Disaster Studies
When reviewing the historically broad field of disaster studies, the critical pivot point within the theoretical corpus centres around the concept of ‘vulnerability’, and the adoption of this term fundamentally shifted the focus of more recent studies of disaster. As such, studies of disaster emerging since the 1980s show a notable difference in their focus to those produced earlier. This review shall therefore begin by discussing disaster studies as a broad field historically, before moving on to analyse recent conceptualisations of the term ‘disaster’. Particularly, recent studies which have come to view disaster as a process rather than a discrete event. Once this broad field is introduced, it is useful to discuss two key terms, the first of these, ‘vulnerability’, is, as shall become clear, critical to recognising the centrality of how social and economic variables shape how a particular disaster-process plays out, and the emergence of this term opened up new perspectives on the nature of
‘disaster’ itself. The second of these is the study of ‘recovery’, which is the specific body of literature this thesis most directly contributes to. Studies of ‘recovery’ generally presents a community several years after the immediate aftermath of catastrophe has passed, and offer a different focus to the discussions of, for example, immediate aftermath or disaster preparation which often form the core of much of the corpus of disaster studies. As shall become clear through this discussion, ‘recovery’ is an under-researched, and contested
term within theoretical debates, and this thesis offers significant opportunities for the development of this concept within disaster studies.
Historical Disaster Studies
Social scientists have attempted to understand the impact and ramifications of large-scale disasters since at least Samuel Prince’s investigation of the Halifax explosion of 1917 in Catastrophe and Social Change (2013), first published in 1920. Historically, the field of disaster studies primarily focused on the immediate response of a population to an external, somewhat objectively understood threat to a state of equilibrium and normality.
Indeed, in Man and Society in Disaster (1962) Gideon Sjoberg offers the following definition of disaster;
“a severe, relatively sudden, and frequently unexpected disruption of normal structural arrangements within a social system, or subsystem, resulting from a force, ‘natural’ or ‘social’, ‘internal’ to a system or ‘external’ to it, over which the system has no firm ‘control’” (Sjoberg, 1962; 357).
In a similar vein, Charles Fritz in the edited volume Contemporary Social Problems published in 1961 offers this answer to why the social sciences should study disaster;
“The impetus for systematic studies of human behaviour in disaster developed primarily from two interrelated practical needs: first, to secure more adequate protection of the nation from the destructive and disruptive consequences of potential atomic, biological, and chemical attack; and second, to produce the maximal amount of disruption to the enemy in the event of war” (Fritz, 1961: 653)
Later, he goes on to state that;
“Many findings of disaster research are being utilized by national, state, and local agencies to develop more effective preparation for disaster warning, control, relief, and rehabilitation in peacetime.” (Fritz, 1961: 654)
Others writing in this period offer similar understandings of this topic. Framing both disaster and the society it supposedly disrupts in this way offers insight into the intellectual position these scholars are adopting, and the assumption of a singular normality to social life has been significantly challenged by subsequent writers, discussed below. This can also be said of the inclusion of such phenomena as atomic attack within their theoretical models, reflecting the particular concerns of those writing at the peak of the Cold War, concerns which now fall under the umbrella of conflict, rather than disaster studies in more recent discourse.
Napier (2013) describes a disaster simulation carried out by the United States government in the 1950s designed to simulate a nuclear attack. The intention was to allow deeper understanding of how a population might react to such an attack, and thus allow better structures to be developed to control local populations and their reaction to disasters.
During the middle decades of the 20th century, much of the research done within disaster studies assumed a purely reactive population, and disaster research therefore sought to create systems to better protect said populations.
Kenneth Hewitt’s (1983a) extensive exploration and critique of this broad
positioning of the field offers an excellent starting point for an examination of the study of disasters by the social sciences prior to the acceptance of social ‘vulnerability’ as a key term within disaster studies discourse, as it has for other similar overviews (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 2002, National Research Council, 2006, Oliver-Smith, 1996, 1999, 2002, Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012).
In ‘The Idea of Calamity in a Technocratic Age’ (1983a), Hewitt unpacks the key assumptions made within the field, and demonstrates how these dominant paradigms served to limit understanding of the study of disaster rather than expand it. The focus of these earlier works he discusses was based on assumptions surrounding an objective external threat and a reactive local population. As shall be discussed extensively, this proposition has come under widespread critique by many subsequent authors, as has the focus of disaster being connected to warfare. Such a critique reflects wider changes across the social sciences towards a more pluralist and reflexive form of critical engagement.
Other reviews of the literature of this period have likewise highlighted similar problems within these historical conceptualisations of disaster. In their extensive review of
the state of social science research into disaster the National Research Council of the National Academies (Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences) (2006) describes the traditional division within this field between hazard research and disaster research, which were historically conceptualised as falling within separate focuses of study. Most such studies within this broad field were concerned either with a focus on hazard vulnerability or hazard mitigation (hazard research), or a focus on emergency response and disaster recovery (disaster research) (National Research Council 2006). This parallel evolution has since lost its clear distinction, and as shall be discussed below more recent studies recognise the necessity to view the study of disaster from a more holistic framework.
Through this mutual evolution the concept of ‘disaster’ has been explored and conceptualised in multiple forms which reflect the underlying dualisms inherent to these historical understandings, in particular a divide between a reactive population and an external ‘disaster’. Oliver-Smith (1999) while discussing these definitions notes
Quarantelli’s (1985, 1995) dissatisfaction with the lack of consensus in the field, and his summary of ‘disaster’ being defined variously as;
“1) physical agents, 2) the physical impact of physical agents, 3) an assessment of physical agents, 4) the social disruption resulting from an event with physical impacts, 5) the social construction of reality in perceived crisis situations which may or may not involve physical impacts, 6) the political definition of certain crisis situations, and 7) an imbalance in the demand-capability ratio in a crisis situation.”
(Oliver-Smith 1999: 21).
Oliver-Smith goes on to state that out of these varied definitions of disaster, a clearer focus did emerge, and more recent debates surrounding the definition and use of the term
‘disaster’ reflects a more coherent discussion. In particular, the recognition that different social variables (such as class or race) will result in a given hazard manifesting as a
‘disaster’ in strikingly different ways depending on context. The critical shift in the study of disaster, and the contemporary debates this shift sparked, will be considered over the next sections, with an overview of contemporary disaster studies, and discussions of the specific term ‘vulnerability’ and its centrality to recent literature, and finally the study of
‘recovery’ as the specific corpus this thesis most directly contributes to.
Contemporary Disaster Studies
Though as this section shall demonstrate there is wide acknowledgement that
‘disaster’ must be understood as both part of wider social processes and as a concept which is historically situated within scholarly and mainstream discourse, the delimitations as to exactly what makes a disaster a disaster remains ambiguous (i.e. why a hurricane might be labelled a disaster while the AIDS virus traditionally has not been). While the particular use of the term ‘disaster’ within specifically anthropological discourse shall be considered at a later point in this chapter, its use and critique within wider, interdisciplinary discourse shall be considered below.
In the International Encyclopedia Of The Social And Behavioural Sciences (2001) Kreps offers the following definition for disaster:
“Disasters are non-routine events in societies or their larger subsystems (e.g.
regions and communities) that involve conjunctions of physical conditions with social definitions of human harm and social disruption” (Kreps, 2001: 3718)
A position which succinctly explains how many contemporary studies of disaster have framed this phenomenon. Others have sought a more extensive overview of the term, and Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (2002) offer a somewhat more extensive description of the nature of ‘disaster’, and the lived experience that many go through while living through such times. In their introduction they note:
“Disasters do not just happen. In the vast majority of cases, they are not ‘bolts from the blue’ but take place through the conjuncture of two factors: a human population and a potentially destructive agent that is part of a total ecological system,
including all natural, modified, and constructed features. Both of these elements are embedded in natural and social systems that unfold as processes over time. As such, they render disasters also as processual phenomena rather than events that are isolated and temporally demarcated in exact time frames” (2002: 3).
By thus acknowledging disasters as the result of an intersection of a vulnerable population and geophysical event, by framing the discussion of disaster within this wider temporal context, and recognising that such disasters exist within pre-existing relational systems, these authors foreground an understanding of disaster as a process contrasting to historical uses where a reactive population was at the mercy of external geophysical events. Central to this is the concept of ‘vulnerability’ discussed below. These framings serve as
acceptable starting points from which to build an understanding of the study of disaster in contemporary social theory, as it underlines the intersection of physical hazard with social life.
In addition to this, they go on to define what the term ‘hazard’ means within their discourse, as they argue one cannot understand ‘disaster’ without also understanding this closely related term;
[a hazard is] “the forces, conditions, or technologies that carry a potential for social, infrastructural, or environmental damage. A hazard can be a hurricane, earthquake, or avalanche; it can also be a nuclear facility or a socioeconomic practice, such as using pesticides. The issue of hazard further incorporates the way a society perceives the danger or dangers, either environmental and/or
technological, that it faces and the ways it allow the danger to enter its calculations of risk.” (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; 4).
This intersection blurs the lines between the previously mentioned historical distinction between those studying ‘hazard research’ and ‘disaster research’, and the geographer Cutter (2001) has critiqued the previous separation of these fields of study as limiting the complexity and breadth of the analysis offered. In Tierney et al.’s Facing the Unexpected (2001) this point is further developed from a more sociological perspective when she states:
“Disasters originate in the fact that all societies regularly face geophysical, climatological, and technological events that reveal their physical and social vulnerabilities. In response, societies engage in activities and develop technologies that are designed to provide protection from such threats. However, such measures
often prove ineffective and can themselves become a source of added vulnerability when extreme events occur” (Tierney et al. 2001: 4).
They go on to place disaster as the centre-piece to what they describe as a temporal cycle surrounding a given hazard: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (2001).
While it is valuable to acknowledge the importance of the interaction between hazard, disaster and society, the above does not offer sufficient clarification as to what disaster and the study thereof entails. When overviewing this core topic, the National Research Council (2006) follow Perry and Quarantelli (2005) regarding the key assumptions made within the broad field regarding the nature of ‘disaster’. They understand disaster as non-routine events involving particular physical conditions with social definitions of harm and disruption, which are outside the ‘norm’ of local social life.
They state that a disaster must have physical impact, as well as subjective impacts and locally emergent definitions and interpretations. These impacts are disruptive to social systems but are also intertwined with other dynamics of change. They state that a
disaster’s characteristics should be considered out with its consequences and antecedents.
They also state that the defining and classifying of disasters (particularly in relation to other similarly defined events) is meaningful in and of itself, therefore theoretical
modelling is crucial. Beyond this, the study of disaster should be scientific in nature in its study. They also state that disaster can be the catalyst for collective action. Finally and interestingly, they state that a disaster demonstrates the difference between a society’s expectation of, and actual experience of physical impact of a hazard, and that a “fully anticipated event would not be defined as a disaster” (National Research Council 2006;
19). While some of these assumptions certainly hold true regarding the experience of Plaquemines Parish, the local experience of disaster as – to some extent – normalised, offers interesting potential to develop an understanding of disaster as a fundamental feature of local social life.
Other research has focused on the wider aftermath of a disaster, thus recognising that there can be diverse impacts to such a process, out with the direct effects generated by
the hazard in question. Kim Fortun’s Advocacy After Bhopal (2001) is one such example, where the writer worked within a local activist group. Fortun situated her work within the wider global environmentalist movement and focused much of her methodology on collecting data from activists, trade unionists, lawyers and others involved in the on-going battle for compensation in Bhopal, India. By doing so, she was particularly effective in establishing that the process of recovery after a disaster has occurred can last long after a token compensation payment has been made, a topic discussed further below.
There has also been discussion amongst social scientists as to whether so called
‘natural’ disasters (such as hurricanes or earthquakes) should be approached from a radically different perspective to ‘man-made’ disasters (such as oil spills). Some, such as Norris et al. (2002) have argued that there appears to be a higher level of correlation between other factors in terms of the psychological impact of disasters (such as pre-disaster vulnerability, or impact severity) than there is in relation to the nature of the disaster itself. Others however have offered an alternative perspective. Freudenburg (1997) argues that technological disasters can have a significantly higher impact than other types of disaster. Two of the studies Freudenburg draws upon (Smith et al. 1986, and a paper presented by Goodman and Vaughan 1986) are of particular interest here, as they discuss communities which had experienced both ‘natural’ (flooding) and ‘technological’ (a chemical spill) disasters in close temporal proximity. These studies appear to support his conclusion by exploring the relative weight local people gave to these disasters within their narratives. This thesis however, does not, and indeed the local context of Plaquemines Parish would suggest that the relative impact of a given disaster is intrinsically determined by the direct ramifications to an individual or group based on their context of vulnerability.
Specifically, the BP oil spill – though catastrophic in scale – was largely experienced as a feature of the on-going recovery from Katrina, rather than a secondary disaster-process.
This appears to be broadly the case even for those most directly impacted by the Spill, such as commercial fishermen.
Although many theorists have used terms such as ‘disaster’ and ‘catastrophe’ inter-changeably, some have called for greater distinction to be drawn, particularly when
creating policy plans to deal with the impact of a major event of this nature. Although scale is certainly a key and obvious distinction, some theorists argue that the differences are more wide-ranging. Quarantelli, in ‘Just as a Disaster is not Simply a Big Accident, so a Catastrophe is not Just a Bigger Disaster’ (1996) presents what he feels to be a summary of the critical distinctions found between these experiences of hazard. Focussing primarily on organizational behaviour in the United States, he notes that disasters should be
distinguished from an accident or emergency due to: 1) The involvement of multiple government and aid agencies, 2) the loss of autonomy and freedom experienced by
agencies and individuals during the response to the event, 3) the emergence of non-normal performance standards and social norms during such times, and 4) the distinct interaction between public and private bodies whereby normal rules of property habitation (for example) might be temporarily suspended (1996).
He goes on to describe how, much like an emergency, a catastrophe has unique features distinguishing it from a disaster. He states that the distinguishing features of a catastrophe are as follows: 1) that the scale of the destruction relative to the pre-event baseline will be significantly higher during a catastrophe than a disaster, 2) it is impossible for local officials to fulfil their normal roles and responsibilities during the event, and well into the recovery period, 3) the normal community functions in a given social context are interrupted, social institutions both formal and informal cease to function across a wide region, 4) help is unavailable from nearby communities (1996).
Tierney (2008) is another theorist who has considered these distinctions and expanded upon the categorisations offered by Quarantelli (1996). She also notes that the scale of the event is a key signifier of the difference between a disaster and a catastrophe, but like him also discusses qualitative differences as well as quantitative ones. Several of her designators are similar to the above such as noting the loss of key systems of economic and social support, and the inability of local (or even regional) formal emergency response system to activate. The key additional designator she discusses is the idea that catastrophes cause multiple ‘cascading’ events which might take several forms (such as flooding
damaging a chemical plant which then contaminates the surrounding area as described by Smith et al. 1986).
The work of these authors is primarily aimed at improving governmental planning and response programs to large-scale events of a ‘catastrophic’ scale, but it is still of interest to consider the ramifications of their work for a thesis which focuses on the cultural impact and recovery from disasters and catastrophes. Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill were two of the largest destructive events of their relative kind to ever impact the region of Plaquemines Parish, however, the local, direct experience of these disaster-processes does not allow either of them to fit exactly into the category of ‘catastrophe’ as presented above, nor do the above understandings adequately account for the cultural significance of a catastrophic disaster-process. This therefore offers an opportunity to reflect upon the use of such terminology in a context where smaller-scale disasters (such as category 1 hurricanes or oil spills of only a few hundred barrels) occur on a semi-regular basis, but where multiple disaster-processes of a ‘catastrophic’ scale (a direct hit of a
The work of these authors is primarily aimed at improving governmental planning and response programs to large-scale events of a ‘catastrophic’ scale, but it is still of interest to consider the ramifications of their work for a thesis which focuses on the cultural impact and recovery from disasters and catastrophes. Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill were two of the largest destructive events of their relative kind to ever impact the region of Plaquemines Parish, however, the local, direct experience of these disaster-processes does not allow either of them to fit exactly into the category of ‘catastrophe’ as presented above, nor do the above understandings adequately account for the cultural significance of a catastrophic disaster-process. This therefore offers an opportunity to reflect upon the use of such terminology in a context where smaller-scale disasters (such as category 1 hurricanes or oil spills of only a few hundred barrels) occur on a semi-regular basis, but where multiple disaster-processes of a ‘catastrophic’ scale (a direct hit of a