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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

1.4 Metodología de trabajo

1.4.7 Generación de alternativas de mejoramiento

FA C U L T Y O F CI V I L LA W PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

ART. 16

Persons criminally liable

The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:

1. Principals 2. Accomplices 3. Accessories

NOTE: This classification is true only under the RPC and is not used under special laws, because the penalties under special laws are never graduated. However, if a special law provides for the same graduated penalties as those provided under the RPC, the classification under the RPC may be adopted.

Parties in the commission of a crime

1. Active subject (the criminal) – only natural persons can be the active subject of crime because of the highly personal nature of the criminal responsibility.

2. Passive subject (the injured party) – the holder of the injured right: natural person, juridical person, group and the State

NOTE: Corpses and animals cannot be passive subjects because they have no rights that may be impaired, except, in the cases of corpses, the crime of defamation may be committed if the imputation tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead (Art. 353).

PRINCIPALS ART. 17

Different classifications of criminal responsibility

1. Individual criminal responsibility – When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for his personal act.

2. Quasi - collective criminal responsibility – Some offenders in the crime are principals and the others are accomplices.

3. Collective criminal responsibility – Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation.

Kinds of principals

1. Principal by direct participation 2. Principal by induction/inducement 3. Principal by indispensable cooperation

PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION

Principals by direct participation

Principals by direct participation are those who materially execute the crime. They appear at the crime scene and perform acts necessary for the commission of the crime.

Requisites

1. They participated in the criminal resolution. 2. They carried out the plan and personally took part

in its execution by acts, which directly tended to the same end.

NOTE: A conspirator who does not appear at the scene of the crime is not liable. His non-appearance is deemed a desistance on his part unless he is the mastermind.

“Personally took part in the commission of the crime”

1. The principal by direct participation must be at the scene of the commission of the crime, personally taking part in its execution.

2. Under conspiracy, although he was not present in the scene of the crime, he is equally liable as a principal by direct participation.

Liability of conspirators for another conspirator’s acts which differ radically and substantially from that which he intended to commit

Conspirators are liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such acts differ radically and substantially from that which they intend to commit.

Liability of conspirators for another’s killing which is not covered in the conspiracy

When the conspirators selected a particular individual to be a victim, and another person was killed by one of them, only that conspirator who killed another person would be liable.

PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION /INDUCEMENT

Principal by induction

Principals by induction are those who directly force or induce another to commit a crime. To be a principal by induction, it is necessary that the inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the principal by direct participation that is, without such, the crime would not have been committed.

Requisites

1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and

2. That the inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor.

NOTE: The inducement should precede the commission of the crime.

Q: A induced B to kill X by giving him Php 500, 000. For his part, B induced C to kill for Php300, 000. C induced D to kill X for Php200, 000. D killed X. Are A, B and C principals by inducement?

A: A and B are not principals by inducement because

they did not directly induce D to kill X. However, C is a principal by inducement because he directly induced D to kill X.

Inducement must be strong enough that the person induced could hardly resist. This is tantamount to an irresistible force compelling the person induced to carry out the execution of the crime. Thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime.

Ways of becoming a principal by induction

1. Directly forcing another to commit a crime by a. Using irresistible force – such physical force as would produce an effect upon the individual that in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument

b. Causing uncontrollable fear – compulsion by means of intimidation or threat that promises an evil of such gravity and eminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.

NOTE: Only the one using force or causing fear is criminally liable. The material executor is not criminally liable because of exempting circumstances of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear under par. 5 & 6 of Art. 12.

2. Directly inducing another to commit a crime by a. Giving price, offering, reward or promise Requisites:

i. Inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;

ii. Such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor.

b. By using words of commands Requisites:

i. The one uttering the words of command must have the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;

ii. He must have an ascendancy or influence over the person who acted;

iii. Words used must be so direct, so efficacious, and powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion;

iv. Words of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime;

v. Material executor of the crime has no personal reason to commit the crime.

NOTE: The one who used the words of command is a principal by induction while the one committing the crime because of the words of command is a principal by direct participation. There is a collective criminal responsibility.

Extent of inducement for a person to be held liable as principal by inducement

The inducement must be “so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed.” In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes (People v. Janjalani et. al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011).

Illustrative cases of principal by inducement by using words of command

1. In a prosecution for falsification of public document in the Information alleged that Ltc. Guillergan of the Armed Forces of the Philippines committed the offense charged by “causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.” Ltc. Guillergan ordered Technical Sergeant Butcon to sign the “received” portion of the payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on the same had

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U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N T O T O M A S FA C U L T Y O F CI V I L LA W signed the document when they in fact did not

(Guillergan v. People, G.R. 185493, Feb. 2, 2011). 2. A married woman suggested to her paramour,

with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations to kill her husband. After killing the husband, the guilty parties immediately escaped and lived together as man and wife until the time of their arrest (U.S. v. Alcontin, 24 Phil. 203).

Q: A asked B to kill C because of grave injustice done to A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much because of the reward promised to him but because he also had his own long-standing grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by