Ganancia de peso vivo del nacimiento al destete en corderos de la

In recognition of the success of the ALP program, its natural maturation, and the need to advance it geographically, SOJTF-A has begun to transition the primary supervisory responsibility for ALP districts to the ANSF, with U.S. forces moving into tactical overwatch. Currently, there are 21 districts that have transitioned into tactical overwatch. The sustainability and success of these districts, however, ultimately depends on GIRoA (ANSF) taking increased ownership and responsibility.

In order for a district to transition to tactical overwatch, it must meet the following criteria: (1) Leadership: DCOP and ALP Commanders are appointed and in place, and DCOP and ALP Commanders are competent and support each other; (2) Legitimacy: Shura leaders are identified and validated. Seventy percent of the ALP across the district are approved by shura and are from the local area. Shura leaders are capable of maintaining the ALP program. The local populace view the ALP as legitimate; (3) Logistics: 70 percent of on-hand ALP in districts are regularly receiving MoI pay and have sufficient weapons, fuel, and ammunition to perform duties. GIRoA district leadership provides adequate sustainment for ALP across the district; (4)

Security: Each ALP village/element has an identified ANSF support force that can reinforce all ALP locations. DCOP is capable of coordinating security actions across the district in support of ALP; (5) Manning: 70 percent of the district tashkil is filled and trained. DCOP has the ability to train ALP; on-hand ALP numbers are sufficient to protect key population centers in the district.

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Non-ALP Local Defense Forces

Until recently, three main Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were supported by ISAF: 1) Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) – aligned to RC-E; 2) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) – aligned to RC-N; and 3) Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) – aligned to RC-S and RC-SW. From September to December 2011, media and international human rights reported multiple allegations of criminal activity and human rights violations by local security forces in Afghanistan. Some of these allegations were associated with coalition sponsored LDF, such as those previously listed. On December 25, 2011, the President of Afghanistan (PoA) called for the disestablishment of all non-GIRoA sanctioned LDF. As of September 2012, all three LDFs were in the process of being demobilized, with an estimated completion date of December 2012. In some cases, SOJTF-A has made application to the ALP program available to recently demobilized LDF. This transition option has been done with the express requirement that those demobilizing meet “all the same criteria” of any other ALP candidate and do not simply “cross- walk” from LDF to ALP. This initiative has addressed both ALP development requirements while maintaining sizeable numbers of former LDF employed under a legitimate GIRoA- endorsed program.

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2.9:

A

I

A

The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Intelligence structures continue to develop at a steady, albeit a slow rate. The objective remains establishing self-reliant, professionally-led ANSF intelligence organizations that generate and sustain enduring intelligence capabilities. Despite early problems with recruitment and training, the intelligence organizations are becoming more effective and capable of leading and conducting intelligence operations. The primary Afghan intelligence organizations are as follows:

Afghan National Intelligence Committee (NIC) (under development): Approved by President Karzai, the NIC will be chaired by the Office of the National Security Advisor and consist of ministerial senior intelligence representation from MoD, MoI, and NDS. The NIC is intended to:

– Coordinate and establish intelligence policy; – Define and delineate intelligence responsibilities;

– Discuss national intelligence requirements and priorities;

– Coordinate intelligence analysis efforts and major intelligence assessments; and – Establish budget requirements for intelligence operations and growth;

National Directorate of Security (NDS): The NDS is Afghanistan’s premier internal security and intelligence service, and is an independent agency responsible directly to the President of Afghanistan. NDS has several thousand officers and staff. The directorate is a capable intelligence organization, with a multi-intelligence function capability and an extensive source network. It routinely operates independently and has succeeded in preventing numerous planned attacks.

Ministry of Interior (MoI): The principal intelligence organization within the Ministry of Interior is the Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI). In addition, several other organizations within the MoI have smaller intelligence functions or sections. These include the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). The AACP Criminal Investigation Department houses the forensics capability for the Ministry of Interior and the biometrics database for the country. The AACP also includes the Counter-Terrorism Department, which appears to have a robust source network but does not work with other elements active in the CT fight such as the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) or the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC). The ABP has approximately 450 intelligence officers to provide intelligence support from the national headquarters down through the police zones to 37 ABP battalions, but they provide little in terms of usable intelligence.

Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI): The DPI was created to provide detailed research, analysis, and reporting on criminal, terrorist, and insurgent activity. The directorate provides ministerial leadership with strategic-level intelligence reporting, as well as intelligence in support of terrorist or criminal network lawful arrest operations. Subordinate departments include Operational Intelligence, Intelligence Investigations, Analysis, Support, Training Management, and the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center. The DPI is the most advanced of the police

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intelligence organizations within Afghanistan. It has a robust HUMINT collection capability and is capable of small scale, independent intelligence operations. Many remnants of the DPI’s former internal policing mission within the Ministry of Intelligence remain, and it is often called upon to investigate police misconduct. Within the DPI exists the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC), an intelligence operations center through which intelligence is collected, analyzed, exploited, and developed to support operations against terrorist, insurgent, and associated criminal networks within a secure, warrant-based, and operationally focused environment. NTEC is capable of conducting independent intelligence operations. However, current capabilities to collect and perform target development are not sufficient to degrade significantly the country’s many terrorist and insurgent networks alone. NTEC’s evidence-based targeting ability is limited to a degree by insufficient intelligence flow, an incomplete, nation- wide communications network, and a still-maturing analytical capability. Currently NTEC integrates intelligence derived from the seven police zones, various MoI organizations, the National Directorate of Security, and the Afghan National Army General Staff G2 (Intelligence). NTEC has developed and authorized 117 operations in its first 16 months of existence; 88 have been executed. Working collaboratively with other MoI intelligence and operational units such as the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU), NTEC provides actionable, evidence-based target intelligence packages for its own or GDPSU action. NTEC conducts successful Afghan-planned and -led operations within its collection and analytical means. Increasing intelligence input to NTEC from the Anti-Crime Police, Counter-Narcotics Police, and GDPSU, as well as from NTEC’s own organic surveillance unit, and the addition of Coalition counter-terrorism and Special Operations Force subject matter expert mentors will further enhance NTEC’s analysis and targeting expertise.

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: CNPA is the MoI’s principal police organization targeting Afghanistan’s narcotics industry. CNPA executes the full range of CN policing operations and has a robust organic intelligence capability resident within three sub-elements: the Intelligence and Investigative Unit (IIU), the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), and the Technical Investigation Unit (TIU). These intelligence organizations are effective with Coalition mentoring and oversight, providing a critical capability within Afghanistan.

Ministry of Defense (MoD): Ministry of Defense Intelligence comprises the Office of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the Afghan National Army General Staff- Intelligence (G2), Corps and below G2 staffs, and Corps Military Intelligence battalions.

Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence (AMoD-I): There is yet to be an Assistant Minister named to fill the AMoD-I senior position. The AMoD-I was designed to conduct Intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting; policy development; security management; strategic analysis; and intelligence operations in support of the MinDEF and the National Leadership. AMoD-I is the principal advisor to the Minister of Defense on strategic defense intelligence, counter-intelligence (CI), security, and other national security matters. AMoD-I exercises ministerial-level oversight for all MoD, General Staff, and Afghan National Army intelligence activities and operations. AMoD-I directorates include Policy & Plans, Counterintelligence, Strategic Analysis, Foreign Intelligence, Operational Support, and the Defense Security Service. These directorates have all been created and are functioning to various degrees of proficiency.

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Afghan National Army General Staff G2 (Intelligence) (ANA GSG2) The GSG2 is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping a sustainable Afghan Military Intelligence capacity in order to support current and future security requirements. ANA GSG2 departments include Collection Operations, Analysis & Production, Counterintelligence, Geospatial & Topography, Plans & Integration, and Programs & Budget. The ANA GSG2 is also developing a National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). The NMIC is intended to provide all-source fusion and integration of intelligence for the ANA GSG2. The NMIC will consist of a Fusion Cell and an Afghan Security Operations Center. The GSG2 possesses the most robust of the Afghan intelligence training programs. GSG2 has an effective HUMINT program that provides “combat information,” but true intelligence analysis remains elusive. In response to continued threats within the ANSF, the ANA is receiving increasing external CI support, and the GSG2 counterintelligence program is expanding in numbers and scope through accelerated training and additional equipping.

Military Intelligence Kandaks (Battalions): Military Intelligence Battalions (referred to as MI

Kandaks) are being fielded for each corps and for the 111th Capital Division. MI Kandaks

consist of three Military Intelligence companies, each with a headquarters section, a HUMINT platoon, a low-level voice intercept platoon, a counterintelligence section, and an operations section. Thirteen MI companies of the 21 MI companies have been fielded as well as the core seven MI battalion staffs. Of the fielded companies, IJC assesses six are effectively performing support to brigade operations and the other seven are not fully operational. ANA GSG2 is conducting a familiarization program to teach corps and brigade commanders on how to best use MI company assets.