderate reformers, and the monarch himself to the perceived successes (or failures) of nineteenth-century reform attempts.6
In recent years, a further line of enquiry has emerged that places greater emphasis on the content of reform projects themselves. Replacing concerns over the success or failure of reforms, this scholarship has instead investigated the process and impact of reform projects throughout wider Korean society in areas as varied as medicine, new
5 For a summary of, and sympathetic defense against, such claims of collaboration, see Young Ick Lew,
“The Reform Efforts and Ideas of Pak Yŏng-hyo, 1894–1895,” Korean Studies 1 (1977): 21-61; Young Ick Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics behind the Kabo-Ŭlmi Reform Movement, 1894–1896,” Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981): 39-81; Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, “The Kapsin Coup of 1884: A Reassessment,” Korean Studies 6 (1982): 105-24.
6 On Qing China see, Young Ick Lew, “Yuan Shih-kai’s Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885–94),” Journal of Korean Studies 5 (1984): 63-107; Kirk Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). On foreign advisors to the government, see Yur-Bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988);
Kim Hyŏnsuk, Kŭndae Han’guk ŭi Sŏyangin komun’gwandŭl (Seoul: Han’guk yŏn’guwŏn, 2008); Wayne Patterson, In the Service of His Korean Majesty: William Nelson Lovatt, the Pusan Customs, and Sino-Korean Relations, 1876–1888 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2012).
On the Tonghak rebellion, see Young Ick Lew, “The Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising” A Reappraisal with Emphasis on Chŏn Pong-jun’s Background and Motivation,” Journal of Korean Studies 7, no. 1 (1990): 149-80; George Kallander, “Eastern Bandits or Revolutionary Soldiers?
The Tonghak Uprising in Korean History and Memory,” History Compass 8, no. 10 (2010): 1126-41. On moderate and early reform efforts, see Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys; Michael Finch, Min Yŏng-hwan: A Political Biography (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, Center for Korean Studies, 2002). On the monarch’s influence on the process of reform, see James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1975);
Yi T’aejin, Kojong sidae ŭi chaejomyŏng (Seoul: T’aehaksa, 2000); Do Myonfe [To Myŏnhoe], “Jishuteki kindai to shokuminchi kindai,” in Miyajima Hiroshi et al., eds., Shokuminchi kindai no shisa: Chōsen to Nihon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2004), 3-25.
styles of fiction and literature, changes to education, technology, the emergence of modern nationalism, the redefinition of land rights, and the nature of the state itself.7 In contrast to accounts that return to the “failure” of Korean reforms to secure national independence, these studies search for the origin of modern society within the reform era, forcing scholars to reevaluate pre-colonial Korea as more than just the passive target of Japanese empire.
Nevertheless, owing to the historiographical trends that placed an emphasis on modernity, much of the new research has presented a relatively narrow vision of reform projects. Most studies begin only after a major series of government reforms in 1894–96 and focus on reforms that replicate an orthodox interpretation of “modernity” as
embodied in the promotion of technology, capitalism, and western ideas.8 Yet, and notwithstanding the doubts that might legitimately be raised over the utility of the
7 Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka in the Korean Enlightenment Period, 1896–1910,” Korean Studies 24 (2000): 1-24; Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: University of Columbia Press, 2002); Wang Hyŏnjong, Han’guk kŭndae kukka ŭi hyŏnsŏng kwa Kabo kaehyŏk (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2003); Dong-no Kim, John B. Duncan, and Do-hyung Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity in the Taehan Empire (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006); Han’guk Yŏksa Yŏn’guhoe, Taehan Cheguk ŭi t’oji chedo wa kŭndae (Seoul: Hyean, 2010); Vladimir Tikhonov, Social Darwinism and Nationalism in Korea: the Beginnings (1880s–1910s): “Survival” as an Ideology of Korean Modernity (Leiden, Brill, 2010); Hwang, Rationalizing Korea.
Underlying many of these studies is an implicit (sometimes explicit) intent to challenge the dominant notion of colonial modernity in Korean historiography. As initially proposed by Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, the concept of colonial modernity attempted to challenge historical narratives that framed the colonial period as either a time of absolute exploitation and oppression or one of unqualified progress and development. Drawing on the ambiguity of modernity, Shin and Robinson used colonial modernity to explore how both aspects might be true at once, as, for example, in the use of new technologies such as the telegraph to both strengthen the capacity of the colonial state and to expand new arenas of communication.
Despite the breakthrough that this represented within the historiography of colonial Korea, the ensuing popularity of the concept gave rise to the unfortunate impression that much of what constitutes modernity in Korea was somehow a byproduct of the colonial state. See, Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea; Tani E. Barlow, ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997).
8 Some notable exceptions to this are John Duncan’s contribution to the edited volume Reform and Modernity in the Taehan Empire, “The Confucian Context of Reform,” 105-25; and, Kyung Moon Hwang,
“Country or State?”
concept of modernity itself,9 it is far from clear that modernity should be synonymous with reform in this period. Insofar as his policies departed from several established norms of Chosŏn governance, James Palais also characterized the rule of the Taewŏn’gun (1864–1873)—the Prince Regent most commonly noted for his conservative Confucian outlook—as a program of reform.10 While the policies of the Taewŏn’gun and those of the Korean Empire (1897–1910) may equally be considered episodes of reform, 11 the two cases, separated by a period of only thirty years, remain largely divided within the historiography.
Even without reference to recognizably “modern” reforms, there is plenty of evidence for significant changes within Korean politics and society at this time. Kirk Larsen’s study of Qing imperialism in Korea details an array of reforms and innovations introduced before the major government reforms of the 1890s—from commerce in the treaty ports to the construction of telegraph communications—as Korea and China redefined their traditional diplomatic relationship. Throughout, Larsen makes clear that zeal for enlightenment and modernity was not necessarily a determining factor in reforms; at times, Qing China’s desire to exert stronger political influence over Korea was equally influential in instigating change.12 At the same time, and as detailed by Kyung Moon Hwang, long-held Confucian concepts continued to inform enlightenment discourse about the nature of the state (kukka) even as intellectuals debated new theories
9 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 113-49.
10 Palais, Politics and Policy, 1.
11 Proclaimed in 1897 by Kojong as an attempt to bolster his rule, the Korean Empire is notable for its pursuit of wide-ranging modernization projects.
12 Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade.
emerging from Japan, China, Germany, and beyond.13 Elsewhere, Yumi Moon’s research into the Ilchinhoe—a populist group famous for their anti-monarch stance and
collaboration with imperial Japan—shows in great depth how legacies from Chosŏn Korea stretched into the political disputes of the 1890s and 1900s. As Moon’s research demonstrates, grievances over old methods of tax collection, the fate of local elite associations, and disputes over rents on state-owned lands fueled many of the Ilchinoe’s anti-government activities just as much, if not more so, than did differing interpretations of modernity.14 Although it is hard to dispute the growing influence of “modern” reforms in the late-nineteenth century, it is also necessary to acknowledge the continuity of “non-modern” aspects as well.
The need to adequately represent the “non-modern” is of particular concern among economic histories of the late Chosŏn period (1750–1910) given the narrow, Eurocentric basis of much economic discourse. This challenge is not unique to Korean history; historians of China too have grappled with similar problems in overcoming narratives of China’s supposed failure to modernize and the difficulties of accounting for economic practices that appear different from standard European models. As Gregory Blue and Timothy Brook argue, the view of Chinese stagnation can be traced back to eighteenth century European intellectual trends that increasingly recast Western
civilization as a universal norm and that still influence much economic thought today.15 In Korea, similar notions were most destructively perpetuated through colonial theories
13 Hwang, “Country or State?”
14 Yumi Moon, Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896-1910 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
15 Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue, eds., China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
of stagnation, although to the extent that later scholarship accepted the basic premise of social theories developed in the nineteenth century many challenges remain in adequately representing late Chosŏn economic activity.16 For this reason, accounts which rely too closely upon standard narratives of economic development or markers of social and technological modernity run the risk of overlooking important aspects of Korean economic history or, at the other extreme, exaggerating only those aspects which fit a stylized European experience.17
Rather than seeking just the modern aspects of reform projects, then, this chapter will examine instead the gradual transformation of the Korean state and its interaction with the economy in response to the demands of the late nineteenth century. In particular, this chapter will focus on three interrelated aspects to trace the course of government reforms through (1) the adoption of new ideas concerning the government’s role in promoting economic growth; (2) government efforts to secure the financial resources necessary to fulfil its new obligations; and (3) the subsequent reorganization of government offices in support of new ideas about the state and political economy. As some of the most fundamental claims that link the state and the population, an
examination of the changes to taxation and government support for economic activity
16 Ibid; Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation”
17 See, for example, Young-hoon Rhee, “Economic Stagnation and Crisis in Korea during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Australian Economic History Review 54, no. 1 (2014): 1-13; Pak Ch’ansŭng,
“Han’gukhak yŏn’gu p’aerŏdaim ŭl tullŏssan nonŭi: naejaejŏk paljŏnnon ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han’gukhak nonjip 35 (2007): 73-118.
Recent scholarship by Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong suggests a promising alternative which calls into question assumptions of both Western and Chinese development narratives. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, “Information and Economic History: How the Credit Market in Old Regime Paris Forces Us to Rethink the Transition to Capitalism,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 1 (1999): 69-94.
will reveal not just the financial health of the Korean government but also ways in which it engaged the population, be it through the method of tax collection and assessment or the obligations it assumed. Viewed in this way, the Korean state was not just an agent of modernity directed from the central government, but was a complex series of offices and bureaucratic hierarchies that incorporated a range of interests and institutional practices at each level. To implement reforms required the central government not only to create an agenda but to find ways to alter the existing government structure and to redefine the terms of its interaction with the public.
II. The State and the Economy in Late-Chosŏn Economic Thought