Gestión de la Comunicación

4.3.1 Party Governance

The CCP is the highest political authority in China and its position is monopolistic. The function of the state system is mediated through the Party’s networks. The organisational principles of the Party are based on the idea of democratic centralism, but in fact democratic decision-making from below has never been achieved in practice. The Party has sought to extend its hierarchical authority into almost all aspects of life, including education, industry, commerce and the military (Hunter and Sexton, 1999: 101). The state institutions, such as legislative bodies, courts of justice, prosecutors’ offices, and various levels of government, have been used to materialise the Party’s dominant leadership.7 The Party’s governance structure was originally based on the CCP’s organisational system at the revolutionary base and was combined with the Soviet administrative systems. The

legitimacy of the CCP’s rule is expressed in its leading role (lingdao), which is based on

two preconditions: (1 ) the CCP’s leading role over all parties; (2) the absolute control over military power (Wang, 1995: 314). Thus, China’s authoritative structure gives the CCP the leading role as the highest authority, the military power (subordinate to the CCP) as the

second highest authority, and the state system as the third highest authority. ' The CCP was established in 1921 with some 50 members, but by 1999 it had about 63 million members and was the world’s largest political party (Yabuki, 2000). The CCP is declared to be China’s only ruling party in the preface to the Chinese Constitution. The leadership role has three elements: leadership over the activities o f state politics; leadership over the state organisations through the CCP’s grasp of the leading position o f the state institutions; and leadership over the fundamental idea for state activities through education and guidance (Xie, Yang and Yan, 1999: 183). The CCP seeks to exercise political leadership and state authority by itself, reflecting the principle of the inseparable relation’ between Party and

Government (dang-zheng bufert) (To, 1997: 1).

The Party Committee System (dangyveiyuanhuizhi) exists in parallel with the hierarchy of

administrative levels from the centre down to the basic unit. This system is intended to guarantee the leadership of the CCP over the authority of state institutions and society (Wang, 1995: 330). The Party’s command system has two features. One is the horizontal concentration on the Party Committee at each level (horizontal unified leadership). There is a vertical command system between the centre and local Party organisations (vertical unified leadership). The Party 's leadership role in terms of its command system is based on horizontal concentration at the same level and vertical concentration between the different levels. Thus, in contrast to the former Soviet system, in the Chinese system authority is horizontally centralised to the Party Committee at each level (Cho, 1998: 211). The concentration of local power is evident in the fact that provincial Party leaders are concurrently provincial governors as well as members of the People’s Congress and the Central Party Committee. The local Party leaders at all levels have absolute authority in local politics. Thus, if they manage the regional economy well, this guarantees them promotion in the Party ’s hierarchy.

4.3.2 The Restructuring o f Party Governance

The formal system o f CCP authority has been subject to frequent modification. Zheng contrasts the earlier decentralisation of 1958-60, when power was transferred from central to provincial Party committees, with the decentralisation of the 1980s and 1990s, when power was transferred from the Party committees to the provincial governments 'As a result, provincial Party committees no longer have as much power to control the local

economy’ (Zheng, 1997: 220). In 1980, at a Politburo meeting, Deng Xiaoping complained that the excessive concentration o f power in the hands of Party committees was the main obstacle to the creation of a modem leadership system (Chang, 1995: 75). Yet at the same time the Party leaders in Beijing continue to influence the composition of provincial and

sub-provincial governments through the so-called nomenklatura system. There are, for

example, frequent transfers of Party and government officials across regions and between Beijing and the provinces (Zheng, 1997: 221). Yabuki (2000) points out that provincial First Party Secretaries are transferred across provinces more often than the Governors.1" The Party Secretaries are expected to exercise a leading role in line with the decisions of the centre (vertical unified leadership), while Governors are expected to carry out policies while taking into account local needs (local initiative) (Yabuki, 2000: 135).

The process of economic reform has exacerbated the diffusion of authority, since it has given various economic powers to the localities. The integrated Party-state has promoted the commercialisation of the Party organisation. The relationship between the central and sub-central levels can no longer be seen simply in terms of the old "command and control’ model typical o f traditional state socialism. Indeed, Song (2000: 122-3) argues that the old hierarchical system has been "undermined’: ‘China is gradually but inexorably becoming a state where there is considerable diffusion of power’. As the market economy has developed, it has required the centre to allow lower’ levels to assume more autonomy and, in many cases, to assume functions of an entrepreneurial nature which are beyond the administrative capacity of the centre. Since a strong entrepreneurial class in the private sector has been slow to develop in mainland China, and since the authorities have sought to regulate the transition to a market economy as much as possible, then the entrepreneurial (quasi-public/quasi-private) role o f the lower levels o f administration has been of crucial importance. In this respect, a key issue is how far the growing autonomy of the lower levels of government in China has been matched by the growing autonomy of local cadres, and whether the increasing entrepreneurial role of provincial and sub-provincial governments has involved the growing influence o f non-Party personnel. Furthermore, some local Party cadres have lost interest in promotion within the hierarchical Party system. As they are involved directly in efforts to maximise economic incentives, it is natural that some will be more interested in economic profit than personal promotion.

The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has further accelerated the diffusion of authority. Until 1992, the reform o f SOEs mainly involved the expansion o f the decision-making capacity of enterprises. The contracted management responsibility system was implemented between 1987 and 1991, but this did not diminish the interference of the government in the management of firms. Since 1992, the further reform of SOEs has focused on the transformation of enterprises into stock companies. In 1995, there were about 120,000 state-owned enterprises in China, each of which was under the control of the governments (at the central, provincial and sub-provincial levels). The sharp growth of township and village enterprises (TVEs), which are owned by local governments (towns and villages), exacerbated the difficulties of small and medium SOEs. The privatisation of the latter then began in 1995. In 1998, private firms were constitutionally admitted as an important part of the socialist market economy. By 1999, private firms, including

individual small firms, already employed about 80 million workers (NKS., 5 July 2000).

Between 1990 and 1999, the total number of absorptive takeovers by private firms of

state-owned firms was 5,600 (NKS, 5 July 2000). Accordingly, there has been a steady

transfer of Party cadres into private firms since the late 1990s, and this is expected to promote the further diffusion of authority and accelerate the blurring o f the public/private distinction. Thus, the attraction of promotion within the Party’s hierarchical system is now subject to more economic incentives.

The overheating of regional self-interest has raised some serious problems for the future system of Chinese governance. One negative feature of the processes of reform is that China has had to face a serious problem of corruption. It is estimated that almost 90% of all collected levies are either unauthorised or illegal (Pei, 1999: 101). Another investigation in 1998 uncovered more than 3,400 different fees illegally levied by local governments and their agencies (ibid.: 101). In April 1995, the Deputy Mayor of Beijing (Wang Baosen) committed suicide as he was about to be charged with embezzling the equivalent of 37 million dollars, and the Beijing Party boss (and CCP Politburo member) - Chen Xitong - was also forced to resign (Zheng, 1997: 209). This is just one example of a growing trend of corruption within the CCP, suggesting that the Party has lost the capacity to control its members. Accordingly, there is a growing recognition that effective economic development requires the talents of non-Party entrepreneurs and skilled business personnel

who are not associated with Party corruption. As, gradually, China’s entrepreneurial middle class grows in size, it will undoubtedly seek more influence in the process of policy-making, and this will almost certainly further undermine the role o f Party cadres.11