106 What led Rawls to make the changes he did? I have so far said that Rawls holds that any conception of justice, to be fully justified, must be able to be accompanied by a moral psychology which shows how the well-ordered society corresponding to that conception can be stable over time (subsections 3.2, 3.3, section 4). But the notion of stability has not been presented with all its elements as of yet (except in summary fashion in subsection 3.2. It was also briefly mentioned again in subsection 5.2). Rawls's full commitment is that any theory of a well-ordered society must show how that society can be “stable for the right reasons.”375
In this section, I first remark on when Rawls introduced the phrase, though not the idea, of stability for the right reasons to his theory. I then outline the two elements of stability for the right reasons, and I then show how they are interdependent.
Rawls does not make it easy to recognise just when and where the idea of stability for the right reasons is at work in his theory. The phrase “stability for the right reasons”
was only introduced in “Reply to Habermas”,376 and then subsequently incorporated into the introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism. There Rawls remarks that
The phrase “stability for the right reasons” does not occur in the text of PL, but
“stability” should usually be given that meaning in both Theory and PL, as the context determines.377
The idea of stability for the right reasons is present in the earlier and the later philosophy.
To illustrate this continuity with an example, when discussing “the criterion of stability” in Theory, Rawls notes that “some ethical theories have flouted it entirely.” The example he gives is of an interpretation of Benthamite Utilitarianism, in which psychological egoism is presumed. The utilitarian legislator arranges society's institutions so that, nevertheless, an artificial identification of interests results.378 But surely such a society could be stable and persist over time? The point is that it would not be the kind of stability Rawls is interested in. Rawls's contrast can only make sense if the meaning behind his use of the word
“stability” in this section of Theory is stability for the right reasons.379 Stability for the right reasons, then, does not enter only with Rawls's political liberalism.
Stability for the right reasons is a characteristic of well-ordered societies, and it has two elements. Stability obtains for the right reasons when the society is governed by a
375 PL, p. xxxvii
376 PL, pp. 388 fn21, 390, 392 377 PL, p. xxxvii
378 TJ, p. 455/399
379 TJ, pp. 453—455/397—399. For confirmation, see PL, p. xl
107 public conception of justice (section 2). The institutional arrangements of the society are hence publicly justified, and the society meets what Rawls calls the liberal principle of legitimacy (see below). Such a society, organised in accordance with the right sorts of reasons, is stable when human beings growing up in such a society are liable to develop a sense of justice strong enough to lead them to act so as to support the basic institutions of that society (subsection 3.2). Both these elements are essential. Not only must the
“character and interests [people form] by living under a just basic structure [be] strong enough to resist the normal tendencies to injustice.” In addition, the people's support of the justice of the society cannot be merely a function of them acting on the basis of other reasons or motivations.380 It must based on their express and “reasoned” support.381 In the manner I put it earlier in subsection 3.2, it must be in virtue of the members of the society being moved by the reasons found in the public conception that the well-ordered society and its institutions are sustained.
I now discuss each half of the idea of stability for the right reasons in turn. The second half of the “stability for the right reasons” slogan connects to the widely (though not ubiquitously)382 acknowledged liberal ideal of public justification. Jeremy Waldron eloquently characterises it:
the social order must be one that can be justified to the people who have to live under it ... a transparent order, in the sense that its workings and principles should be well-known and available for public apprehension and scrutiny.
People should know and understand the reasons for the basic distribution of wealth, power, authority, and freedom.383
This idea is not unique to Rawls, and is not restricted to his political liberalism, or other theories which accept the distinctive key element of that view. Certain writers place the idea of public justification at the heart of their work, whilst simultaneously rejecting Rawls's political liberalism.384
When the ideal of publicity obtains for a society, public justification is achieved. In the later philosophy, the ideas of public reason, and the liberal principle of legitimacy are
380 For an illustration of how we could conceive of principles of justice being supported by a society without the members of that society being moved by those principles itself, see Cohen (2008) pp. 127—129.
381 See JF, p. 185—186, PL, pp. 142—144 382 See fn389 below
383 Waldron (1993) pp. 57-58
384 One such writer is Gerald Gaus. See, for example, his (1996) pp. 3-5 for the endorsement of public justification, and (1996) pp. 131—136 and (2003) chapter 7, for the rejection of Rawls's political liberalism.
108 also introduced. Public reason, briefly put, is the body of knowledge, methods of inquiry, reasons and justifications from which are specified “the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their relation to one another.”385 Public justification is hence to be achieved through the use of public reasoning.
Given the nature of liberal democracy as a political order, Rawls assumes that public justification is needed in order for the institutions and constitution of society to be legitimate. A political order, in anything other than an anarchist society, is an expression of state power. State power, in an ideal liberal democracy, must ultimately only be wielded by citizens as a collective body. The apparatus of the state, which constitutes a huge resource of technological know-how and institutional machinery, must be used only in ways which can be given public justification. Hence, the ideal liberal state as an entity is not conceived as anything over and above the citizens of the state and the state apparatus taken together in conjunction. But state power – liberal or not – is always coercive power, backed by sanctions.386 Intuitively, this is enough to urge the need for legitimacy. But beyond even this, the political structure and basic institutions of a society impact on the character and aims of those who develop under them in profound and deep ways. Such a great impact also calls for justification. The ways in which the social order influences our upbringing must be capable of some appropriate kind of reflective endorsement by each member of society when they reach maturity.387
The liberal principle of legitimacy, as Rawls formulates it, states that “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”388 Public reason is the common human reason spoken of here, or at least a major section of it. Any liberal view which endorses the idea of public justification – which aims to bring about a liberal regime governed by the right reasons, meaning public reasons389 – has need of a similar principle of legitimacy. I'll call these public justification
385 PL, pp. 441—442, CP, p. 574, LP, p. 132 386 PL, pp. 68, 136, 216—217, CP, p. 482
387 PL, pp. 68, 269—271, TJ, p. 7/6—7. See also TJ, pp. 514—519/451—456, on autonomy, which at least in part is conceived as a kind of reflective endorsement of how our upbringing influenced the
development of our character.
388 PL, p. 137
389 Not all liberalisms endorse the ideal of public justification, or place it at the centre of the idea of liberalism. These include certain Hobbesian liberalisms, certain value—pluralist liberalisms, and certain perfectionist liberalisms. In this taxonomy I have followed Quong (2011) pp. 12—21. I do not say that all varieties of these liberalisms must reject or downplay the importance of public justification, but at least some examples of each do so. See in addition fn108 below.
109 liberalisms.390
So the well-ordered society of Justice as Fairness must be governed by the right reasons: public reasons. But the society must also be stable, and stable for those reasons.
The well-ordered society must not only possess a public conception of justice. It must also persist, given favourable conditions. And it must persist, given favourable conditions, due to its public conception.
The idea of stability spoken of here is essentially the same as that outlined in subsection 3.2 and elsewhere. I summarise it again here. It can be boiled down to two elements. The members of the well-ordered society must be able to realise a moral sensibility the content of which is given by the public conception of justice. As we have seen, this sensibility consists in the two moral powers. Furthermore, this sensibility must be compatible with human nature more generally. This means that the psychological strength of the motivations incorporated into the moral powers, and the strength of the other motivations which are congruent with those powers, must win out, at least in favourable conditions, against the strength of whatever further motivations human beings may be capable of developing under the institutions of the well-ordered society. Realising such a moral sensibility means that the members of the society grasp and are moved by the right reasons. The greater strength of these motivations, in comparison to opposing, unjust motivations, makes the society stable.
The account of the correct public conception, and the correct account of a stable well-ordered society, are interdependent. It should be remembered from chapter 2 that a well-ordered society must be sufficiently stable in order for a conception of justice to be justified, all-things-considered. To recap, a proposed conception of justice can fail in the argument from the original position in three ways. First, its principles can directly fail to meet the fundamental interests of the representees of the parties in the original position.
But even if this test is met, a proposed conception of justice can fail if, second, it fails to be associated with a suitable moral psychology capable of (1) being realised by human beings, and (2) winning out against the special psychologies. If it is unable to meet one or both of these requirements, it would hence be futile. Third, and finally, it may be that all these requirements may be met, and so the conception of justice will be likely enough to be stable, given favourable circumstances. But it may be that the conception is comparatively less stable than some other conception which meets all the same criteria. It may come with
390 This moniker follows Quong (2011) p. 17, though on his usage public justification liberalism is a variety of political liberalism. I have restricted the term “political liberalism” to Rawls's view, or those positions which share the distinctive basic commitments of Rawls's political liberalism. These are outlined in subsection 14.1. I have not used Gaus's “justificatory liberalism” as I believe this is better reserved for Gaus's own view. See, for example, Gaus (1996), (2003) chapter 8.
110 a higher risk of being unstable, as was considered in chapter 2. The alternative conception will then win out in the parties' overall judgement, and the conception will have failed the test of arbitration.
If a given set of principles of justice fails the futility test,391 then even if a society manages to come about which is governed by the corresponding public conception of justice, we can assume that many members of that society will eventually be moved to act unjustly. The ones who possess sufficient power will succeed. In so far as these powerful individuals use their power to alter the basic structure of society, the institutions of the society will become unjust. They will no longer be an expression of the collectively exercised power of the people, constrained by the requirements of public justification. The institutions will be an expression of the will of the most powerful factions in society. This amounts to the well-ordered society being unstable, for by definition a well-ordered society is governed and its power employed in accordance with its public conception of justice.
Hence that conception of justice is unable to be sustained, even under ideal conditions.
By the requirements of the argument from the original position, this means that that conception of justice is unjustified, all-things-considered. But this means that the principles of that conception cannot provide the right public reasons by which a well-ordered society is to be governed. Even though we can imagine that this conception is capable of being realised as public conception, it is incapable of being sustained. This means it is unstable.
But therefore, such a society was never governed by the right public reasons in the first place, as the right reasons must always be stable reasons over time.
In summary, stability for the right reasons obtains only for conceptions of justice which can be public conceptions shared between the members of the well-ordered society and which are stable over time. Reasons cannot be the right reasons without also being stable. And a conception of justice cannot be stable for the right reasons without its well-ordered society being governed by a public conception of justice. Hence, as was just stated, the account of the correct public conception of justice and the account of the stable well-ordered society are interdependent. It is important to get this dual-criterion on any conception of justice right in order to be clear on why the issue of stability for the right reasons leads to the revision of Justice as Fairness into a politically liberal theory.