2.2 Análisis de hacinamiento
2.2.2 Hacinamiento cualitativo
To answer the question on why people migrate I first reviewed the theoretical migration literature and linked the theories in a general framework. This was followed by an econometric analysis of some aspects of these theories. So why do people migrate? They migrate because their assets, investments and opportunities in the source country are limited. They migrate because they are not able to support their families or use their skills efficiently. They migrate because they do not have access to public transfers. They migrate because they see others in their social network migrate and they realise that migration is another option to make a living. I will now discuss the reasoning behind these conclusions in more detail. The macro‐level is the level of analysis of classic neoclassical migration theories. Lewis (1954), Ranis & Fei (1961) and Harris & Todaro (1970) all contributed to the classic macro migration model that explain migration as a result of geographical differences in the supply and demand of labour, mostly between the rural agricultural sector and the urban manufacturing sector. Migrants are attracted to cities by higher wages, where labour is scarcer and migration continues until wages are equalized. The related dual‐labour market theory (Piore, 1979) also emphasizes the strong, often temporary, labour demand in Western economies as a pull factor of international migration. Other theories place migration in a broader framework: For example, Zelinsky’s hypothesis of Mobility
i a
Transition (1971) argues that migration is part of the demograph c transition ny country undergoes when modernizing.
Another more mainstream economic theory is focused on the micro‐level, the Human Capital Approach (Sjaastad, 1962). According to this theory potential migrants make a rational decision to decide whether to migrate, weighing the costs (e.g. transportation costs, missing family) versus the benefits (e.g. higher probability of employment, higher income). Related migration models are behavioural models that also include non‐economic considerations. Wolpert’s Stress‐Threshold model (1965) describes a behavioural model of internal migration, similar to a cost‐benefit analysis, but assuming that while individuals intend to be rational ex‐ante, they are not necessarily so ex‐post. This kind of model explains why people migrate even if they are not better off afterwards.
Potential migrants are not individuals in a social vacuum; the decision of one or more family members to migrate is often made jointly and is also influenced by the wider community. This is stressed by meso‐level theories. Mincer (1978) amongst others regards the migration decision as a cost‐benefit analysis of the whole family, which may or may not result in the migration of the family as a whole. The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) literature (e.g. Stark, 1991) considers the decision to migrate as truly a family decision, in which a household maximises 124 joint income, status and minimises risks. Due to failing labour and credit markets at home a household may send one or more household members abroad. Migration networks and institutions in the origin and destination countries help to perpetuate migration (e.g. Goss & Lindquist, 1995). These may be both informal (e.g. former neighbours helping you find a job) and formal (e.g. the IOM advising migrants on their rights). Another meso‐level theory, Cumulative and Circular Causation (Massey, 1990) shows how migration becomes more and more prevalent since it has started, by sustaining itself. One should be aware that informal migrant networks may influence migration flows both by being a means
to migration (i.e. facilitating migration) and an actual cause (making individuals
aware of the option migration).
In the conclusion to Chapter 2, I show how most of these theories can be linked and that they should best be treated in a complementary fashion. The different actors are not isolated but often affect one another at one point in time (through social capital) and over time (e.g. cumulative causation). It is therefore important to consider the different levels of migration. Structural macro factors affect the decisions made on the micro level and vice versa. Looking at the union of migration theories in another way, one could say that macro‐level factors like unemployment in the source country or structural labour demand in the destination country create migration potential, while micro level factors (like income maximisation) create actual migration streams.
In Chapter 4 the migration theories are linked in another way by placing them in the context of the Welfare Pentagon. The Welfare Pentagon (de Neubourg, 2002) is a general framework that explains how people maximise income and smooth consumption by accessing different parts of the Welfare Pentagon, namely families, markets, membership associations, social networks and public authorities. When an individual has no or not significant access to some of these institutions and has insufficient assets and thus cannot make ends meet at home, the individual may decide to migrate. At the same time relevant assets and access to some of these institutions are also necessary in order to migrate, e.g. social networks.
In Chapter 4 this framework is explored empirically with data for Albania and Moldova and I give a first indication of characteristics of Albanians and Moldovans that do migrate internationally. In terms of demographics, migrants are younger on average and being male and married increases the propensity to migrate. These effects are especially strong for Albania, where a higher number of children in the household also leads to more migration. It appears that migration is very much a family‐focused decision, taken in order to support the family. The existing literature on Albanian migration acknowledges the importance of the family in terms of support (see also Chapter 6) and also as an important factor in the migration decision (e.g. Vullnetari, 2007 and Barjaba & King, 2005). In section 4.5
of Chapter
receivers live in communities that are less developed in terms of access to cre it and infrastructure but these results are not significant.
I have argued that it is more valuable to consider migration theories in conjunction. Moreover, not all migration theories are applicable in all country contexts. I have investigated two countries that seem similar on the surface: They are in transition from a central to market economy, very poor and European countries bordering the European Union. Nevertheless the motivations behind migration in these two countries and amongst different groups of migrants seem to 4 it was shown that remittances in Albania are mostly linked to the motive altruism, which corroborates the conclusion that Albanians migrate to support their families. However, my empirical work does not strongly support previous findings that Albanian migration is additionally driven by dire economic circumstances, such as poverty, unemployment etc. (e.g. Mancellari et al, 2006). The Welfare Pentagon framework hypothesizes that individuals that are unemployed or underemployed in the local labour market, may migrate. While migrants in Albania are generally less educated, in Moldova the more highly educated are more likely to migrate. In section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4, I also show that more highly educated Moldovan migrants send more remittances. My own evidence on employment is fuzzy, but there is some indication that in Moldova migration is linked to employment. Other research (e.g. Lücke et al, 2007 and Danzer & Dietz, 2009) clearly links migration to dysfunctional labour markets in Moldova. According to the human capital approach (Sjaastad, 1962) and the Welfare Pentagon perspective, migration in Moldova can thus be seen as a (human
i e e g o
cap tal) inv stm nt: Moldovans mi rate abr ad, because they are better able to employ their skills and human capital abroad.
As spelled out above, migration theories on the perpetuation of migration emphasize social networks in explaining migration flows. The Welfare Pentagon also shows how access to social networks and membership institutions helps maintaining income at home, but also to realize migration. There is strong evidence for formal and informal networks facilitating migration in both countries. Albanian migrants have more friends, than non‐migrants, and meet their friends more often. Migrant households live in communities with more community groups and these households have joined more groups. In both Albania and Moldova, the higher the fraction of migrants in the community, the higher is the propensity to migrate.
The NELM emphasizes that failed or non‐existing labour and credit markets in source countries may be a motivation to send one or more household members abroad. The Welfare Pentagon framework also adds weak public authorities to that list. Migration may be a solution for poor households, if neither markets nor the government are available to help. Previous studies have pointed out the important role the collapse of social services played in influencing Albanian migration flows (e.g. Unicef, 1998 quoted in Barjaba & King 2005). In Chapter 4 it is also tested whether structural differences in terms of infrastructure and public transfers stimulate migration flows, but the empirical results are ambiguous. Descriptive statistics show that migrant households are less likely to receive public transfers. It is not completely clear whether migrants live in less developed communities: Migrants and remittance receivers are more likely to live in rural areas. Remittance
diverge. Therefore it is impossible and undesirable to give a general answer to why people migrate and it is of utmost importance to consider the specific migration motives in different countries or amongst distinct groups of migrants.
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Here remittances are paid to the household at home for services provided, e.g. looking after the migrant’s children.
The most pressing problem in the remittance literature is that the theoretical literature is explicit and blunt, while the real motivations of remitters are fuzzy and implicit. Most likely it will only be a subconscious thought of migrants that building a grand house in their village of origin is an investment into their reputation. Furthermore, a migrant seldom only has one motivation in mind. The