Why has the Russian Federation adopted a public discourse aiming at restraining and even repressing the capability to speak for the rights of LGBTQI persons at this particular time? This runs contrary to the global trend of preferring the benefits of giving rights to the costs of attempting to take them away from LGBTQI minorities. James Wilets (2011, 633) points out that when homosexuality and sexual minorities are perceived as a product of contemporary Western society, it is unlikely that people will accept the protection for sexual minorities in their legal system. This resonates with the rhetoric of the new law amendments and public discourse in Russia. In addition to this conclusion, I argue that we cannot understand today’s reaction towards homosexuality in Russia without taking a broader view on the topic and looking back to the history of Russia (and the Soviet Union). It can be argued that sexuality was banned from public discourse during the Soviet times and was hidden away in the private sphere of life. (Kondakov 2013, 23; Rotkirch 2000, 11;
Kon’ 1995, 67 & Ries 1997, 68).
Since the Tsarist-era, sexuality has been considered somewhat a threat and as an influence from outside the scope of ‘Russian (or Soviet) behavior’. During Soviet times, sexual dissidence was seen as a form of political opposition. Sexuality and eroticism became generalized political symbols through which people expressed their own general moral-political views (Kon’ 1995, 13 & 36-37; Essig 1999, 3-5.) According to
Zhuk (1994, 147-148), totalitarianism from the 1930s on was a new formation and thus was characterized with a rather strong polarization.
Picture 1. Extract of a video from the St Petersburg Pride 29th June 2013. In this photo, there are
representatives of the three symbolic groups who are openly against gays: On the very left the Cossack-inspired nationalists with fur hats and leather birches, in the middle authorities of Orthodox church and on left extreme-nationalist, martial arts practitioner Andrei Kochergin, who is also active in Orthodox church. Source: You Tube (2014).
Essig (1999, 5) depicts how in the Soviet Union, sexual practices were in fact no longer affairs of the individual, but indicative of political systems. In short, sex was political and politicized: “The state must intervene in desire, or desire will intervene in the state”, went the common slogan during that time. In Stalinist Russia, the pervert was never a patriot but considered as a fascist, a threat to the sovereignty of the state. Interestingly the same idea of a threat from “outside” is still present in recent law amendments, such as in “Foreign Agent” law.
According to both Essig (1999) and Kon’ (1995), after the death of Stalin in 1953, the politicization of same-sex desire did not end. However, something crucial changed. The topic was no longer worthy of much notice from the state. In fact, the intercourse between two men was considered as a crime against the person. In addition, lesbians were almost unmentioned. However, once they were, it was usually in cases of psychological services and mental institutions. Essig (1999, 7) argues that this could have resulted from the assumption of lesbianism being withered away. In fact, complete silence surrounded the topic.
Homosexuality became the unmentionable sin, continuing to be so for many decades. Alexander Kondakov (2013, 403) argues that the silence and silencing are still present today in Russia and that they are resulting in exclusion and discrimination. In this regard, it is not surprising how for example homosexuality in Russia is considered as “non-traditional” sexual behavior that needs to be kept under control. It is depicted as a non-Russian form of behavior and as an example of a certain Western influence instead of inborn sexual orientation.
According to Kuhar (2011), sexual and gender minorities remain undiscussed at a national level in Russia and, thus, they are not considered to be part of a society. Kondakov (2013) agrees with these ideas by dichotomizing Russian public discourse as either silent or loud. Silence forces LGBTQI people underground whereas fuss and heated public discussion both enable them to be underground but also mobilizes people who are for or part of the LGBTQI movement to speak out against or at least correct the public discourse.
However, Kuhar (2011, 159) points out that the sexual and gender minorities stay often ‘conscious’
outsiders. This means that in public discourse, sexual and gender minorities are positioned in a visible, yet separated psychological area within a society. Secondly, they represent a rebellion against social norms and the power relations that make the marginalized position of certain individuals or groups possible in the first place. This positioning can provide a space for speaking out. It also enables one not to settle with the discourse but attempt to change it. Being in opposition thus creates the possibility of forming new discourses. Nevertheless, Russia is not a special case; denouncing publicly one’s sexual orientation that is not heterosexual is still considered rather political act in many countries.
Evans (1993, 13 & 20) argues that modern societies accept the increasing sexualization but the gradual 'liberalization' of repressed innate instincts and desires, such that the extension of rights and freedoms to sexual minorities is often rejected. Calhoun (2000, 75-77) is more pessimistic from the previous researchers and argues that that lesbians and gay men are displaced from civil society’s future via legal, psychiatric, educational and familial practices. The central difficulty in developing the notion of lesbian and gay subordination is that lesbians and gay men, unlike women and racial minorities, do not appear to be located in any particular social structural places. This may be since gay men and lesbians do not occupy directly any specific socio-economic position.
By being excluded from so-called Russian culture, sexual and gender minorities are presented as something irrational, dirty or even pervert – outside from the culture and the status quo. At the same time, this discussion decreases the symbolic power from the person in question. Pierre Bourdieu (2008, 133) claims that symbolic power is a power (economic, political, cultural or other) in which one is recognized having the power over the situation or in a discussion. This person is then recognized in a public discussion. The specific
effectiveness of this power is exercised, not in the physical force, but rather in a meaning and knowledge.
A curious example of this is the decision introduced by the Russian Duma of not using the term sexual minority or homosexuality, but instead non-traditional sexual relations (Russian government, article 19, 27.6.2013). This term hides the official term of sexual and gender minorities. In addition, an individual may not even know the real term for example his/her sexual orientation and may thus suspect him/herself to be ill or abnormal without a further understanding of it being part of his/her personality. However, Russian LGBTQI movement speaks against this silencing and raises the voices of LGBTQI people in multiple ways. In the following chapter, I will discuss about the birth of Russian LGBTQI movement. In addition, I will bring out how the recent law amendments have in fact enhanced the growth of the movement.