CAPÍTULO IV: RESULTADOS
4.1. Variable 1 Procesos de gestión
4.1.1. Gestión del modelo educativo personal docente
During the authoritarian New Order the media were heavily regulated by the government.40 Whereas the broadcast media, RRI41 and TVRI42 were state-owned, the press belonged to the private sector (Kitley 2001: 260). The 1966 press law introduced a licensing system which was one of the most important means for the government to regulate media. The license (SIUPP43) could be issued and
40 The media were regulated by the 1966 and 1982 (revised) press laws that guaranteed the
fundamental right of press freedom. However, the press law contained a number of restrictive articles, undermining this statutory right, and allowing the government considerable power over the media (Rüland 1998: 267; Kingsbury 2005: 126, 136).
41 Radio of the Republic of Indonesia; established in 1945. 42 Television of the Republic of Indonesia, established in 1962.
withdrawn by the Ministry of Information, sometimes rather arbitrarily.44 Extra-
legal means used to intimidate the press included threatening phone calls (budaya telepon) from the military, the police or the civil service as well as the payment of ‘hush money’ (budaya amplop) (Romano 2003: 62; Kitley 2001: 258). Such legislation and control mechanisms forced journalists to self-censor. However, the media sometimes did report on politically sensitive news in an effort to increase sales, while avoidingthe risk of license withdrawals (Gazali 2005: 25).
During the New Order the Indonesian press was transformed from being primarily a medium of political discourse to a commercially significant industry (Dhakidae 1991) or, alternatively from a ‘partisan press’ to a ‘commercial press’ (Sen and Hill 2007: 51-71). The New Order’s enforced merger of opposition parties in 1973 and the annulment of a regulation stipulating that all newspapers had to be affiliated with a political party or mass organisation removed the influence of partisan politics from the press and encouraged its commercialisation. Those newspapers that had previously been bound by party connections were encouraged to seek new sponsors. Consequently, most of the media tried to reach a larger readership across all social, cultural and political differences to enhance their circulation and attract more advertisers. As the domestic economy began to expand, the companies increasingly used the press as an advertising medium for their
44 In particular, political tensions between government and media led to license revocations. After the
Malari riots in 1974, twelve publications were banned. Another conflict arose when the press reported extensively on 1977 student protests, which criticised the Suharto clan even calling for Suharto's resignation. The government responded in January 1978 with the closure of seven daily newspapers and seven student publications (Sen and Hill 2007: 53). In 1994 three leading weekly publications (Tempo, Editor and DeTik) were banned over a story about an internal government split over the purchase of 39 former East German warships by Research and Technology Minister B. J. Habibie (McCargo 1999).
products (Dhakidae 1991: 74; Hidayat 1999: 182). The press industry developed into a profitable business, in which the Suharto family and its cronies invested. In order to protect their business in the event of sudden license revocations, as happened in the mid-1970s, many press companies applied a strategy of diversification and reinvestment (Sen and Hill 2007: 57). This resulted in the development of huge press conglomerates and a decline in the number of media owners. In the mid-1990s the press industry was effectively controlled by 16 major press conglomerates (Haryanto, 23 August 1997), 45 out of which nine had close links to Golkar and the
Palace (Sen and Hill 2007: 59).46
The broadcast industry underwent a similar process of commercialization to the press. The government’s abolition of the television monopoly in the 1990s and the introduction of private, commercial television channels were mainly based on economic considerations, aligned with the government’s policies of economic liberalization and deregulation. In the late 1980s television had become the principal medium of information dissemination. It followed that manufacturers and distributors of products saw television as the most effective medium for reaching mass audiences. However, commercial advertising on the state television TVRI was prohibited. As the national economy grew there was pressure to permit advertising on TV, to expand the consumer market. Eventually, the government gave in to the interests of business and removed TVRI’s monopoly, opening television
45 These were: Kompas Gramedia Grup, Grafiti Grup, Media Indonesia Grup, Jawa Pos Grup, Femina
Grup, Sinar Kasih Grup, Bakrie Grup, Cipta Lamtoro Gung Grup, Bimantara Grup, A Latief Corporation Grup, Agung Laksono Grup, Gatra Grup, Subentra Grup, Suara Merdeka Grup, Pos Kota Grup, dan Republika Grup (Haryanto, 23 August 1997).
46 Between June 1994 and May 1998 only individuals or firms with close ties to the political
establishment received TV licenses, with all five licenses going to Suharto's family and friends (Sen and Hill 2000: 60-1).
broadcasting to private investment. In 1989, RCTI, the first commercially funded channel went on the air. Others followed soon: SCTV (1989), TPI (1990), ANTeve
(1993) and Indosiar (1995) (Sen and Hill 2007: 111-16; Kitley 2000: 224-6). The private stations were independent only in financial terms. They were closely monitored by the Information Ministry and owned by individual members of the Suharto family and their cronies as part of their business empires (Sen and Hill 2007: 111-13). Due to this “pattern of vertical integration between the private media and the ruling elite” (Gazali 2004: 23) as well as the state’s control measures the majority of the commercial mainstream media supported the New Order regime until the months leading up to May 1998 when Suharto’s power structure collapsed after 32 years (Harsono 2000: 85).
After the fall of Suharto, the media were freed from government control (Kitley 2001: 256). Developments such as legally guaranteed press freedom, media liberalization and the simplification of the licence application procedure have resulted in a highly diversified media landscape. Yet recent studies (Armando 2014; Ida 2011; Haryanto 2011; Sudibyo and Patria 2013) have shown that media liberalisation since the Suharto period did not change the inherited concentration of media ownership in the hands of a small number of old players from the New Order era. Indeed, although the number of print media exploded from 289 by the end of the New Order to 1,881 (of which only 556 published regularly) in 2001 (Piper 2009: 3),47 the print media industry remained dominated by huge media
conglomerates48 which had been established during the New Order. Regarding the
47 By 2010 the number had dropped back to 1,076 (Wikan 2011: 2).
television sector, five new national commercial television stations49 entered the
market, joining the six pre-existing TV stations (including the state channel TVRI). Most television stations, however, remained under the control of the Suharto family or cronies of the New Order regime (Ida 2011: 14). Over time, between 2007 and 2011, mergers and acquisitions have resulted in the concentration of ownership into five conglomerates that control all ten commercial television stations (Sudibyo and Patria 2013: 266; Nugroho et al. 2012: 58, Table 5.2.).50 As Table 1.1 below shows, in
2011 the majority of Indonesia’s media were controlled by twelve major media groups (Nugroho et al. 2012: 4). Thus, political and economic liberalisation has enabled the elite to retain control over the commercial mainstream news media.
49 Global TV, Lativi (TVOne), TV7 (Trans 7), TransTV, MetroTV.
50 Those conglomerates and their respective television stations are: MNC Group (RCTI, MNCTV
(previously named TPI), Global TV); EMTEK (SCTV, Indosiar Visual Mandiri), CT Group (TransTV, Trans7), Visi Media Asia (ANTV, TVOne), and Media Group (MetroTV) (Nugroho et al. 2012: 58, Table 5.2.).
Table 1.1: Major media groups in Indonesia: 201151
Group
TV Radio Print Media Online
Media
Other businesses52 Principal Owner Global Mediacomm (MNC) 20 national: RCTI, GlobalTV, MNCTV (formerly TPI) 22 7 e.g. Seputar Indonesia 1 Content production, Content Distribution, Talent Management Hary Tanoesoedibjo
Jawa Pos Group
20 n/a
171 e.g. Jawa Pos,
Rakyat Merdeka
1 Paper Mills, Printing Plants, Power Plant
Dahlan Iskan, Azrul Ananda Kelompok Kompas Gramedia 10 12 89 e.g. Kompas 2 Property, Bookstore chain, Manufacturing, Event Organiser, University Jakob Oetama Mahaka Media Group 2 19 19
e.g. Republika n/a
Event Organiser, PR Consultant Abdul Gani, Erick Thohir Elang Mahkota Teknologi (EMTEK) 3 national: SCTV, Indosiar Visual Mandiri (formerly Indosiar)
n/a n/a 1 Telecommunications and IT solutions Sariatmaadja Family CT Corp 2 national: TransTV, Trans7 n/a n/a 1 Financial Services, Lifestyle and Entertainment, Natural resources, Property Chairul Tanjung
Visi Media Asia 2
national: ANTV, TVOne (formerly Lativi) n/a n/a 1 Natural resources, network provider, Property Bakrie & Brothers Media Group 1 national: MetroTV n/a 3 e.g. Media Indonesia
n/a Property (Hotel) Surya Paloh
MRA Media
n/a 11 16 n/a
Retail, Property, Food & Beverage, Automotive Adiguna Soetowo & Soetikno Soedarjo Femina Group
n/a 2 14 n/a Talent, Agency,
Publishing Pia Alisjahbana
Tempo Inti Media 1 1 3 e.g. Tempo, Koran Tempo 1 Service sector PT Grafiti Pers, PT Jaya Raya Utama, Yayasan Jaya Raya, Yayasan Tempo 21 Juni 1994, Yayasan Karyawan Tempo53 Beritasatu Media Holding 2 n/a 10 e.g. Jakarta Globe, Suara Pembaruan 1 Property, health services, cable TV, Internet service provider, University Lippo Group
51 Source: Compiled from various sources: Nugroho et al. 2012: 39 (Table 4.1.), 58 (Table 5.2.); Haryanto
2011: 106-7 (Table 6.1.); Sudibyo and Patria 2013: 267-70 (Table 1.)
52 These are businesses run by the same owner/group owner. 53 PT Tempo Inti Media Tbk 2009: 42.
Media-elite linkages through ownership
Some of those owning these media groups or holding key positions within them simultaneously hold key positions in political institutions or are affiliated with political parties or politicians. The most prominent examples of senior politicians, who simultaneously own media companies, are Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar Party chairman, TVOne, ANTV, vivanews.com) and Surya Paloh (Nasdem Party chairman and former Golkar politician, MetroTV, Media Indonesia).54 As shown in numerous
cases,both politico-businessmen have frequently used their media organizations for their own interests (Anwari 2013; Saragih 2009). Surya Paloh, for example, used his media organisation to campaign for his nomination as Golkar’s presidential candidate in 2004 (Tempo, 5 April 2004). Bakrie, for example, uses his media empire to promote the view that the mud flow in Sidoarjo was a natural disaster and not caused by the Bakrie-owned company Lapindo Brantas while drilling for natural gas (Tapsell 2010: 8). For example, Bakrie-group owned TV-stations prefer to use the term ‘Sidoarjo mud flow’ (Lumpur Sidoarjo) when covering the disaster whereas, other stations (for example, MetroTV) use the term ‘Lapindo mud flow’ (Lumpur Lapindo) (Cahyadi and Uliyah 2011). However, that Bakrie and Paloh were using their respective media companies to their own advantage became most obvious when both were running for Golkar chairmanship in 2009 (Tapsell 2010: 5-6). Following the failure of his own presidential aspirations in 2014 Bakrie used his
54 After Paloh lost the Golkar chairmanship elections against Aburizal Bakrie in October 2009, he co-
founded the mass organization Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem) in early 2010. In 2011 a new political party called the Nasdem Party was established. Surya Paloh, who preferred to focus on the apolitical Nasdem organisation was not a board member of the political party at that time. However, Paloh funded the Nasdem party (The Jakarta Post, 25 July 2011) and eventually became Nasdem Party chairman in 2013.
media empire to support the Prabowo-Rajasa candidates while Paloh’s media group supported the Jokowi-Kalla team (Tapsell 2014).
Hary Tanoesoedibjo, the president of MNC Group, also used his media empire to promote his interests in business and politics (Dhyatmika, 11 December 2014). His political ambitions started in 2011 when he took up the role as chairman or the board of experts in Nasdem Party. After a disagreement with party founder Surya Paloh, he joined Wiranto’s Hanura in 2013 (The Jakarta Post, 19 February 2013). Simultaneously his media empire MNC switched allegiance from Nasdem to Hanura. When Tanoesoedibjo became Hanura’s vice-presidential candidate he began to appear on various programs broadcast by his television stations promoting his candidacy and political party (Dhyatmika, 11 December 2014). However, when Hanura’s poor showing in the legislative election did not allow its candidate pair to compete in the 2014 presidential elections, Tanoesoedibjo threw his support behind Prabowo’s (Gerindra) candidacy.55
Following the fall of the New Order Dahlan Iskan, owner of the Jawa Pos Group, became increasingly involved in politics. His involvement in provincial government businesses started in 1999 when he was appointed CEO of the Wira Group at the request of the East Java governor. In the June 2005 Surabaya mayoral election he reportedly sponsored (and financed) the candidature of Arif Afandi, former Jawa Pos chief editor (Ida 2011: 19- 20). On the national level he established
55 See for example: The Jakarta Post, 25 March 2014; The Jakarta Globe, 21 February 2014; The Financial
Times, 5 June 2014. Meanwhile, in February 2015, Tanoesoedibjo founded his own political party United Indonesia Party (Perindo, Partai Persatuan Indonesia) which draws on the MNC group to gain popularity and to support its interests (Tempo.co, 12 June 2015). Before the launch, Perindo was a mass organization founded by Tanoesoedibjo following his departure from the NasDem party in 2013 (Kompas.com, 7 February 2015).
links with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and backed his presidency. In 2009 PresidentYudhoyono selected him as new president director of the state power utility PT PLN. Then, from October 2011 to October 2014 he was Indonesia's minister for State-owned enterprises. Encouraged by the Democratic Party and its chairman President Yudhoyono, Dahlan Iskan joined the Democratic Party's presidential convention as an independent candidate to battle for his nomination as the party’s presidential candidate for the 2014 elections (The Jakarta Globe, 26 August 2013).56 Even though Dahlan Iskan won the convention he was not named as
the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate. This was related to his low personal popularity compared to other leading presidential candidates and the Democratic Party’s decision to not field its own presidential candidate following its low voter turnout during the 2014 legislative elections (The Jakarta Post, 17 May 2014; Aspinall and Mietzner 2014: 350).57 Being out of the race for the presidency himself
Dahlan Iskan rallied his media empire behind Jokowi-Kalla (Tapsell 2014; The Financial Times, 5 June 2014), opposing Prabowo-Rajasa whose candidacy was supported by the Democratic Party (Kompas.com, 31 May 2014).58
56 The Democratic Party’s decision to select its candidate for the 2014 presidential election through an
eight month convention (from September 2013 until April 2014) – similar to an US-style presidential primary election but open to non-party members to compete – was strategy to determine the most publicly appealing figure as its presidential candidate while simultaneously raising the Democratic Party’s electability, popularity and acceptability. For further information on the Democratic Party’s convention see, for example, RSIS, 20 March 2014; Fionna 2013; Syofyan, 4 September 2013.
57 According to opinion polls announced by the Democratic Party Dahlan Iskan would get only 2 to 2.9
per cent of the vote if he were to stand in the presidential race, whereas PDI-P's Jokowi and Gerindra's Prabowo would get 29 to 45 per cent and 29 to 35 per cent of the vote, respectively (The Jakarta Post, 17 May 2014).
58 Ultimately, following considerations to form a coalition with Golkar to field Pramono Edhie
Wibowo, who came second in the in the Democratic Party’s presidential convention (The Jakarta Post, 17 May 2014), as vice-presidential running mate to Golkar’s Aburizal Bakrie (The Jakarta Post, 18 May 2014), the Democratic Party decided to support the candidacy of Prabowo-Rajasa.
Chairul Tanjung, whose company CT Corporation owns the popular online platform Detik.com and two national television stations (TransTV and Trans7), is reportedly close to Yudhoyono and the Democratic Party (Winters 2013: 28). Chairul Tanjung’s closeness to Yudhoyono crystallised in 2014 when he became the Democratic Party’s spokesperson and was appointed coordinating minister for economics (Tapsell 2015: 33).59 Following this appointment in May 2014 he officially
stepped down from his position in CT Corp in order to prevent a conflict of interest and to maintain the appearance of good governance (The Jakarta Post, 16 May 2014). Since the different media groups protect the interests of their owners and shareholders, media ownership is considered to be the primary means to control media institutions and content. Ownership also provides unlimited media access and attention (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 232). Thus, there are also a number of politicians who went into the media business. In 2006, for example, then President Yudhoyono established Jurnal Nasional, a daily broadsheet paper closely linked to the Democratic Party (Tapsell 2012: 235; The Jakarta Post, 26 February 2009).
Besides highlighting such media-elite linkages, this short overview has shown the shifting interests and alliances of media conglomerates, and, as in the example of the 2014 presidential elections, that media ownership does not automatically translate into political success. However, as the following section will show, examples of media-elite linkages take various forms and go beyond ownership.
59 President Yudhoyono appointed Tanjung to replace Hatta Rajasa, who had resigned to take part in
Media-elite linkages beyond ownership
Some journalists and editors supported particular candidates during elections or became candidates themselves. August Parengkuan, senior editor of Kompas, for example, joined the team Mega Center, a think tank to support the official campaign team for the President/Vice-President candidate pair of Megawati Sukarnoputri (PDI-P) – Hasyim Muzadi during the 2004 presidential elections (Tempo, 5 July 2004; Tempo, 13 September 2004). Goenawan Mohamad, former Tempo chief editor and founding member of PAN, was a member of the official Amien Rais (PAN) – Siswono Yudo Husodo campaign team during the 2004 presidential elections (Harsono, 7 June 2004).During the 2009 presidential elections Goenawan Mohamad supported Boediono (Kompas.com, 15 May 2009; Mohamad, 18 May 2009).
However, in those cases it is difficult to establish whether these figures made use of their respective media organization or whether the support was individual and private. Certainly more obvious is the case of Alwi Hamu, co-owner of Fajar, a regional daily that operates under the Jawa Pos Group (Wangkar 2001; Hamad 2004: 160-1), who had been campaign coordinator for Jusuf Kalla during the 2004 presidential elections. During the campaign Alwi Hamu used Fajar as well as the Jawa Pos News Network (JPPN) to support the Yudhoyono-Kalla candidature (Harsono, 7 June 2004). He applied various strategies, for example, displaying news of Kalla on the front page, inside pages or tucked in the middle of the news. Fajar’s
editorial board did not oppose Hamu’s move. According to Fajar’s then chief editor, Aidir Amir Daud, there was no reason not to back one of its shareholders and co- founders, Jusuf Kalla, in his election campaign. When Kalla won the vice-
presidential seat, Alwi Hamu became part of the vice-president’s special staff (Tempo, 24 October 2005).
According to Tri Agus Susanto Siswowiharjo (27 December 2008) during the 2004-2009 government term 23 out of 550 legislators had a journalistic background. Whereas some had long ceased to practice journalism, others were still journalists when they entered politics.During the 2009 general election, there were about 120 journalists or former journalists throughout Indonesia competing as candidates for the legislature (Siswowiharjo, 27 December 2008). Among the successful candidates were Hanura’s Akbar Faizal and Golkar’s Bambang Soesatyo who later utilized their media experience to promote a parliamentary inquiry into the Bank Century scandal.
In a study on the media’s impact on local elections David Hill (2009: 248) highlights the success of the then Jawa Pos chief editor Arif Afandi in the 2005 Surabaya mayoral election as an example of how the media can be utilized not only by its owner but also by an experienced media professional with first-hand experience in the media business:
What Arif Afandi was able to bring to the political equation was not control of the media (though his connections would have proved beneficial) nor a media- generated popular image such as may be enjoyed by “celebrities” or “artistes” in the Indonesian context. Rather, he brought a keen understanding of how the media operates. He was a “media savvy”. His knowledge and understanding of the industry and how it operates, and how an aspiring politician may maximize