Hacia una definición aplicada de contexto

process of party institutionalization, and institutionalization as a property variable—a coherent analytical framework suited for examining the institutionalization of Hamas is constructed. The framework is divided into two basic elements, namely that of process and property. The processual or sequential element fuses social movement theory and institutionalization as a process, whereas the property element is focused on measuring the degree of institutionalization.

The processual element allows for a theoretically founded analysis of Hamas from its modest beginnings as a militant movement, its transmutation toward a political party, and its institutionalization into an increasingly stabilized political party. Based on the sequencing of the two theoretical components, the process is divided into five phases: It begins by tracing Hamas from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement to its establishment as a social movement organization; then the focus shifts to Hamas’s transmutation from a social movement organization to a political party; and finally comes the three phases of institutionalization as a process—i.e., identification, organization, and stabilization. Recall

Strong institution Weak institution

tendencies factions

that there are no clear-cut thresholds between these phases, but rather that both the transmutation from movement organization toward political party and the institutionalization process are expected to be incremental and overlapping. In combination with the need for contextual sensitivity, the processual element of the analysis will therefore be organized according to historical phases rather than to the theorized steps.

The property element enables the analysis to investigate the degree to which Hamas institutionalized throughout these phases. Importantly, there are no standardized frameworks to measure the degree of institutionalization. Furthermore, as the environment in which Hamas emerged and matured escapes clear classification and in any event is a far cry from

“ordinary politics,” it would be of limited analytical value to directly adopt existing frameworks developed to measure the degree of party institutionalization in more stable political systems.²⁷ In short, the volatility and violence characterizing the political environment in occupied Palestine render some of the criteria usually employed to measure the degree of party institutionalization unsuitable for the case at hand, and for the same reasons, Hamas can not be expected to institutionalize to the same degree as parties operating under more conventional circumstances.²⁸

By carefully selecting criteria and associated indicators deemed appropriate given the environmental conditions in occupied Palestine, it is nevertheless possible to estimate the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized at various historical junctures. Following previous studies of party institutionalization employing Randall and Svåsand’s framework, such as de Zeeuw (2009), Hamas’s changing degree of institutionalization from one period to the next will be estimated on a rough ordinal scale from low, via medium, to high. This approach is adopted to highlight in a clear and consistent manner the changes in Hamas’s degree of institutionalization between the historical periods covered.²⁹

It would have been preferable to offer a more precise and nuanced scoring of Hamas’s degree of institutionalization. However, the data needed for achieving this was neither available in

27 Basedau and Stroh (2008) suggest a number of criteria to measure party institutionalization that are suitable for comparison. However, adopting their framework wholesale would sacrifice the contextual sensitivity needed to properly measure the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized. Note, however, that certain criteria listed below are taken from or inspired by the framework developed by Basedau and Stroh, complemented with suitable criteria partly based on those employed in other studies of party institutionalization, including de Zeeuw (2009), Levitsky (1998), Dix (1992), and Janda (1980).

28 For example, it would be a tall order for a political organization operating under the dire conditions of occupation to routinize organizationally to an extent comparable to parties in stable political systems.

29 Because of this, no claims for external comparability of these scores are made.

the extant literature nor obtainable as primary data—mainly due to the Israeli occupation and the consequent secrecy surrounding certain aspects of Hamas.³⁰ And in lieu of higher quality data, it was also unfeasible to define exactly what would qualify for an increase or decrease between the ordinal levels. To compensate for this lack of explicit coding rules, care was taken to be as transparent as possible in the inductive assessments of Hamas’s degree of institutionalization. As a result of the above, the scoring is admittedly rather rough and somewhat subjective. Nevertheless, the scores do provide a clear picture of the changing degree to which Hamas had institutionalized in the various periods of analysis.

In essence, Hamas’s level of institutionalization will be measured by relying on the four elements of institutionalization suggested by Randall and Svåsand (2002a), i.e., systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification. Below, the selected criteria and associated indicators for each of the four elements are laid out in some detail. For a summarized version, see Table 10 on page 343, Appendix D.

The criteria

Criteria used to assess Hamas’s level of systemness in each period include the degree to which it had routinized—both formally and informally—leadership alternation, decision-making, and recruitment and advancement procedures. Although details regarding Hamas’s internal workings and structure are scarce, crucial aspects were nevertheless uncovered, both in interviews with current and former Hamas members and by consulting certain secondary sources.³¹ Based on this information, it is possible to infer with some certainty how routinized Hamas was at various points. Moreover, by observing the behavior of Hamas, deviations from these routines can be identified, which in turn would indicate lack of systemness.

Organizational coherence is also deemed a suitable indicator of Hamas’s systemness.

Operationalized as factionalism, observed occurrences of either horizontal or vertical power struggles between identifiable sub-groups will be taken to indicate a lack of systemness. In addition, how closely bylaws are followed and the degree of material self-sufficiency are regularly used as criteria of systemness. However, as Hamas refuse to disclose both its bylaws and financial details—ostensibly for reasons of security—it is difficult to rely on these criteria 30 Consult chapter 2, section 2.2, pp. 56ff. for discussions regarding the consequences that the Israeli

occupation has for the quality of the data used in the thesis.

31 In particular, Mishal and Sela (2000), Hroub (2000, 2006b), Tamimi (2007), Gunning (2008), Caridi (2010), and Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010) provide credible details regarding the inner workings and organizational structure of Hamas. For details regarding the interviewees, see chapter 2, section 2.2.1, pp.

56ff.

to measure Hamas’s level of systemness. Yet, based on secondary sources, it is possible to at least indicate the degree to which Hamas was materially self-sufficient at various junctures.

Hamas’s level of value infusion will be measured by its degree of organizational cohesion, i.e., how disciplined its members remain in the face of unpopular decisions taken by the leadership. More specifically, if the Hamas leadership fundamentally alters its stated goals or changes its preferred strategy without suffering defections or facing public opposition from its rank-and-file, it is arguably infused with value. Conversely, members defecting in protest, or rank-and-file vocally opposing changes in ideology or strategy, are taken to indicate a low degree of value infusion. Note, however, that given Hamas’s organizational and ideological heritage, there are probably limits as to how infused with value it can become; simply put, as Hamas was founded as a religious liberation movement, it can neither stray too far from Islam nor abandon its goals of liberation without risking organizational splits and possibly its own demise.³²

Decisional autonomy will be measured through investigations of the nature and number of relationships between Hamas and external sponsors. More specifically, if it can be demonstrated that Hamas depends on the sponsorship of one particular donor for its survival, there is obviously a risk that this patron can exercise undue influence on Hamas and thus impede on its decisional autonomy. Because of this, it is assumed that having a larger array of external sponsors, Hamas will be less dependent on any one of them, which in turn is taken to indicate a higher degree of decisional autonomy. In addition, the nature of Hamas’s relationship with civil society organization can be used to evaluate its degree of decisional autonomy.³³

Finally, the degree to which popular support for Hamas has fluctuated will be used to estimate its level of reification. Specifically, trends in available polling data will indicate whether Hamas became more or less reified throughout the periods examined. Added to this, the question of identifiability, i.e., if Hamas successfully monopolized important symbolic values and whether it was recognized as a serious contender by both its supporters and detractors, 32 Another criterion used to measure value infusion relates to whether a party belongs to a broader social movement. However, as this question can be answered in the positive at the outset—after all, Hamas was established by the Brotherhood movement—this criterion will not be used to trace its changing degree of value infusion.

33 While this criterion will be used intermittently in the coming analyses, it should be noted that, despite some overlap in personnel, Hamas’s relationship with civil society organizations in occupied Palestine have been thoroughly studied by various authors, most of whom find that there is no obvious or official ties, and no examples of meddling in either direction (cf. Benthall 2010; Høigilt 2010; Kjøstvedt 2011; Roy 2011; see Levitt 2006 for a different view).

will be used to suggest the degree to which it had become reified in the public imagination.

In sum, these criteria and associated indicators constitute the main independent variables used to track the degree to which Hamas has institutionalized throughout the analyses; Hamas’s degree of institutionalization as estimated at the end of the first intifada will form the baseline for the longitudinal comparison, and each subsequent analytical chapter will conclude with a section assessing and detailing Hamas’s degree of institutionalization at the end of the respective period under scrutiny.