1. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. OFAC maintains the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List and Blocked Persons List (BPL) which should be consulted prior to the execution of contract support in order to limit the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to US Government sanctions. The SDN List and BPL are not exclusive or exhaustive. Although the SDN List and BPL includes persons meeting the criteria established in the authorities or executive orders that define certain OFAC sanctions programs, transactions with actors not named on the SDN List may nevertheless violate US sanctions due to interests of designated parties in such transactions or prohibitions owing to country-based OFAC administered sanctions programs. List checking alone is insufficient to meet the due diligence requirements due to the fact that OFAC traditionally only designates umbrella organizations. List- checking alone does not guarantee the safe and secure delivery of contracting funds and resources in high risk areas. Therefore, list-checking and compliance capabilities are both parts of a federated risk-based approach that the Department of Defense must employ. See the US Department of the Treasury’s resource center at http://www.treasury.gov/resource- center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.
2. In addition to OFAC guidelines, the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce issues specific guidance to mitigate the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to export regulations. Specifically, the Bureau of Industry and Security recommends that in the event a company, entity, or person on one of the maintained lists (Denied Persons List, Entity List, Unverified List, and Consolidated Screening List) appears to match a potential party in an export transaction, additional due diligence is required before proceeding. Depending on which list the match was found, a match indicates either there is a strict export prohibition; a specific license requirement; or the presence of a “red flag.” Prior to taking any further actions, users are to consult the requirements of the specific list on which the company, entity or person is identified by reviewing the web page of the agency responsible for the list. See the consolidated interagency website at http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp.
Contract Support Integration
threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the US. Compliance with the OFAC guidelines in the execution of contract support will allow DOD to reduce the risk of inadvertently conducting business with individuals and entities that have been identified by OFAC and are the subjects of USG sanctions. This risk is inherently higher when DOD executes contract support in or near specific geographic areas that have been the subject of focused scrutiny by OFAC. Restrictions on dealing with key countries, areas, and individuals are published in regulations and executive orders. The SJA must be consulted in contracting to ensure compliance with the most current sanctions and regulatory oversight requirements. In addition to OFAC guidelines, the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce issues specific guidance to mitigate the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to export regulations.
For CTF Policy, see DODD 5205.14, Counter Threat Finance Policy.
b. COP. Establishing and maintaining an effective OCS COP can be a challenge, especially since there are only limited officially fielded automation tools currently available for use to support of this important task. However, there are numerous OSD-developed OCS as well as contracting specific COP-related tools can support joint and Service component HQ and supporting contracting activities in contingencies. These tools can provide both OCSIC and lead contracting activity the ability to capture and track contract visibility, spend data, and other important OCS-related information. When employing these operational prototypes, users must ensure the tools have the appropriate cybersecurity accreditations prior to authorizing their use on command networks. Information on these tools is available from DPAP’s Contingency Contracting Office’s website http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/resources.html).
c. Phase 0 (Support). While sometimes overlooked, OCS is a significant phase 0 enabler. In fact, most phase 0 actions are entirely supported by commercial, vice uniformed military, sources which can provide the CCMD OCSIC with significant analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information. DOD has been challenged to provide sufficient warranted or otherwise authorized personnel (i.e., credit card holders) to be able to conduct procurement support of theater security cooperation events. While DOS personnel can provide assistance to some minor operations (i.e., suggest sources of supplies and services), DOD is inherently responsible to execute procurements in support of military- related requirements. Additionally, OCS planners should be aware of special challenges when planning and executing phase 0, OCS actions to include lack of contingency contracting authorities/waivers (i.e., contract support must be executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures), lack of contingency funding, and lack of applicability and clarity of some contractor personnel policies and laws. For additional guidance, see OSD DPAP’s Procurement Support of theater security cooperation website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/security_assistance_efforts.html.
d. SOF Support. GCCs, as recommended by their OCSIC and ICW their aligned TSOC and the appropriate Service component commands, may designate an LSC or LSCC responsible to assist their TSOC in contracting planning and execution. The designated LSC’s or LSCC’s supporting contracting activity will be responsible to provide dedicated contracting OCS-related planning assistance, requirements development assistance, and
assistance in coordinating specific contracting support arrangements to deployed SOF elements. Normally, theater support contracting will be provided by the Service with the preponderance of forces or the most capable force in the particular mission area unless a JTSCC responsible for all theater support contracting is formed. Additionally, deployed SOF units may receive common logistic and other support services from CAP and other external support contracts. SOF-peculiar contract requirements are the responsibility of USSOCOM.
e. Multinational Support. The JFC and the US military lead contracting activity must be cognizant of challenges and potential pitfalls on planning and executing OCS actions in a multinational environment. Every effort must be made to arrange common contracting support, or at a minimum, to share vendor information. Planning for and executing common contracted support in a multinational force is complicated by the lack of a commonly accepted contracting policy and procedures. Additionally, even in alliance operations (e.g., in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission), OCS is not something that is routinely trained or exercised.
(1) Lead Nation or Role Specialist Nation Contracting Support. In most multinational operations, the multinational commander will normally designate a lead nation and/or role specialist nation to provide CUL support to the multinational force. Often, the US will be the lead nation responsible for this CUL support, which in many operations may be sourced through a combination of theater support contracts or CAP task orders. Challenges to set up a lead nation or role specialist nation contracting support include, but are not limited to a lack of common standards of support; a lack of standard terms and procedures (e.g., requirements development procedures, contract oversight procedures); difficulty in determining and establishing funding and method of payment arrangements; and a lack of trust in the reliability of this support.
MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM