Moral panic and cultural trauma – two concepts introduced in the theoretical section but not empirically described so far. As both serve more as a structural breeding ground for social change than that they themselves inflate and deflate in a short period after a terrorist attacks, they did not lend themselves very well for the analytical strategy pursued in this thesis, which was breaking up 2001 until 2004 in the aftermaths of the three individual terrorist attacks. That said, it is appropriate to assess empirically whether a moral panic or cultural trauma has existed, and what implications that may have had for the policy developments observed.
There are several authors engaged with the question if, and to what extent, a moral panic has existed in the Netherlands. Although the breeding ground for this moral panic had already started in the 1990s, three specific events in the early 2000s incited these slumbering feelings: 9/11, the murder on Pim Fortuyn, and the murder on Theo van Gogh. A central assumption of these observers is that the media
and political actors – two important elements in bringing about a moral panic – have played an important role in exaggerating the threat coming from the migrant community, whether that was a terrorist threat or other threats that they were associated with, like “random violence”14
. As Burger concludes in his gripping account of how Moroccan gang violence was exaggerated in the media:
In the wake of 9/11, Dutch public and political discourse on ethnic issues assumed an unprecedented vehemence. The moral panic about random violence morphed into a panic about ethnic violence; and Moroccan adolescents were increasingly seen as potential muggers and rapists. This development had started before the attacks on the United States. After 9/11, Moroccan adolescents, and Muslims in general, were also seen as potential terrorists. In Dutch terrorism discourse, too, legends and news are found to be closely entwined. (Burger, 2009: 290)
This was largely due to the vast media coverage that enabled legends to turn into widely accepted ideas of the presence of these gangs that would for example attack girls at night (ibid.). The discussion was in essence about the degree to which the immigrant community was truly integrated in Dutch, and if that would ever be possible at all. Built on a longer existing ‘general perception that anti-social or irresponsible behavior had been steadily growing in the Dutch society’, besides 9/11 the murders on Fortuyn and Van Gogh to many confirmed these views and accelerated the public unease (Ossewaarde, 2010: 343). This unease was not only based on the idea that the country was “under siege” by its own government that was not only unable but also unwilling to address the “true” problems of the nation, but also that the country was having a serious multicultural problem with the (Islamic) migrant community, which Fortuyn would later even describe as a “fifth column”, which was eroding the country (ibid.). According to Ossewaarde:
The norms and values debate strongly resembled a theatre podium for a select few actors who appeared successful in the strategic use of rhetoric and symbols to catch the imagination of a Dutch population that, in the process of welfare state reform and the loss of some former entitlements, had become already highly vulnerable to moral panics. The media has shown itself to be a most willing instrument in this spectacle. (2010: 345)
These actors were most importantly Fortuyn, Wilders and Verdonk, who succeeded in ‘stigmatizing those who failed to carry their self-responsibility, that is, failed to show their commitment to Dutch culture’ (ibid.: 344). The murder on Van Gogh, according to Vesta, played a key role in this redefining of the Dutch national identity, as it ‘fueled perceptions of a schism between immigrant Muslims and the “native Dutch” over basic democratic values such as freedom of speech and the position of women in Muslim communities’, especially because the murder on Van Gogh was linked to Hirsi Ali’s controversial film (Vesta, 2007: 714). The media furthermore reinforced the negative stereotypes of the migrant community as they had a tendency to show the extreme sides of the debate (ibid.: 726). Another interesting account
14
Random violence, in the Netherlands known as “zinloos geweld”, has been an important subject of public debate over the last two decades.
of this interplay between the political actors and the media can be read in Hajer & Uitermark’s depiction of the public debate in Amsterdam in the aftermath of the murder on Van Gogh, and how local political actors tried to spin the murder into their political narrative, whether that was more appeasing or confronting towards the Muslim community (Hajer & Uitermark, 2008: 14).
It is impossible to outline the whole public debate on immigration and integration in the Netherlands in those years in this short section, and that was thus also not the goal here. Rather, the question is whether a moral panic happened in those early years of this millennium and how the terrorist events may have played a role in it. This short introduction to literature suggests that it indeed took place (and still very well may do today?), and that especially 9/11 and the murder on Van Gogh have played a reinforcing role in it. Earlier, moral panic was described as a ‘disproportionate and hostile reaction to a circumstance, person or group that is seen as a threat to societal norms and values’, which gets reinforced by political actors and media (De Haan, 2007: 253). Various authors have convincingly argued that this was indeed the case, with the Muslim community being seen as a threat to Dutch norms and values, a feeling that was reinforced by actors like Fortuyn, Wilders and Verdonk, and further supported by the media.
De Haan discusses the concept of cultural trauma, in which ‘members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways’ (Alexander, 2004: 1). However, this concept differs from moral panic as it, besides the points that were already introduced in the theoretical section, is not aimed at, for example, a specific group or person, but at a (abstract) damaged group conscious. He argues that a cultural trauma was inflicted, but for that argument, he uses a different referent object than those describing a moral panic: the group consciousness of the Dutch identity and the existence of solidarity in society. As he argues: ‘In the context of 9/11 and the murder on Van Gogh, the meaning of the word “tolerance” has been transformed of a stance that a dominant group can take towards a minority group, into a stance that is demanded of a minority group, by a dominant group’ (De Haan2007: 261). That is thus a different point of view and does not have to exclude the presence of a moral panic; it is rather even possible that a moral panic stands at the base of a broader and longer cultural trauma. Therefore, this thesis assumes that both have existed in the Netherlands, if they do not still today.
The complex interplay between moral panics, cultural traumas and terrorist events has not been thoroughly analyzed yet. While it is obvious that terrorist attacks can lead to, or have a role in, the development of moral panic and cultural traumas, it is relatively unclear how those moral panics and cultural traumas interact with policy-making theory. This was also outside of the scope of this thesis, but it can be reasonably assumed that moral panics and cultural traumas affect the political stream of Kingdon, that is that they enable the formation of policies that are in line with emotions standing at the core of those panics and traumas. In the case of the Netherlands, that would suggest that policy discussions would
eventually have to be about the integration of the Muslim community, whether that would be constructive (e.g. strengthening bond of these communities to society) or destructive (e.g. eviction or stricter immigration policies). The analysis shows that, in parliamentary debates, although this did not become a major issue in the aftermath of terrorist attacks until the murder on Van Gogh, this discussion indeed took place, which thus seems to support this assumption.