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that has to be addressed by any electoral reform in PNG is the large number of candidates in PNG elections” (1996, 34-35).

Minimal vote shares

One consequence of very high levels of candidature under a FPTP system is that many successful candidates will be elected on only a small plurality of votes, often well short of a majority. The 1992 results give a good indication of the relationship between the number of candidates and the vote share necessary to win the seat — Sinasina- Yonggamugl Open, with the highest number of candidates, required the lowest winning vote share of only 6.3 percent; while in Namatanai Open, with only two candidates, Sir Julius Chan scored 58.5 percent, the highest of any seat. There is no strict causal relationship between candidacy levels and a winning candidate’s vote share: each tends to encourage the other. The understanding that so few votes are needed to gain a place in the national parliament itself encourages candidature from those who would otherwise not consider standing, the higher candidature levels means that fewer votes than ever are needed to gain a plurality, and on it goes.

As noted earlier, under a FPTP system and assuming more or less equal support bases, the more candidates standing for election, the smaller the total vote share needed to win the seat. The Electoral Commissioner claims that this means that

the representativeness or otherwise o f many MPs could be called into question by their own electors. More and more candidates are winning with fewer and fewer percentages (sic) and with smaller and smaller margins over the runners-up. This year only 14 candidates (12.8%), compared with 22 in 1992 (20.2%), won with 30 per cent or more o f the formal votes cast in their electorates. At the other end o f the scale, the number o f candidates winning with less than 10 per cent o f the formal votes cast rose from 9 in 1992 (8.2%) to 15 this year (13.8%), with three winning candidates obtaining less than seven per cent o f the votes (1997, 13-14).

As Table 4.6 indicates, the 1997 election continued the trend, apparent since independence, of increasing numbers of successful candidates being elected with minority support.

Table 4.6: Percentage of votes gained by successful candidates 1977-1997

Y ear N o o f seats

< 10%

P ercen tage o f form al votes gained by w in n ers

10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% >50% 1977 109 - 11 37 26 16 19 1982 109 4 20 33 20 14 18 1987 106 2 39 41 13 4 7 1992 108 9 45 33 14 3 5 1997 107 15 47 31 8 2 4

Source: Electoral Commissioner 1997; Electoral Commissioner 1987.

These figures show a clear increase in minority victories at each election since 1977. Winning members supported by an absolute majority of voters have declined from 19 in 1977 to just four in 1997. While only 11 members won with less than 20 percent of the vote in 1977, by 1997 only 45 elected members could gain more than this level of support. However, the figure of most immediate concern in 1997 was the 15 MPs elected with less than 10 percent of the vote. As in previous elections, most of these candidates were independents from the highlands, where inter-clan fragmentation and competition is most prevalent and the inclusive and accommodative candidacy which was a feature of AV elections is now virtually unknown. Recent elections in PNG have seen a high incidence of ‘dummy’ candidates being encouraged (and sometimes paid) to stand for a seat in order to split a strong block vote from an opposing clan (Domey 1990, 59). By enabling a candidate with a very small support base to entertain hopes of winning, and by rewarding the placing of ‘dummy’ candidates and other vote splitting devices (such as paying the nomination fees or electoral expenses of a friendly candidate from a different grouping in order to divide an opposition clan's block vote), FPTP can reward tactics which undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process, and militate against electoral alliances.

While this pattem is now widespread, it is not universal. Burton has pointed to the example of tribal groups in the Mt Hagen area who negotiate candidature between themselves a year or more before the elections, ensuring both that candidate numbers are minimised and that clan groups deliver their 'block' votes to one or the other candidates well before the election date. Some clans agree not to put up candidates so

as not to split a vote; others agree to support a particular candidate.16 In this way, a form of vote pooling takes place before the election. Note, however, that this vote pooling relies on the ability of separate clan leaders to negotiate selective candidate withdrawal and deliver a block of votes from their clan to a particular candidate.

The increasing minority support for many successful candidates is reflected in the election results: the 1987 elections saw one candidate in Kerowagi Open in Chimbu elected with 7.9 percent of the vote; and this was surpassed in 1992 where the winning candidate in the Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open electorate (also a Chimbu seat) attracted a bare 6.3 percent of the vote. As well as undermining the overall legitimacy of both the electoral process and the elected legislature, such results point to a change in the meaning and nature of a ‘constituency’: for many MPs, their actual constituency is not their electorate but the much smaller sub-group within their electorate to which they owe their allegiance, and their parliamentary positions. Standish, for example, has written that “it is assumed that ‘representatives’ will only work for the benefit of a small minority who actually voted for them, which can be as low as 7 per cent under the first- past-the-post ballot” and that “usually the majority ... of voters opposed the winner, and often refuse to let their elected member visit them” (1994, 60). Siaguru has argued that this localisation of politics has reached such a point that, even if MPs want to expand their base so as to more effectively represent their entire electorate, they cannot do so for fear of upsetting their clan base.17

Electoral violence

The high rate of candidature also appears to be a factor contributing to the increasingly common phenomenon of electoral violence. The Electoral Commissioner has defined electoral violence as including “intimidation of electors and electoral officials, particularly through the use of weapons; murders; unauthorised road-blocks; [and] snatching of ballot papers and ballot boxes”, and asserted that the 1997 elections were the most violent ever (1997, 7). Similar statements have been made after previous elections.18 Threats of violence against the electoral administration is an increasing problem in PNG, and recent elections in some of the more volatile highlands areas have

16 Personal communication, Dr John Burton, Research School o f Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 24 February 1996.

17 Interview, Sir Anthony Siaguru, 25 July 1996.