The Stoics, despite the influence on them of Cynic doctrine, seem always to have retained a belief in man's social nature.31 Diogenes Laertius, at any rate, reports of them that they said the wise man would not live in solitude: h o l v w v l m o s yap cpuaeu xau TipaxiLHOs (D.L. 7.123). Goodness and sociability go hand in hand, so that only the wise man may be able to live in the Politeia envisaged by Zeno (see D.L. 7.33).
'Oyoudxqg is the basis of true friendship, and öydvoua as for the neo- Pythagoreans is essential for the welfare of any community (D.L. 7.124, SVF 1.263). Baldry claims that Zeno in his Republic with its ideal
conditions was setting forth a vision of what might be and not
describing an idyllic past, despite the primitive nature of some of the regulations.32 This does not mean that the early Stoics did not believe that their ancestors lived in a way more appropriate to the wise (who considered all but the good 'indifferent') than the sophisticated contemporary existence.33 One later Stoic, at least, Posidonius,
31 'Aussi oppose ä 1 ’individualisme qu’on peut 1 ’etre(Japprenant a l ’homme ä se considerer non comme une simple partie (yepos), mais comme un membre (yeAos) d ’un vaste organisme social, oil chacun a pour devoir de s ’interesser au perfectionnement des autres, Zenon donne ä l ’esprit purement negatif et frondeur du cynisme un espoir positif en meme temps qu’un caractere philanthropique', J. Bidez, 'La Cite du Monde et la Cite du Soleil chez les Sto’iciens', BAB (1932), pp.270-1.
32 See H.C. Baldry, 'Zeno's Ideal State', JHS.79 (1959), p.6. 33 As Bidez claims, though with some exaggeration, '1*ideal du
Portique, d ’apres les formules de Zenon du moins, nous ramenerait a une sorte d ’age d ’or oü le regne absolu de la Raison nous dispenserait d ’avoir aucun autre droit que le droit naturel', Bidez, 'La Cite du Monde', p.272. This was of course theory, not practice. He also
concerned himself with theories of society’s origin, and ascribed to philosophers both the political and the technical discoveries that made
civilization possible (Sen.
Ep.
90.5,7). This attitude clearly was not one involving praise of the simple life, and proves that the Stoic ideas on society as on other matters did not stand still after Zeno.From the beginning, however, Stoic social theory had been more than simple advocacy of a primitive way of life; essential to it was belief that there were two kinds of men, the good and the base (see SVF 1.216). The good, obviously a minority, are blessed in every way and Stoics believe cpuAtav ev ydvous rot's anouöatous tovao, öua rqv opoodiriTa (D.L.
7.124). The good and wise seem then to form a community only with each other. Their relation to the evil men making up the majority of
humanity could only be as sovereign.34 Thus what looks at first glance like an assumption of the equal right of all to live as they please appears on closer inspection to do little to encourage belief in the equality of all men or to forward the claims of all to participate in government. The ’natural* man is not as common as one might expect.
To Polybius no philosophical label can properly be attached, but he does present a view of society in Book Six of his history into which the position of the monarch is also fitted, despite his interest in the mixed constitution of the Romans.35 He believes that the human race has already been destroyed many times. Social groups formed from the
comments, with similar lack of precision, ’toujours, depuis l ’epoque ou Zenon se formait chez le cynique Crates jusqu’au siecle d ’Epictete, les Stoiciens, dans leurs cites ideales, ont cherche un retour ä l ’etat de nature’ (’La Cite du Mo n d e ’, p.287).
34 'The theory that there was a great difference in capacity among various individuals and that responsibility for the good of the whole should be placed upon those of greater capacity may have been accepted by the Stoics generally. At any rate it was held by Posidonius’, Margaret E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa
(Augustin, New York, 1951), p.54.
35 F.W. Walbank, ’Polybius on the Roman Constitution’, CQ„37 (1943), refers to his reaching ’a frame of mind in which he recognized in the Stoic anaeyclosis a more adequate explanation [of the Roman
constitution’s] development than in the mixed constitution of Dicaearchus’ (p.88), although T.A. Sinclair, A History of Greek
Political Thought (2nd ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), claims that ’he betrays no real knowledge of Stoic doctrine and it would be a mistake to attach a label to him or to expect much philosophy from h i m ’ (p.272).
survivors of cataclysms were united simply because their weakness made joint action necessary. Virtue was not innate, but emerged as men
learnt to use their reason and make decisions about what kind of conduct
would benefit and what harm the community (6.6.4ff.). Naturally the
first ruler was the strongest man, but sociability and true kingship
developed together (6.5.10). Such kingship was monarchy based on the
reason and judgement of the ruler. Polybius therefore saw the rule of
one man as an off-shoot of the advance of society, though he did not expect it to endure unchanged in any community. What is important is his contractual view of all social groups and his pragmatic approach to
the question of the best type of government; a king's position comes
about only because he is of use to his fellows. He is therefore firmly embedded in his society, unlike his position in much of the theory of society we have examined so far.
Because Polybius has so few philosophical presuppositions, he can afford to consider the question of society empirically, and come to a different conclusion from the theorists'. Yet even he shows an interest in the personality of the ruler which partly draws his attention from the complex interrelationship of ruler and society.
For Epicurus and his followers, also, society was a product of an agreement, since 'there never was an absolute justice' (D.L. 10.150). So only by using the capacity to make covenants (ouvdqKab) with one another for their mutual preservation can people know justice or
injustice {ib.) . Self-sufficiency within this framework is each
individual's best chance of happiness. An elite of the wise is still
assumed, but such an elite is unlikely to have anything to do with
public life (see fr. LVIII and fragments 81 and 87 Bailey). There is no logical relationship between the social outlook of the Epicureans and
any particular form of government. 'Friendship' for them had no
political meaning, and if society was all, it was the small intimate society of kindred spirits.
If the neo-Pythagorean writers on kingship took notice of the views
of Archytas (or his later imitator and namesake), they would have been
aware that he had definite views of the ideal society. The best
condition for a polis is to be self-sufficient (p.86). This is actually a call for a Spartan existence, but the social implications are not
worked out. Education in the society's customs inculcates desirable social habits, bringing about harmony (p.88).
For Ecphantus, the most metaphysically inclined of our writers, man has achieved the highest development among the animals on earth, with the king being as it were the summit of human achievement (p.272 and p.244). The most significant fact about men is the existence among them, as in all the universe, of m o l v o j v u (see esp. p.279). The (ptAua
existing in political societies is a faint reflection of the oyovota of the universe (f>275 and cf. Euryphemus uepu Buou, V, pp.914-5).
The independent, direct imitation of the deity with no need of obedience, that quality so close to necessity, is the best way for
mortals to achieve virtue (pp.277-8). One obvious way for men to come
to self-reliance is for them to reduce the number of their wants, and
this Ecphantus, like Archytas, advocates (p.279). This should abolish
the need for government, but since men are weak, the principle of rule and subordination must come into play, and 'nothing unruled can be
found' (p.274).
Diotogenes is concerned to show how the good man (i.e. the true king in particular) differs from unreasoning animals (p.266) and he too is interested in the harmony of the earthly rule (pp. 264-5). For this to come about, strangely enough, the king must be unlike other men, since he has to impose harmony from above ( b b.) . Like Ecphantus, Diotogenes and Sthenidas stress the need for rule and subordination throughout the cosmos (see esp. p.265 and p.271), but for Diotogenes justice is the basis of the harmony that results (p.269 and p.264), although we are not told what this justice implies for the subjects, since it seems to be a kingly rather than a human quality. The social doctrine of all these works has then no meaning apart from the theory of kingship in which it
is embedded.
CICERO
The theoretical basis of Cicero's attitude to society and its
origins is inextricably linked with his attitudes as a Roman politician, but we can adduce a certain consistency of belief behind the shifts and
argumenta ad hominem of his career. Thus he puts forward with considerable persuasiveness a view, owing much to the Stoics, which argues for the natural sociability of man, especially the wise man.
This quality derives both from traits man shares with the gods, and from the purposes for which men come together. In the first book of the De Officiis, Cicero claims society is founded on justice and service, and although desire for self-preservation and propagation of the species is strong in man as in the animals, the capacity to look to the future and
plan ahead makes co-operation among humans more permanent (De Off.
1.11). Cicero in the De Republica is at pains to stress that the most powerful impulse to association in primitive man was not utilitarian
(the wish for mutual protection) but because there is naturalis quaedam
hominum quasi congregatio (De Rep. 1.39). 36 Cicero elaborates on this
by saying what man is not: non est enim singulare neo solivagum genus
hoc (ib.), no doubt having in mind here those such as the Epicureans whose theories of social origins tended to see little positive value in
the larger social units.37
In the De Legibus Cicero also sets forth the rationale behind a
society governed by law when he describes men as bound together naturali
quadam indulgentia et benivolentia3 tum etiam societate iuris (De Leg.
1.35). This natural love for one’s fellow also appears in the De
Finibus (e.g. 3.63). We can agree with Reesor that society as shown here
is based on three fundamental aspects of man, that he is by nature a social animal, that he feels a natural affection for his fellow men, and shares with them certain fundamental capacities .3 8
36 This emphasis probably derives partly from Panaetius. See
Maximilian Schäfer, ’Des Panaitios avqp äpxtxos bei Cicero’, Gymnasium,
67 (1960), p.508: ’Wir befinden uns also mit diesen Zusammenhängen zutiefst in panaitianischem Denken und sehen ihn hie[r]bei in Gegner schaft zu einer auch von Polybios (VI 5) vertretenen und von Epikurs Schule verfochtenen Ansicht, die erste Ursache des Sichzusammentuns mit andern sei ein Schwächegefühl wie bei Tieren, die sich einem stärkeren Leiter als Führer und Schützer der Herde unterstellten.'
37 Cf. Laelius 27: a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia
orta anricitiaj applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi3 quam cogitatione quantum ilia res utilitatis esset habitura.
38 Margaret Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa, p .52.
Whom, though, does Cicero hold responsible for the development of
society from its primitive state? This, after all, for many thinkers is the most important question to be asked about society, and on the answer they give to this depends their subsequent theoretical position. We need then to know if Cicero's account is one that shows a true concern for the integration of men into an harmonious state which uses the abilities of all.
The De Inventione puts before us a magnus vir et sapiens whose knowledge of the human potential leads him to persuade, ratione, other men, who, through the use of ratio and oratio become civilized (De Inv. 1.2). In the Pro Sestio Cicero assumes that those primi virtute et consilio praestanti brought men together and led them from their
savagery to justice and gentleness, and the comforts of town life (Pro Sest. 91). In the Tusculan Disputations the philosophers were the
people who first created civilization (Tusc. Disp. 5.5; cf. 1.62). Not all men therefore were responsible for the emergence from barbarism. Rather, it was the work of an elite, however defined. Cicero obviously does not, however, believe that those excelling in force and strength began the process — differing in this respect from Polybius, for example.
In whatever guise society appears, speech is for Cicero crucial to its foundation. This is an obvious agent for change and communication, but Cicero makes it much more. We notice
how Isocrates (Ant. 235) equates 'sophist' with 'sage' and how Cicero similarly is quick to identify eloquentia with
sapientia (cf. De inv. 1.5). This collocation of wisdom and oratory was, of course, common in the Hellenistic age.39
He constantly refers to the fact that language is the one advantage men possess over the animals (see e.g. De Orat. 1.32) and asserts through the mouthpiece of Crassus that no other force than human eloquence could have been strong enough out dispersos homines unum in locum congregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere (De Orat. 1.33). Speech is again the unifying force in the discussion on the origin of society at the beginning of the third book of the De Republica:
(ratio) homines antea dissociatos iucundissimo inter se sermonis vinculo
39 S.E. Smethurst, 'Cicero and Isocrates', TAPA?84 (1953), p.300, note 16.
conligavit {De Rep. 3.3) and when Cicero is describing m a n ’s debt to Providence in the De Natura Deorum, he waxes eloquent on the power of speech 'which has bound us together in the bonds of justice.law and citizenship. It has raised us from a life of brutal savagery’ {Nat. Deor. 2.148).40 In the De Legibus, the vis orationis is eonciiiatrix humanae maxime sooietatis {De Leg. 1.27).
Speech is one important expression of ratio.41 It gives man the ability to extend the influence of his mind over others posse dieendo teuere hominum coetus mentes allioere etc., but significantly Cicero considers that this gift, which nature has granted to all, appears fully developed in very few {De Orat. 1.30). Because of the facts of man's nature, certain structures and attitudes have grown up: apparet a natura ipsa3 ut eos quos genuerimus amemus3 impelli. Ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatia3 ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum3 quod homo sit3 non alienum videre {De Fin. 3.62-3). What then are the principles behind existing societies and governments? Firstly, their vinculum is ratio et oratio3 quae docendo discendo3 communicando disceptando iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate {De Off. 1.50). The definition of man given in the De Legibus shows the same emphasis:
animal hoc providum sagax multiplex acutum memor plenum rationis et consilii {De Leg. 1.22). The orator combining ratio and oratio in him self can therefore claim to be of considerable importance to the state. The individuals who are the medium of transmission of ratio are not visualized as being in any sense detached from the society they are
40 lam vero domina rerum . . . eloquendi vis quam est praeclara quamque divina: quae prinrum efficit ut et ea quae ignoramus discerc et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus3 hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore3 hac
gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus3 haec nos iuris legum urbium societate devinxit3 haec a vita inmani et fera segregavit.
41 'Genauer führt I 50 aus, wie ratio et oratio die menschliche
Gemeinschaft binden. Mit ratio et oratio gibt Cicero oft das Wort Adyog wieder ... und bezeichnet damit richtig dessen beide Seiten, den Adyog ev6ucx§£Tos und den tpocpoptxds ... Die Redner feiern seit Isokrates Nik. 5 und Antid. 254 den Logos als Gründer der staalichen Gemeinschaft ... und denken dabei an die Rede, die Überredung; hier schwebt Cicero mit Panaitios zunächst die Sprache als Verständigungsmittel vor (vgl. ND. II 148)', Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, p.19, note 1 (Teubner^1934,
affecting, and the society itself is just as necessary as they are in
any developments: urbes vero sine hominnm coetu non potuissent nee
aedifieavi nee frequentari (De Off. 2.15).
Cicero has no fear of the material benefits of civilized life, as some of the Stoics he followed did. In De Offieiis 2.60, he
perfunctorily criticized extravagant expenditure, but much more in character is his account of how men have laboured together to produce
all the comforts and conveniences of society. Such things are
impossible sine hominum labore et manu (see 2.12-15 on this theme). Only communis vita, teaching men to seek help from each other, could
have brought about protection from the elements. Cicero includes the
working of metals, importing and exporting goods, ductus aquarum3
derivationes fluminum3 agrorum inrigationes3 moles oppositas fluetibus3 portus manu faetos (2.14) among the benefits of society, thereby
accepting that a complicated and sophisticated life is a necessary part
of the fully human personality. Even if early man could have done with
out a political order because of his few wants, as Plato, for example,
had suggested in describing his first polis, obviously such a
civilization as Cicero depicts could not.
One inevitable accompaniment of this kind of life is a social structure that arranges for the few to possess the highest works of men's hand and mind and the many to labour for the former select group. It is not therefore so surprising to find Cicero suggesting an
alternative reason for the development of society to that of natural
instinct: hanc ... ob causam maxume3 ut sua tenerentur3 res publicae
civitatesque constitutae sunt (De Off. 2.73).42 To avoid appearing too
inconsistent, Cicero explains: etsi duce natura congregabantur homines3
tarnen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidiu quaerebant (ib.). Cicero has little hesitation in dividing men up into those who should rule and those who should obey. He shows the wisdom of choosing
'the best' to preserve the state: praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit3
42 'With all the fervour of a true Roman, Cicero believed that the mission of his country was to make the world safe for property', Charles