2. MARCO TEORICO
2.2. Fundamentación teórica
2.2.1. Características generales sobre la percepción nutricional de las madres de
2.2.1.1 Hábitos alimentarios en el niño/a preescolar
Stone sees the seeds of the Cold War being sown even before the conclusion of the fight against the Axis.
. . .
May 4, 1945
I
t is very difficultat a conference of this kind to see the forest for the trees, to disentangle the realities from the rhetoric, but I think I am begin- ning to get my bearings.I am inclined to believe that what is going on here becomes a good deal clearer if one keeps in mind that action is proceeding on two planes. On one, the formal and public plane, a final draft is being prepared for a world security organization. On the other, the informal and private plane, quite a different tendency is at work.
That tendency, which is very strong, if not dominant, in the American delegation, is to regard the United Nations Conference on International Organization as a conference for the organization of an anti-Soviet bloc.
This is not my own opinion alone. It is the opinion privately held by some of the most astute newspapermen here, irrespective of their own polit- ical orientation. In my own case, this opinion is the net product of my own estimate of the basic forces at work, of conference gossip, and of an attempt to find some pattern into which all the diverse pieces will fit.
But I did not set this down on paper until I found confirmation in trust- worthy official American quarters I may not here identify. I can only say that among the younger and more progressive men attached to the Ameri- can delegation there is increasing apprehension over the extent to which the
conference begins to take on the aspects of an attempt by our delegation to build an anti-Soviet world coalition.
The maintenance of the unity of the powers as a first essential of world peace is a principle to which everyone agrees. But whenever one sets out to explore some specific problem, the future of Germany, the fate of the Rhineland and Ruhr, the course of the Far Eastern war and the settlement which will emerge from it, one finds this principle forgotten.
One finds, instead, that the main question in the minds of many State, War, and Navy Department officials, and too many members of the Ameri- can delegation, is the balance of forces between the USA and the USSR, an implied assumption that war between them is inevitable and that it is our job to maneuver for as strong a position as possible in anticipation of that conflict.
This dangerous belief that war between the two remaining great powers of the earth, the USA and the USSR, is inevitable—a belief which can make it so—has diverse roots.
The defeat of Germany has upset the world balance of power. The strength of the Soviet Union has both surprised and frightened many lead- ing figures in the War and Navy Departments; the bureaucracy of both tends to be either politically naive or socially reactionary.
The divergencies of outlook between a great Communist power, domi- nated by a one-party dictatorship and a still revolutionary mentality, and a capitalist democracy like our own are very great, and it will take much for- bearance and good will to bridge them. There is less forbearance and good will visible since Roosevelt’s death.
I think we must also recognize that there is no alternative between the achievement of full employment in America by peaceful means and new im- perialist adventures and war. This is recognized by the progressives among the technical staffs and consultants of the American delegation, who fear a tendency—an almost unconscious and organic tendency—to find a way out of a new postwar unemployment crisis by armed conflict instead of the peaceful, but painful, process of adjusting our economy to full employment. American progressives must keep in mind that however “correct” the at- titude of the Soviets and however conservative the policies Moscow may
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impose on Communist parties abroad to conciliate capitalist opinion, the contrast between full employment in the USSR and a new unemployment crisis after the war in the USA would be explosive. Many people fear the impact of so socially dangerous a contrast, but, while some of us conclude from it the necessity of a full-employment program, others may think the contrast would best be avoided by an attempt to destroy the USSR. I do not believe that anyone would advocate this publicly, and very few would even admit it to themselves. Yet there is a natural drift in that direction in some circles.
I do not set this down to be alarmist; I do not think such a conflict is at all inevitable. But I think it time that people became aware of this danger- ous undertow and took steps to counteract it lest we wake up one day to find that we have permitted our representatives here to lay the foundations for a third world war—a war against the Soviet Union—while going through the motions of establishing a stable peace.
That is a rough way to put it. It by no means does justice either to the motives or the actions of many members of the American delegation, but I am convinced that it provides a true picture of what is developing here.
As early as April 26, Walter Lippmann noted a tendency to assume “that because Germany is prostrate, the German problem is no longer the para- mount problem of the world.” He found this reflected in “the fact that the main preoccupation of so many here has been not Germany, but the Soviet Union.” And he warned that our relations with the USSR would become hopeless “if we yield at all to those who, to say it flatly, are thinking of the international organization as a means of policing the Soviet Union.”
I think it is no exaggeration to say that since last week, when Lippmann wrote what I have quoted, the anti-Soviet atmosphere has grown. It is no longer a question of not “yielding” to the men Lippmann has in mind. They are, if not running the show, at least playing the dominant part in the American delegation and in the conference.
Some of them have been very open and very indiscreet in voicing their anti-Soviet views at the social functions in which celebrity-dazed San Fran- cisco has been lionizing them. They have been equally open in spreading anti-Soviet propaganda “off the record” to correspondents who are their confidants or mouthpieces.
One correspondent, on a conservative paper with more access to these circles than I, says the only two members of the American delegation who have not been spreading an anti-Soviet line are Commander Stassen and Dean Gildersleeve. I cannot vouch for that information and it may be un- fair to one or two others, but I do not think it is far wrong.
In an atmosphere of this kind one may be sure that the realistic Russians, who understand perfectly well what is going on, will make few concessions on Poland and other areas important to the security of the USSR. They are no more willing than are the French to rely for their security solely on a new world organization, especially one born in such circumstances.
If this seems wicked of them, it may well be kept in mind that the United States Navy, on the question of international trusteeship, is equally unwilling to accept the new organization as a substitute for effective Amer- ican control of the Pacific islands and perhaps some of the African territo- ries where it considers bases necessary to our own security.
Whether President Truman is aware of, and supports, the kind of ma- neuvering in which the American delegation is engaged I do not know. Since the death of Roosevelt, the leadership of the American delegation seems to have fallen to Senator Vandenberg.
Truman’s own attitude is not clear. It is noted that the day after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union he issued a particularly unfortunate statement that is now being recalled with perhaps unjustified apprehension.
The New York Timesof June 24, 1941, carried a story by Turner Catledge
in which he said Congressional reaction to “the newest turn of the Euro- pean war was reserved except among isolationists. . . .” I do not think that term was fairly applied to Truman, but Catledge went on to quote Truman as one of those isolationists.
“If we see that Germany is winning,” Catledge quoted then Senator Tru- man as saying, “we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them think anything of their pledged word.”
What Truman said in 1941may be no index of his ideas in 1945, but what he said in 1941reflects the kind of thinking which has a strong hold on too many of the members of our delegation in San Francisco.