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422. Adm Boyce assured Mr Blair that there were “no serious equipment

problems” on 13 March.

203 _{Minute APS/Minister(DP) to CM(SD), 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC – UORs’.} 204 _{Minute DJW to COSSEC, 11 March 2003, ‘OP TELIC – NBC Respirator Policy’.}

205 _{Minute DJW, 12 March 2003, ‘Commanders’ Guide to Respirator Best Fit Risk Assessment’.} 206 _{Minute CGS to CDS, 10 March 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC’.}

423. _{Mr Blair held a meeting to discuss the military plan and timetable with Mr John}

Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce on 13 March.207 _{At the meeting, Adm Boyce “assured the Prime Minister that}

the Armed Forces faced no serious equipment problems”.208

424. On 14 March, RAdm Style reported to Lord Bach that:

•

178 equipment UOR business cases had now been approved at a cost of “some £494m”;

•

9 UORs had been accepted into service over the previous week;

•

the manufacturer of desert NBC suits had revealed that production for the suits could not start “as early as we had hoped and will not deliver the first items until mid-April, a delay of 2 weeks”;

•

the delivery of RVD tickets to theatre had been delayed, and was expected to be complete by 19 March; and

•

while the DLO was confident that sufficient ComboPens had been delivered to theatre, this could not be confirmed until the re-allocation exercise currently under way had been completed.209

425. On desert clothing, RAdm Style wrote:

“Sufficient desert clothing for the entire force was ordered in Dec 02 with an ISD of 31 March 03, with a small in-service reserve being available as a result of 3 Cdo Bde and 16 Air Asslt Bde personnel retaining their clothing from Op JACANA. Although pressed to advance their production and delivery schedules, few contractors have been successful … Across the desert clothing range, at least 70% of all deliveries are complete and in theatre, broadly equivalent to 2 sets per man, not counting those personnel already equipped before deployment. Providing contractor delivery profiles are met, we expect all outstanding demands to reach depots by 19 March and to be with personnel by the end of the month. There are some exceptions; desert helmet covers … and floppy hats … will not be delivered to depots until nearer the end of the month.”

426. Lt Gen Reith provided Adm Boyce with an update on the redistribution of NBC

equipment in theatre on the same day.210 _{He wrote that “sufficient” NBC Individual}

Protective Equipment had been deployed, but “some stocks required redistribution to ensure that all personnel had their initial allocation of 3 suits”. The redistribution of the maritime component was 100 percent complete, the land contingent 97 percent, and the air contingent 70 percent complete.

207 _{Letter Manning to Watkins, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military Plan’.} 208 _{Minute Rycroft to Watkins, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.}

209 _{Minute CM(SD) to PS/Minister(DP), 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC UORs’.}

427. _{As part of the final battle preparations, the contingent was completing NBC}

respirator testing but, because 1 (UK) Div needed to move forward to assembly areas, its General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major General Robin Brims, had decided to suspend that process. Lt Gen Reith “strongly” supported this decision from an

operational perspective and said he could restart the process of testing “if time allows”. He added:

“In terms of risk, his manoeuvre units would prove difficult targets, once battle begins. However the more static units in the Divisional Support Group and Joint Force Logistic Component would be at greater risk and thus I have directed that testing should continue for them. The Maritime and Air contingents will also complete the process.”

428. Lt Gen Reith added: “Clearly Ministers will need to be informed.”

429. In the record of Lord Bach’s meeting on 17 March, the key points included:

•

other than “the ongoing work on Phase IV”, there were “no major outstanding UOR issues”;

•

a flexible approach was needed on whether to continue with undelivered UORs “as circumstances develop”;

•

there was “a 100 tonne backlog of equipment” waiting to be delivered to theatre;

•

there were now “no significant outstanding NBC issues except on delivery of RVD tickets into theatre”; and

•

“notwithstanding helmet covers and floppy hats, which were taking slightly longer than hoped for, 80% of clothing and boots ordered had been delivered and prioritised in theatre. The overall figure of ‘desertised personnel’ was higher, as it included those who had already been issued with desert kit for Op JACANA.”211

430. At the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 19 March, it was reported that only 3 percent of

the land component’s respirators had been checked, “the work having been overtaken by other events in-theatre”.212

431. On 21 March, AM Stirrup reported to Lord Bach that 183 business cases for UORs

had been approved at a cost of £497m.213

432. _{Desertisation measures for the Challenger 2 vehicles had been delivered to theatre}

in the past week (the fitting process of which was ongoing), along with Combat ID equipment for all vehicles and ECBA, meaning that all unit demands for the latter had been met.

211 _{Minute APS/Minister(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC – UORs’.} 212 _{Minutes, 19 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.}

433. _{AM Stirrup also reported that “a problem with packaging” had led to a “small delay”}

in the provision of new books of RVD tickets. The last 450 were received on 20 March and should arrive in theatre that day.

In document Agrimensura 3D con tecnología LiDAR (página 91-101)