GESTION DEL RIESGO FINANCIERO

decisionism, in his theory of exception and of sovereignty) – to imply the instance of the subject, a classic, free, and wilful subject, therefore a subject to whom nothing can happen, not even the singular event for which he believes to have taken and kept the initiative: for example, in an exceptional situation. But should one imagine, for all that, a ‘passive’ decision, as it were, without freedom, without that freedom? Without that activity, and without the passivity that is mated to it? But not, for all that, without responsibility? Would one have to show hospitality to the impossible itself – that is, to what the good sense of all

philosophy can only exclude as madness or nonsense: a passive decision, an originarily affected decision?

Such an undesirable guest can intrude into the closed space or the home ground of common sense only by recalling, as it were, so as to derive authority from it, an old forgotten invitation. It would thus recall the type or the silhouette of the classic concept of decision, which must interrupt and mark an absolute beginning. Hence it signifies in me the other who decides and rends. The passive decision, condition of the event, is always in me, structurally, another event, a rending decision as the decision of the other. Of the absolute other in me, the other as the absolute that decides on me in me.” (“Une théorie du sujet est

incapable de rendre compte de la moindre décision. Mais cela doit se dire a fortiori de l'événement, et de

l'événement au regard de la décision. Car si rien n'arrive jamais à un sujet, rien qui mérite le nom d'événement, le schème de la décision tend régulièrement, du moins dans son acception commune et hégémonique (celle qui semble dominer encore le décisionnisme schmittien, sa théorie de l'exception et de la souveraineté), à impliquer l'instance du sujet, d'un sujet classique, libre et volontaire, donc d'un sujet auquel rien n'arrive, pas même l'événement singulier dont il croit, par exemple en situation d'exception, prendre et garder l'initiative. Devrait-on pour autant imaginer une décision ‘passive’, en quelque sorte, et sans liberté, sans cette liberté-là? Sans cette activité-là, et sans la passivité qui s'y accouple ? Mais non sans responsabilité pour autant ? Faudrait-il se montrer hospitalier pour l'impossible même, à savoir ce que le

bon sens de toute philosophie ne peut qu'exclure comme la folie ou le non-sens, à savoir une décision passive, une décision originairement affectée? Un hôte aussi indésirable ne peut s'avancer dans l'espace

clos ou le chez-soi du sens commun qu'en remettant en mémoire, en quelque sorte, pour s'en autoriser, une vieille invitation oubliée. Il rappellerait ainsi le type ou la silhouette du concept classique de la décision: celle-ci doit interrompre, elle marque un commencement absolu. Elle signifie donc l'autre en moi qui décide et déchire. La décision passive, condition de l'événement, c'est toujours en moi, structurellement, une autre décision, une décision déchirante comme décision de l'autre. De l'autre absolu en moi, de l'autre comme l'absolu qui décide de moi en moi.”).

99 _{Derrida, Aporias, 16(37). See above FN 25.}

100 _{I say experiences instead of abilities or capacities because, as we already indicated above, Derrida will}

precisely problematize the sense of these components of moral life as simply powers or abilities.

101_{Although Derrida notes in Rogues, 43f.(69) that he usually does not use the term “freedom” (“liberté”)}

very often because he is worried about the metaphysical charge it carries, he does refer to the need for a “free decision” (“décision libre”) in “Force of Law,” 252(53). Furthermore, he writes in Beast and

example in his contribution to Le génome et son double (translated in Negotiations),

where he implies that a decision, in order to be “ethical, political, juridical, etc.,” must

“involve freedom and responsibility”

example) must be criticized, it is not a matter of abolishing the notion but of rethinking it (along with such notions as responsibility) in light of deconstruction (I, 301(402); translation modified. See below FN 168). See also Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, where Derrida talks about the decision, responsibility and free obligation as requiring the undecidable. This is because “[w]hen the givens of a problem or a task do not appear as infinitely contradictory, placing me before the aporia of a double injunction, then I know in advance what it is necessary to do, I believe to know it (or, as the official translation says, I believe the knowledge: je crois le savoir), this knowledge commands and programmes the action: it is done, there is no more decision or responsibility to take. On the contrary, a certain non-knowledge must leave me disarmed before what I have to do so that I have to do it in order for me to feel freely obligated (librement obligé) and bound to respond to it.” (53f.(128); translation modified: “Quand les données d'un problème ou d'une tâche n'apparaissent pas comme infiniment contradictoires, me plaçant devant l'aporie d'une double injonction, alors je sais d'avance ce qu'il faut faire, je crois le savoir, ce savoir commande et programme l'action : c'est fait, il n'y a plus de décision ni de responsabilité à prendre. Un certain non-savoir doit au contraire me laisser démuni devant ce que j'ai à faire pour que j'aie à le faire, pour que je m'y sente librement obligé et tenu d'en répondre.”).

102 _{Derrida, “Human Genome,” 200(144): “[W]hat this means is that the decisions we need to discuss here,}

the recommendations we need to make, if they are ethical, political, juridical, etc., if they involve [or concern: concernent, T.B.] freedom and responsibility,...” (“[C]ela veut dire que les décisions dont nous avons à parler ici, les recommandations que nous avons à faire, si elles sont éthiques, politiques, juridiques, etc., si elles concernent la liberté et la responsabilité.”). The entire quote, which speaks to the central role of freedom, decision and responsibility for Derrida's conception of ethics runs as follows: “[T]here is a troubling and painful paradox when we have to acknowledge the fact that the concepts of responsibility and freedom do of course call for the establishment, the institution of norms, or the reference to norms, but that they also, at the same time, call for a suspensive attitude with regard to the norm and normality. A

responsibility or an ethical decision, intent on modeling itself after, or ordering itself according to, a scientific or allegedly scientific knowledge that establishes the norm or normality – that is, a responsibility or an ethical decision that would be satisfied with unfolding a theoretical program or the content of a knowledge regarding a norm-obviously would not be, in the rigorous sense of the term, an act of responsibility or freedom. What this means, abstractly – I will say it abstractly first, then I will say it concretely – however paradoxical it may seem, is that freedom and responsibility are incompatible with the mere reporting of the existence of a norm, a normative reality. Freedom is free with regard to such a normative reality, as is responsibility. If there is responsibility, if there is an ethical and free decision, responsibility and decision must, at a given moment, be discontinuous with the normative or the “normal,” not in their misrecognition of norms, not in their ignorance of a knowledge about norms – rather they must take a leap and welcome a sort of discontinuity, a heterogeneity in relation to the normative as such. This may seem shocking, but it follows from the very concept of freedom and responsibility. The statement thus appeared a little speculative. But concretely, what this means is that the decisions we need to discuss here, the recommendations we need to make, if they are ethical, political, juridical, etc., if they involve freedom and responsibility, must naturally take into account the scientific knowledge about the aforementioned norms, mono norms, polynorms, but must not leave to knowledge or expect from the knowledge that science has at its disposal, any of the political, ethical, etc. decisions that we are discussing here. This means that, at a certain moment, questions of norm must escape scientificity, they must escape a techno- scientific programming.” (Ibid., 199-201(143f.): “[I]l y a un paradoxe troublant et douloureux à devoir prendre acte du fait que les concepts de responsabilité et de liberté en appellent, bien sûr, à l'établissement,

At the same time, alterity is also that which endows the experience of these very