GESTIÓN DE SUSTANCIAS QUÍMICAS PELIGROSAS

Although Iran had a long legacy of military might under successive powerful empires, it was not until the 1920s that it developed a unified national army.

Historically, separate units of armed and tribal groups lent their support to the Iranian emperors and monarchs to fight wars and deflect invaders (Kazemi, 1980, p.218). Iran’s experiment with a model of military modernisation dates back to the eighteenth century during the Qajar dynasty. Humiliated by the crushing defeat and the loss of territories to Russia, the Iranian modernisers in the Qajar court undertook various measures aimed at reforming the traditional structure of the army in order to bolster Iran’s defence (Cronin, 1997, p. 2; also see Lampton, 1987, p.98). The

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earliest attempt in this period at modernising the army based on the European model was made by Abbas Mirza, the crown prince (vali’ahd) and the Governor of the Azarbaijan, who sought to develop a standing army that would protect the Iranian territory against further Russian invasion. For this purpose, he developed a program called Nazam-e Jadid based on the Ottoman model of military restructuring. Under this program, Abbas Mirza brought the first French and British instructors into Iran and dispatched students abroad for military training; however, Abbas Mirza’s program failed because of internal opposition and further loss of territory in the war with Russia (Cronin, 1997, p. 2). The Qajar period witnessed two additional efforts for the development of an army based on the European model: the first under Amir Kabir in 1848-51 and the second under Mirza Husayn Khan, Moshir al-Dowlah, in the 1870s. Like their predecessor, both Amir Kabir and Moshir al-Dowleh adopted a program based on the Ottoman model, albeit implemented more rigorously. This included the importation of foreign military instructors, the introduction of measures for financial reforms of the army, the setting up of new recruitment practices and the development of indigenous arms production. Amir Kabir implemented a new type of recruitment and instituted Dar al-Funawn, an elite school which provided military education in its curriculum. Two decades later, Mushir al-Dawleh created the Cossack Brigade, a military cavalry influenced by Russian tutelage (Cronin, 1997, p.3; Bakhash, 1978, p.100).

These early measures brought a degree of modernisation to the army in seeking to establish central control over the army’s finances, to eliminate nepotism and to upgrade its structure and capability through the selection of skilled officers, foreign instructors and the purchase of modern weapons. Nonetheless, they only introduced limited changes into the structure of the army, the composition of the military budget and training and tactics (Bakhash, 1978, p. 100). One of the obstacles to modernisation of the army was the problem of regular payment necessary for the delivery of military equipment. This, coupled with the lack of a modern bureaucratic organisation for provision of military supplies and goods for the troops, stalled the development of the army as a unified fighting force (Lampton, 1987, pp. 98-99).

Another factor that curtailed the formation of a centralised army was the involvement of certain European powers and their use of Iran as a sphere of

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influence in competition amongst themselves. This involvement brought about a measure of foreign control over army reorganisation, allowing for no more than a cosmetic change in its traditional structure (Cronin, 1997, p.3). As a result, the bulk of Iran’s defence force remained composed of a permanent royal forces and an irregular cavalry and artillery based on tribal levies (Bakhash, 1978, p 100; also see Lampton, 1987, p. 98).

The fall of Qajar and the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty by Reza Khan signified the beginning of modern state-building in the Iranian history. This period was accompanied by a considerable growth in the centralisation of state power. This went hand in hand with an increasing centralisation of the Iranian military and its involvement in the Iranian society. Ascending to power through the use of the Cossack regiment in the coup of 1921 before he was crowned king, Reza Shah continued to boost his authority by creating a loyal national military. The national military was a newly developed institution that, along with a modern bureaucracy and extensive court patronage, constituted a central pillar of the new political structure (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 136). To restructure the Iranian army based on the European model, Reza Shah eliminated some military units while incorporating the rest into a unified army (Kazemi, 1980, p. 220). In 1925 he requested that the Iranian Majles pass a law introducing compulsory military service for all men aged 21 and over (Kazemi, 1980, p. 220). As a result of a fivefold increase in the annual defence budget from 1926 to 1941, as well as the establishment of the conscription law in villages and towns, the armed forces were transformed from five divisions totalling 40,000 men to eighteen divisions totalling 127,000 men (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 136).

The armed forces were critical to the centralisation of state power, both through restoring peace and order in troubled areas and through implementing social and political reform in the modern state. The army’s vital role in the making of the modern Iranian state was carefully kept in check through its loyalty to the person of Reza Shah. This was reinforced by a civil-military symbiosis based on mutual interest, as the officers in the Cossack Brigade (who constituted the army’s commanders) were aware that their individual status relied on the centrally controlled military structure (Cronin, 1997, p. 190-205).

The second Pahlavi monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah, gradually consolidated his power and central authority via support of the military after a decade of political

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upheaval that followed his father’s forced abdication at the hands of the Allies in 1941. One of the defining episodes in the first decade of the Shah’s reign was the debate over oil nationalisation, and the efforts of a popular coalition, known as the National Front, to gain control over Iranian oil from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Led by Dr. Mohammad Mossadiq, the leader of the National Front, the Bill for Nationalisation was passed by the Majles in March 1951. Mossadiq became the Prime Minister following the resignation of Hussein Ala, a Conservative politician, who supported a formula that proposed a fifty-fifty profit share between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Anglo-Iranian government (Katouzian, 1981, pp. 169-170).

During the two years in which Mossadiq presided over the government, he was responsible for far-reaching reforms which stripped the Shah of his absolute authority. A key action was the reform of the armed forces. Mossadiq eventually won control of the armed forces after his conflict with the Shah over the issue culminated in his resignation, only to be brought back to the post in the aftermath of massive demonstrations and riots in support of him. Entrusted with the responsibility for the Ministry of National Defence, Mossadiq purged a number of pro-Shah army generals who were corrupt and disloyal to the government. He was aided in this task by a network within the military loyal to the authority of the government, known as the ‘patriotic officers’ (Katouzian, 1990, pp. 131-132). The purged officers, however, remained active in opposing the government and constituted the bulk of the forces behind the successive coups of August 1953, which, with the help of the United States and Britain, overthrew Mossadiq and restored the Shah to power.

The post-Mossadiq era was marked by the centralisation of power in the hands of the Shah. This was particularly evident after the dismissal of Premier Zahedi, a former general who had a leading role in the overthrow of the Mossadiq government, in early 1955. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Shah implemented a host of measures to gain absolute control over the military and security apparatus. While heavily relying on the assistance from the United States, the Shah carried out a major overhaul of the military and security forces. To this end, a growing number of US military advisors were brought to Iran over the years. It is estimated that before the 1979 revolution, more than 20,000 US advisors, granted with extra-territorial rights and exempt from prosecution under Iranian law, were engaged in defence-related contracts (Bill, 1988, pp. 155-157). With the assistance

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of the United States, the Shah also created the State Security and Intelligence Organisation (SAVAK) to crush domestic opposition to the Pahlavi regime (see Halliday, 1979, pp. 78-90). The army underwent rapid growth in the size and quality of its sophisticated weaponry, especially in the 1970s, during which the rise in oil revenues increased the Shah’s purchases of arms from American firms (Kazemi, 1980, p. 233). The western influx of arms and financial support to Iran was prompted by the status of Iran as a regional power set against communism, as well as the Shah’s ambition to strengthen his autonomy and power and thus to offset both domestic forces in Iran and great powers abroad (Katouzian, 1981, pp. 318-319). In addition, the military budget grew astronomically, from 2,544 million rials in 1954 to 92,100 million rials in 1972. Another significant change during the 1970s was the rapid growth in the size of the military: the armed forces on active duty totalled over a quarter of a million (Kazemi, 1980, p. 233).

Despite these changes, the military could not resist the tide of revolution that broke out in 1978 and dismantled the Pahlavi dynasty in the course of a year. A host of factors contributed to the armed forces’ inability to suppress the protests, leading in turn to the defection of its segments to the revolutionary forces. The first factor was the way in which the Shah attempted to dominate the armed forces. Though the armed forces proved to be loyal to the Shah, a few instances of opposition within the military-security sector – first from the Tudeh network in 1954 and later from his once-loyal allies – had made the Shah wary of potential threats to his rule from military personnel. To hinder the emergence of a potential rival, he sought to prevent the military’s involvement in politics while relying on the armed forces as an instrument of coercion. The Shah encouraged competition among the military-security personnel while being careful not to allow any one figure to become powerful within them. To this end, he assigned overlapping responsibilities within the security sector (Kazemi, 1980, p. 235-237). This strategy, along with the provision of financial benefits and assignments of punishment, not only aimed to ensure that military-security personnel were loyal to the regime, but also prevented them from taking a significant role in the government. Though these methods hindered the emergence of a challenge to the Shah, they fell short of yielding an effective strategy in response to the crisis of 1979. This is because the Shah’s tactics were mainly designed for combating internal threats from the system and; therefore

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they did not provide the armed forces with sufficient training to deal with civil disturbances and riots (Afshar, 1985, p. 188). By being personally involved in all military matters including promotions, the Shah forced the military to be extremely dependent on his decision-making and therefore left the armed forces devoid of their own initiative (Afshar, 1985, p. 188). In addition, his method of divide and rule compounded the unity of the armed forces. As a result, the armed forces were incapable of implementing cohesive action that dealt decisively with the revolutionary crisis.