Genes que potencialmente codifican factores de virulencia en Avpg5

Demonstrating the existence o f a positive willingness to pay for the preservation of Bulgarian monasteries and its distribution amongst population segments is only half of the story. The logical follow-up is to investigate how the estimated values can then be captured. Capture involves turning willingness to pay into actual cash flows and, of considerable importance, ensuring that at least a significant proportion of those cash flows reach those in the local community who can help conserve the assets. This feature of capture mechanisms helps define the role of cultural capital in poverty alleviation.

which is especially important in countries such as Bulgaria, with one of the lowest GDP per capita of Eastern Europe.

The findings reported in this chapter have important implications in the range and design of capture mechanisms that can be used to appropriate the estimated benefits of monasteries conservation. Any financing mechanism should bear in mind the heterogeneous distribution o f benefits across the population and, particularly, the fact that a significant proportion of the public is not willing to pay for the protection of monasteries. Whatever the moral arguments for heritage conservation, the survey showed that a significant proportion of the population feel that resources spent on monasteries conservation could be used to meet other, in their view more important, concerns that might also be described as ‘rights’ (Pearce, 1999). As such, using general tax increases, as described in the questionnaire, may not be an adequate way of achieving conservation objectives and one with undesirable distributional impacts. As Peacock (1997) notes:

‘...one cannot see ‘strong heritage sustainability’ surviving the test of support from those who are meant to benefit firom heritage services - usually the taxpayers - even if the ‘beneficiaries’ are willing to assign the task of running such services to the cognoscenti.’

In view of the survey results, what mechanisms could then possibly be used to finance a conservation programme for Bulgarian monasteries?

At the moment, in Bulgaria, the financing structure is unclear even for those working in the monasteries sector; hence the state o f decay encountered in many sites. There is no unique mechanism to finance conservation and repair works. Most financial support is linked to the state budget, either directly or indirectly through the Ministry of Culture, the National Institute of Cultural Monuments, the Directory o f Religious Affairs and the regional municipalities. The economic rationale for the use of state grants is the theory o f public goods. Essentially, there is a presumption that individuals will understate their true willingness to pay for the benefits of a public good because (i) its provision can be jointly enjoyed by everyone and (ii) no individual can be excluded

from its benefits. Other sources of revenue come from national and international non­ governmental organisations, charitable contributions from individuals and corporations, from visitor expenditures and from the monaisteries own economic activities such as agriculture. However, the share of cultural expenditures in the state budget has decreased sharply over recent years and the available funds are believed to be largely insufficient to restore deteriorated monasteries and maintain the state of the remaining.

This study may help make a case for public subsidy, demonstrating the existence of considerable social benefits. However, in a country such as Bulgaria, the presumptive case for state provision is further eroded by the risks of state finance, not least the likelihood that heritage may be seen as a Tuxuiy’ item in times of hardship for the pubhc revenues. Additionally, state finance may lead to some state control, and centralised bureaucrats may not be the best judges of how optimally to exploit cultural heritage for the benefit of the nation as a whole. Cultural ministries are often the last to receive disbursements, and revenues from cultural assets frequently do not accrue in full to the heritage itself or even to cultural ministries. Long-term sustainability thus implies the need to look at alternative innovative financing mechanisms.

In general, innovative finance means trying to minimise the role that the state plays in financing conservation (Pearce and Mourato, 1998). It does not imply wholesale surrender to ‘the market’, but it does make far more use of markets than conventional public finance approaches to conservation. The rationale for this is that such approaches reduce demand on public expenditure which can then be redirected to other basic social needs; that they avoid the risks o f cyclical financing as public expenditure is controlled for macroeconomic reasons; and that heritage conservation is made, as far as possible independent of the whims of politicians.

Cultural assets such as Bulgarian monasteries are in fact ‘mixed’ goods. They have public good characteristics in that benefits of its existence can be conferred on everyone without any one person reducing the benefits of any other. The survey showed that these non-use motivations are important determinants of value. But the overwhelming

For example, work on charitable donations in the UK has shown that donations probably understate the ‘true’ willingness of pay of individuals by about 40% due to the public good nature of charitable activities (Foster et al, 1999).

majority of Bulgarians visit their monasteries as well. The direct enjoyment from the visits is more akin to a ‘club’ good, one that can be shared up to the point where crowding occurs and individual enjoyment is diminished by the presence o f one more user. Moreover, to some extent, cultural assets can be priced in such a way that those who are not willing to pay a given price for it can be excluded.

It is this ‘mixed’ nature of heritage assets such as monasteries that makes state provision only one amongst several possibilities. In recent years many countries have experimented with the introduction of self-financing or partial self-financing entry and view charge systems for cultural goods. Charging for ‘use’ o f the cultural asset is the clearest way to capture economic value.

The obvious problem with market pricing is that it may defeat the wider objective of securing the widest possible appreciation of monasteries because optimal pricing deters people from the site or asset. In particular, the idea of charging for religious heritage may seem objectionable, although the survey showed that only 12% of people visit monasteries for religious purposes. Moreover, monasteries in Bulgaria have historically been regarded more as centres for cultural enlightenment and national spirit than of religious worship (Berbenliev, 1985). Currently, entrance is free in monasteries in Bulgaria.

To some extent these ethical issues can be overcome in a number of ways.

First, fees can be charged in optional complementary services such as car parks, museums, visitor facilities, restaurants and souvenir shops. This would allow everyone to enjoy the monastery, while capturing some o f the willingness to pay o f the wealthiest visitors. Some of the existing facilities in monasteries, such as museums, already charge entry fees, but most pricing takes little or no account of demand, often set historically with no real idea of the potential for raising prices to increase revenues.

Second, some discrimination in pricing is perfectly possible. The most familiar is the charging of different prices to national and foreign visitors. This ‘two tier’ pricing is already current practice in some monasteries. For example, the Rila Monastery Museum discriminates prices between Bulgarians and foreign tourists. Given the expenditure already undertaken by overseas visitors in just getting to Bulgaria, incremental admission charges tend to be a tiny additional burden and are willingly paid. Charges

can also be varied according to the provision of services, such as special exhibitions. Issues such as congestion and tourist ‘carrying capacity’ of the site should also be taken into account when designing such pricing mechanisms. A more precise study of access to the site would allow a price elasticity of demand to be estimated.

A specially innovative process for raising finance that mixes charging and private finance can occur when local commercial interests form partnerships with the heritage managers to rehabilitate heritage areas (Pearce and Mourato, 1998). Not only is the cultural asset rehabilitated but the surrounding area might be redeveloped to include landscaped area, restaurants, shops etc. Once rehabilitated, proper (‘optimal’) charging can be introduced for at least some aspects of the heritage site, whilst the surrounding private sector interests benefit from increased tourism.

However, while the potential for generating visitor revenues may be quite substantial in the case of the most famous monasteries, user values alone may not be enough to deliver sustainability for the large majority o f less known monasteries. Hence, alternative financing mechanisms, that also take into account the complex distribution of existing values, should be investigated.

In particular public donations receive most attention in the public’s mind when considering charitable activity, including the conservation of cultural monuments. In 1996-1997, voluntary giving to environment and heritage charities in the UK generated over £0.1 billion, demonstrating the importance that voluntary givers attach to these issues (Charities Aid Foundation, 1998). Indeed, the econometric models presented in this chapter have shown the importance of charitable giving as a determinant of the desire to pay to conserve monasteries. In addition, charitable donations can be subject to tax allowances - in themselves, these special tax provisions are powerful weapons for conservation.

Donations are voluntary, thus subject to free-riding. However, they are compatible with situations where the benefits are concentrated in certain segments of the population that, once identified, could be the focus of especially targeted appeals.

An interesting ‘model’ of financing heritage conservation is the UK’s National Trust. The Trust is the largest conservation charity in Europe, protecting through ownership some 244,564 hectares and 575 miles of coastline. 251 historically important properties

were opened to the public in 1997 attracting 11.7 million paying visitors. Virtually all its finance is private, coming firom membership and donations. In 1997 the Trust had an income of £204 million, inclusive of all sources of income, o f which £85 million comes as donations, gifts and membership revenues (firom its 2.5 million members). By its charter all its activities are dedicated to the benefit of existing and future generations, and not just to those who are members. The Trust is widely regarded as an important instance of the potential for financing cultural heritage with money fi*om the general pubhc and the private sector (Sawers, 1998). A similar organisation, specialising in financing of conservation using public and corporate donations, could be a way of financing heritage conservation in Bulgaria.

A final possibility is a state lottery. Many countries have state or local lotteries. Lotteries are controversial because they define a ‘fuzzy’ area between gambling and altruistic behaviour through donor activity, purchasers of tickets being aware that a firaction of proceeds go to charity (Pearce and Mourato, 1998). Provided they conform to underlying cultural values, they can be extremely powerful sources of finance. In 1997, for example, the Heritage Lottery Fund in the UK awarded more than 600 grants to heritage projects, worth £405 million, which constitutes an enormous boost to the heritage sector (Heritage Lottery Fund, 1997).

This study demonstrated a rationale for public subsidy in the case of conservation of Bulgarian Christian-Orthodox monasteries. In addition, the alternative financing mechanisms explored above show how revenues can be increased, even in the presence of a large proportion of people with low values, thus making the heritage asset more self-financing, avoiding reliance on the vicissitudes of state funding. It would be interesting to investigate the sensitivity of the value of conservation to changes in the payment and provision mechanisms. Future valuation research should focus not only in demonstrating values but also in exploring ways in which they can be realised, along the lines suggested in this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING MODELS OF NON-USE VALUE OF