Hábitos Alimentarios y Rendimiento Académico

Much literature has been written about the punishment of slaves in the ancient world that applies directly to administrators as well. Normally, if an administrator were found to be unfaithful and disobedient to his master he would have been liable to great professional and physical maltreatment. But in some instances of administrative carelessness, it appears that they were punished rather lightly. After all, administrators were specially skilled and educated labourers who possessed great money-making potential for their masters. Severely injuring or killing one’s administrator, therefore, was not always in the best interest of the proprietor. Ischomachus, for instance, remarked that he punished his estate managers, not vindictively, but for pedagogical purposes, to train them how to superintend the estate better. As Ischomachus explained,

109 Andreau, 'Les esclaves', 116-17: ‘Au moment où l’esclave allait être affranchi, le maître pouvait lui redemander le pécule tout entier tel qu’il était au moment de l’affranchissement, ou bien lui en reprendre seulement une partie. Quelle partie? Assez souvent, semble-t-il, le maître demandait une somme équivalant au prix d’achat de l’esclave, afin qu’elle lui permît de racheter un esclave de valeur analogue’. Andreau points as evidence to Pliny the Elder, Nat. 7.39.128-129.

110 Although the LCL translation suggests that the freedman’s purchase was for his own manumission, Petronius’ Latin text is ambiguous and may indicate that the freedom of the freedman’s wife (contubernalis) is in view. In either case, the story depicts the great monetary possessions of a slave. The boast of the fictitious bailiff Olympio, ‘I can get freed for a farthing [una libella liber possum fieri]’ (Plautus, Cas. 316), is of course hyperbole, but nevertheless demonstrates that slave stewards possessed adequate funds to purchase manumission.

115 Whenever I notice that they are careful [ἐπιμελομένους], I commend them and try to show them honour [ἐπαινῶ καὶ τιμᾶν πειρῶμαι αὐτούς]; but when they appear careless, I try to say and do the sort of things that will sting [δήξεται] them. . . . If you want to make men fit to take charge, you must supervise their work and examine it, and be ready to reward work well carried through, and not shrink from punishing carelessness as it deserves. (Xenophon, Oec. 12.16, 19)

These kinds of gentle punishments—those which merely ‘sting’—were suitable for generally-obedient administrators, those who, even when deserving of punishment, were still of great value to their masters.

But some administrators were punished quite violently, especially when they had caused their masters great misfortune. Rural estate managers and business agents were especially liable to the master’s aggression,¹¹¹ for as Ramsay MacMullen observes, ‘It was easy for [the master] to hurt people he never saw’.¹¹² While some administrators were banished to a distant country estate (Petronius, Satyr. 69), others were heavily beaten and whipped (Columella, Claud. 38.2; Chariton, Chaer.

3.9.5-7).¹¹³ In his novel, Chariton tells that during an inspection a master’s anger toward his administrator might be expressed in a subtle complaint (μέμψις) or in such fury (βαρύθυμος) as to require a lover’s intercession and rescue from death (Chaer. 2.7.2-6; cf. Cicero, Resp. 1.59). Moreover, the masters in the gospel parables are quite famous for viciously penalising disobedient managers. In certain cases they desert or demote their managers to menial servitude (Luke 16.2-3),¹¹⁴ and in others they have their administrators cut into pieces (διχοτομέω [Luke 12.46//Matt 24.51]).¹¹⁵ These horrific examples were not exceptional. As Saller maintains,

‘Romans regularly and legitimately inflicted on their fellow men corporal punishments that maimed and even killed’.¹¹⁶

D. Summary

In the preceding analysis of private administrators we sought through the use of the title οἰκονόμος and several other Greek and Latin correlatives to identify

111 Cicero remarked, ‘If a man, as a guardian, or as a partner, or as a person in a place of trust, or as any one’s agent, has cheated any one, the greater his offence is, the slower is his punishment’

(Caecin. 2.7).

112 MacMullen, Social Relations, 6. Seneca’s vilicus appealed to the intimacy and longevity of their relationship in an attempt to appease his master’s anger (Ep. 12.1-3).

113 Fitzgerald, Slavery, 32-50.

114 Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 49, who argues that demotion and desertion were suitable forms of punishment for slaves, because the inflicted slaves would either be left to fend for themselves and probably to die, or be demoted to digging as a drudge.

115 Ulrich Luz, Matthew 21-28: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 224-25;

cf. Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 43.

116 Saller, Patriarchy, 134 (original emphasis).

116 their main characteristics and chief attributes. Several features of the position were consistently observed. Although οἰκονόμος originally referred to a free proprietor of an estate, over time the title and the responsibilities of estate and business management came to be identified almost exclusively with slaves and freedmen.

Administrators, therefore, were typically the subordinates of wealthy

masters/patrons, although administrators themselves were normally located in positions of authority as well. Granted the responsibility of running an enterprise, private administrators were charged with making steady—though not excessive—

profits for the proprietor and with directing a group of subordinate labourers to achieve that end.¹¹⁷ Administrators were often authorised to enter into contract negotiations with potential third contracting parties. Both to their slave staffs as well as to third parties, then, administrators acted as representatives of their principals and were entrusted with the right to act for them as such.

Administrators, however, were generally not liable for their contracts. Rather, when formally authorised, the principal was normally held responsible for all commercial dealings, as long as the agent acted within the scope of his commission. But even though third parties could not charge the administrator with fault, business managers were always held accountable to their principals for the work they performed. Depending on their fidelity to their principal, they either received rewards (e.g. promotion, commendation, allowance) or punishment (e.g. demotion, chastisement, death).

117 In his treatise on estate management, Xenophon records how Ischomachus summarises the make-up of the good administrator: ‘[A]fter you have implanted in him a desire for your prosperity and have made him also careful to see that you achieve it, and have obtained for him, besides, the knowledge needful to ensure that every piece of work done shall add to the profits [ὠφελιμώτερα], and, further, have made him capable of ruling [ἄρχειν], and when, besides all this, he takes as much delight in producing heavy crops for you in due season as you would take if you did the work yourself. For it seems to me that a man like that would make a very valuable bailiff [πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπίτροπος]’ (Xenophon, Oec. 15.1).

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Summary of Part 1

In Chapters 2-4 we surveyed the three main administrative contexts from Graeco-Roman antiquity in which oikonomoi served (regal, municipal, private) in order to highlight their key similarities and significant differences. Therein we made several important observations relevant for our enquiry concerning Paul’s metaphorical use of oikonomos. Firstly, we noticed that the social and legal status of oikonomoi varied according to the kind, period, and location of the administration in view. The civic oikonomoi from the Hellenistic period, for instance, were freemen, while those in municipal positions during the Roman period could have been free, freed, or slaves. Moreover, although regal oikonomoi from the Hellenistic period were always freemen, during both the Hellenistic and Roman periods private oikonomoi were almost always freedmen or slaves. Secondly, we observed that the administrative structures in which oikonomoi served varied according to context. Although regal and private oikonomoi operated in hierarchical structures, civic oikonomoi served in democratic and republican forms of government, which dramatically affected the power they possessed and the manner—and even possibility—of their calling to account. These observations will enable us now to identify the source domain of Paul’s oikonomos metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9.

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