Germany

Some argue that the methodology of scientific research programs has been overtaken by subsequent philosophizing, much of which concludes that neither temporal nor heuristic novelty offers useful measures of progress.⁵⁸ To be sure, Lakatos has become less popular. At the 1989 Capri conference on research programs in economics, for

developments in the history of psychology: “any successful defense of the claim that psychology is a science must show features of psychology that are shared by some other science or sciences.” See Barry Gholson and Peter Barker, “Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan: Applications in the History of Physics and Psychology,” American Psychologist, Vol. 40, No. 7 (1985), p. 766.

57. See, for example, T. Hagerstrand, ed., The Identification of Progress in Learning (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

58. Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931–935.

example, supporters of his methodology were a beleaguered minority:

“Of the 37 participants ... only 12 were willing to give Lakatos a further run for his money and of the 17 papers delivered at the conference not more than five were unambiguously positive about the value of Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs.”⁵⁹

While Lakatos’s methodology is no longer as favored as it once was, his ideas remain of interest to, and are still engaged by, philosophers of science and methodologists. For example, citing Lakatos, philosopher of science Jarrett Leplin argues that theories should be justified “on the basis of their successful novel predictions.”⁶⁰ Invoking both heuristic and background theory novelty, Leplin suggests that a successful theory is one that anticipates “experiences of a kind not involved in its development or original application,” and that predicts facts that are not accounted for by competing explanations. He shows that the historical records of several theories in physics and astronomy reflect a concern with predictive novelty.⁶¹

Similarly, philosopher of science Deborah G. Mayo engages at considerable length the “proposed notions of novelty” offered by the

“Lakatos-Popper school.”⁶² She notes that “the question of what counts as novel evidence for a hypothesis” can be restated in terms of the more “general question of what counts as a severe test.”⁶³ Mayo agrees

59. Mark Blaug, “Afterword,” in de Marchi and Blaug, Appraising Economic Theories, p. 500. See also de Marchi, “Introduction: Rethinking Lakatos,” pp.

18–19; and Backhouse, Explorations in Economic Methodology, pp. 2–4.

60. Leplin, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, pp. 78, 98–100. See also Ladyman, “Review of A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism,” p. 183.

61. Leplin, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, pp. 33, 49, 64, 77, 83–97, 184–

185. For additional discussions, see Nickles, “Lakatosian Heuristics and Epistemic Support,” pp. 198–204; and Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan, Scrutinizing Science, pp. 31, 35–37.

62. Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, p. 256; see also pp.

251–293.

63. Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, p. 208. “Severe testing” is central to Mayo’s methodology. On the importance of “severe tests,” Karl Popper wrote, “The theoretician will ... try his best to detect any false theory among the set of non-refuted competitors; he will try to ‘catch’ it.

that Lakatosian proponents have an “important kernel of rightness ...

[in that] aspects of the hypotheses and data generation procedures need to be taken into account in assessing the goodness of tests. They may be relevant to the error probabilities and so to the severity of the overall experimental tests.”⁶⁴ In particular, while Mayo insists that not all novel tests are severe tests (or vice versa), she argues that violating the “Zahar-Worrall [criterion] of heuristic novelty” should be avoided if it is likely to diminish the reliability or severity of hypothesis testing.⁶⁵

Scholars in the social sciences also find Lakatos’s novelty criteria important indicators of progress. For example, economist Roger E.

Backhouse acknowledges that, although there are “problems” with applying Lakatos’s methodology to economics, “it nonetheless provides a useful framework for thinking about certain methodo-logical issues.”⁶⁶ Likewise, Mark Blaug “remains convinced that Lakatos is still capable of inspiring fruitful work in methodology.”⁶⁷ Sociologists and psychologists have also argued that their theories can be considered scientific because their development and acceptance or rejection follow Lakatos’s description of scientific change.⁶⁸

These examples notwithstanding, however, there is no doubt that philosophy of science has moved a considerable distance in the last twenty-five years, and during that time the methodology of scientific

That is, he will, with respect to any given non-refuted theory, try to think of cases or situations in which it is likely to fail, if it is false. Thus he will try to construct severe tests, and crucial test situations.” Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 14. See also Chapter 14 by Andrew Bennett, p. 471.

64. Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, p. 253.

65. Mayo, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, pp. 253, 259, 275, 278, 292.

66. Backhouse, Explorations in Economic Methodology, p. 4.

67. Blaug, “Afterword,” pp. 510–511.

68. Gholson and Barker, “Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan.” See also R. Boudon,

“Scientific Advancement in Sociology,” in Hagerstrand, The Identification of Progress in Learning, pp. 91–114; and Michael Burawoy, “Two Methods in Search of Science,” Theory and Society, Vol. 6, No. 18 (1989), pp. 759–805.

research programs has become a great deal less fashionable.⁶⁹ We readily acknowledge that epistemological advice based on contemporary philosophy of science would be far removed from the international relations subfield’s present practices. It is indisputable that mainstream IR is firmly characterized by commitments both to paradigmatism and to the belief that there are generally applicable and rational grounds for distinguishing good and bad theories.⁷⁰ Our concern here is not that these practices may be old-fashioned when compared to modern philosophy, but that they have become detached from the metatheories that originally provoked, sustained, and justified them. They have become ingrained habits rather than

69. Much of the opposition to the methodology centers on Lakatos’s appraisal criteria, especially the emphasis on novel facts. More fundamental criticisms, however, address not only particular elements of the methodology but the predicate question of whether it is possible to make any reliable generalizations about scientific change. If science is predominantly irrational, and actual research activities are guided by socialization and internalization, then prestige, propaganda, and polemics will determine which theory wins the day. As Larry Laudan unsympathetically relates, such a skeptical position is reinforced by general arguments of cultural relativism: science is just one set of beliefs among many possible ones, and the West venerates science not because it is more rational but because “we are a product of a culture that has traditionally set great store by science.” See Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 3. According to this view, science is an ideology in which objective, rational preference is impossible and, as Mark Neufeld observes, where the “standards for what constitutes reliable knowledge are human constructs and social conventions.” Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 50. We accept that adopting a radically skeptical view would undermine the utility of Lakatos’s methodology (ibid., pp. 51, 137–138, note 5).

However, it would also entail abandoning almost all mainstream political science.

70. By “paradigmatism” we refer to the position that scientific disciplines are best viewed in terms of durable theoretical aggregates. Disciplinary surveys are structured around these aggregates; theory development and empirical investigations are done in the name of bolstering or undermining them. In IR, paradigmatism is most clearly signaled by the subfield’s attachment to the

“isms,” particularly realism or liberalism.

deliberate, thoughtful choices. In short, while accepting that Lakatos may be unpopular and even discredited in some circles, we maintain that it is nonetheless necessary to undertake a comprehensive reengagement of the epistemological underpinnings of the subfield’s attachment to “rational” paradigmatism. As Giovanni Sartori suggests, if “methodological discussions are often reinventing what has been forgotten,” rediscovering “the forgotten known is just as important as discover[ing] (anew) an unknown.”⁷¹

lakatos’s methodology does not work for a social