For Kagame, to speak of a Bantu philosophy, two conditions for its possibility ought to be taken into consideration: first, studying the consistency in Bantu lan- guages; and second, using a philosophical method from Western philosophy in order to analyse it (Kagame 1971: 591). This method is the analytical approach to philosophy. During a large part of the 20th century, the dominant philosophical movement in the English-speaking world was known as analytical philosophy. Analytical philosophy is grounded on the thesis that philosophical questions are primarily questions of language, with special focus on clarifying notions through an analysis of language. The main tasks of the philosopher, therefore, become clarification (‘analysis’ in the narrowest sense) of the meanings of the words/language with which our beliefs are expressed and justified - in the sense of identifying and assessing the arguments and evidence with which those beliefs
are justified. Such rigorous linguistic analyses could prevent the abuse of lan- guage. This is the task analytical philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Alfred North Whitehead prescribe to the philosopher.
African philosophers such as Kagame and Wiredu take this challenge serious- ly and apply it in their study of African philosophy. We may also add the Ordi- nary Language Analysis adapted by Hallen and Sodipo in their study of the lan- guage of the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria. It may be instructive to note that Kagame, for instance, uses language more as a naïve linguistic scholar, rather than as analytical philosophers such as Russell, Whitehead, or Wittgenstein, and based on Scholasticism and thus Aristotle. Wiredu (1972c) invites us to take a thorough philosophical look at the different kinds of beliefs Africans do actually have as well as the languages with which they are expressed. In Wiredu’s opin- ion, philosophy can be intercultural if it can be translated to meet with the shared foundational semantic and logical canons between the different natural languages (Wiredu 1998: 148). This gives the possibility for an intercultural dialogue in philosophy and enhances the intercultural character of philosophy. He goes fur- ther to explore the philosophy inherent in the language and culture of his native Akan language (Wiredu 1980; 1996). Wiredu argues that the different ‘cultures’ necessarily have a universal component that accounts for the communication be- tween them. Without such a component there would be no communication.
What, therefore, is Kagame’s method? Kagame prescribes a systematic analy- sis and interpretation of a specific language in a bid to get to philosophical ele- ments which can then be compared with other languages in the Bantu area. Here is Kagame’s description:
[My method is to] look for the elements of a Bantu philosophy first within a specific language; to affirm nothing that is not based in an indisputable cultural proof, tran- scribed in the original language itself and translated literally into the language acces- sible to the foreign reader. Once in possession of these basic elements, to undertake the study on the scale of the Bantu area, to verify how each zone agrees with or dif- fers with the results initially determined. (Kagame 1971: 592)
Kagame’s approach could be upheld as a preliminary step towards philosophiz- ing. He worked on the premise that Aristotle’s ontology was a consequence of Greek grammar. He then tried to bring to light what he believed to be the ontolo- gy underlying the different Bantu languages. Through language, we can find this collective, deep, implicit philosophy. This silent philosophy can be described when we apply the major Scholastic grids to the language. They are formal logic, ontology, theodicy, cosmology, and ethics.
Kagame aligns the four Bantu ontological categories with Aristotle’s (Table 2.1):
53 Table 2.1 Comparing Kagame’s Bantu ontological categories with those of Aristotle
Bantu Categories Aristotle’s traditional cate-
gories Greek equivalents
1.Muntu: Being with intelligence
2.Kintu: Being without intelligence, or thing
1. Substance 1. οὐσία
3.Hantu: Expresses the time and place (pre- sents variants such as Pa- in the eastern Bantu languages, Va-in the west, and Go-+ Lo/ro in the south).
2. Time 3. Place
2. πότε 3. ποῦ 4. Kuntu: Indicates modality and thus central-
izes all the notions related to modifications of the being in itself or vis-à-vis other beings. Hence, Kuntu corresponds to seven different Aristotelian categories 4. Quality 5. Quantity 6. Relation 7. Action 8. Passion 9. Position 10. Possession 4. ποιόν 5.ποσόν 6. πρός τι 7. ποιεῖν 8. πάσχειν 9. κεῖσθαι 10. ἔχειν
For the sake of comparison, I have added the Aristotelian categories in Greek, which do not appear in Kagame’s text. From the table, one notices that the first two Bantu categories split the Aristotelian concept of substance. Man and things are not of the same category but constitute two radically different divisions. Man is the order which conceives the way in which things are thinkable. This is be- cause man is endowed with intelligence. The things that are thinkable are non- man, Kintu, beings without intelligence. Humans are also thinkable but they are not usually conceived of as things, even though slaves could be. This category of thinkable things includes minerals, vegetables, and animals. Bantu ontology is clearly seen through the interrelationship between these four categories, which all come from the same root, ntu, and which refer to being or essence and also the idea of force. Kagame asserts that the Bantu equivalent of to be is strictly and only a copula. It links the subject class with the predicate and determines the quality of the proposition. By enunciating muntu, kintu (the essence of some- thing) is signified and the notion of existence is not necessarily present (Kagame 1971: 602).