With the use of transport planning literature, Vigar (2002, 2001, 2000) provides an historical overview of the UK transport planning policy from the 1950s to 2001. In his analysis he assesses the extent to which UK transport planning could be conceptualized as having a dominant paradigm, or a hegemonic discourse maintained by an institutionalized discourse coalition (2002, p. 42). Furthermore Vigar explores whether or not a paradigmatic shift has taken place in transport policy and practice from the ‘predict and provide’ towards the so-called ‘new realism’ paradigm (see Table 2.2).
12 Though it would be a simplification to suggest that these two countries can be seen as representative of
all the diversity in Western European transport policies, they do form good examples. Furthermore, the two countries show interesting similarities and differences when compared by a short discourse analysis.
1950-1987: the hegemony of ‘predict and provide’?
Vigar argues that for most of the twentieth century nations dealt with the continued increases in demand for mobility by building more roads, the so-called ‘predict and provide’ policy. This policy was characterized by a strong roads program largely disconnected from considerations related with other transport modes and from other spatial developments. In the predict and provide approach the existing demand for mobility was extrapolated into the future and then attempts were made to match the supply of infrastructure to that potential demand. The same type of models were used to project further declines in passenger numbers for public transport companies, thereby justifying cuts in rail and bus networks (Vigar, 2002, pp. 1-2). However, the extent to which the predict and provide approach dominated transport policy differs per time period and also for intra- and inter-urban forms of traffic.
During the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s UK central government policies on inter-urban transport were clear and consistent. Movement by cars was promoted by massive investments in road infrastructures, while investment in public transport was seen as a duplication of the road network and as uneconomic (i.e. too expensive to support apart from a core network of inter-city routes) (Vigar, 2001, p. 280). Complex transport models, which predicted dramatic increases in mobility were used to support the extensive road construction policies. The main explanation for this approach was that central government, considering the public opinion to mobility restrictions, viewed demand-management tools as inappropriate. With regard to intra-urban transport the picture, however, is more complicated. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the building of urban roads was, comparable to interurban transport, seen as the principal solution to problems of movement within towns and cities (Vigar, 2001, p. 274). However, in the late 1960s and in the Table 2.2. Policy goals for mobility within two paradigms (adapted from Vigar, 2002, p. 191). The ‘predict and provide’ approach The ‘new realism’ approach
Network congestion is a problem in and by itself Congestion is a problem because of the external effects it brings along for the environment, economic activity and quality of life Travel demand is an expression of social and market
dynamics and cannot be prevented without serious and unknowable consequences
Travel demand can be influenced by public policy, e.g. with price signals, user prioritization, and spatial organization
The appropriate policy response is to change the network capacity
The appropriate response is to develop travel demand management, stabilize mobility levels, and provide a modal shift. Network expansion plays only a supporting role and only under certain conditions
Policy issues concern the rate, priority order and scale of changes with respect to network capacities
Policy issues include broader economic, social and environmental impacts
1970s a change in central government policy occurred in relation to problems of intra-urban movement. Road construction in line with traffic forecasts were seen as unacceptable for the environment and suggestions were made that traffic should be controlled instead of provided for. Furthermore, the Transport Policy White Papers in 1966 and 1977 focused on restricting car use in (potentially) congested urban areas and on promoting public transport. Maintenance of local rail services were regarded essential for social reasons as well (Vigar, 2001, 2002). Nevertheless, even though local authorities were encouraged to invest in public transport, due to financial deficits many suburban rail lines were closed, thus undermining any public transport emphasis. Also in the 1970s municipal authorities showed little interest in restraining car use as congestion levels were not reaching the intensity as suggested by transport models in the 1960s13. The
support for public transport ended with the Thatcher government. Throughout the 1980s the national government stimulated local authorities to designate money to road construction while simultaneously targeting municipal transport operators, resulting in the privatization of many public transport providers (Vigar, 2002, pp. 48-52).
1987-2001: towards a paradigmatic change in transport policy?
Despite the dominance of the predict and provide approach as the outcome of transport policy until the end of the 1980s, the previous sections showed that even in the 1960s and the 1970s a competing storyline emerged which argued for a more balanced and people-centred approach (see Vigar, 2002). However, it was not until the 1990s that this approach, since then labelled ‘new realism’, came to be a modus operandi for UK transports policy. The year 1987 can be marked as the moment of change, since in this year criticism about the existing road-construction policy reached new heights. The ensuing ‘new realism’ within transport planning consisted of growing concerns among transport professionals that road construction could no longer solve the problems of increased mobility. During the 1990s this concern resulted into a major policy shift whereby environmental considerations played a key role in providing the legitimation and line of argumentation underpinning the shift (Vigar, 2002, p. 84). The new realism represented an alternative solution to mobility problems since it focused on a set of measures which are provided as a package instead of working with individual policy measures and targets. The approach has been described in terms of ‘a demand management discourse’ (Vigar, 2000, p. 28) and it involved the combined measures of traffic calming, road pricing and improving the provision of non- automotive transport providers including public transport, walking and cycling (Vigar, 2002, p. 67). Interestingly, throughout the 1987-2001 period the conception of mobility and the environment changed in various ways. In the 1989 Road Programme environmental effects were seen as unavoidable by-products of inevitable growth in mobility, which could best be solved via technological fixes. In the 1990s more emphasis was placed on the balance between the three pillars of sustainability. More specifically, local air quality and global ecological conditions received greater emphasis. However, although the failures of the ‘predict and provide’ approach were already noticed in the 1980s, actual reductions in spending money on road construction did not occur until 1994! Only after 1996 the UK Department of Transport recognized that, in order to lower 13 This was partly due to overestimates of economic growth and population, and traffic management policies.
environmental impact of transport, the rate of transport growth itself needed to be influenced (see Vigar, 2002, p. 85) as well.
In sum, the recognition of ecological limits in the context of UK transport policy contributed to the ‘realism’ that capacity for traffic growth should not be (automatically) provided for. At the very same time technical studies verified the fact that capacities matching existing patterns of traffic growth could not be provided for (Vigar, 2002, p. 180). These combined facts provided the political space needed for the development of new story lines such as the ‘user pays’ principle and the ‘demand side management’ approach into more prominent policy alternatives. Increasingly, these new storylines contained in the new realism discourse became incorporated within actual UK transport policy. These storylines were consolidated in the 1998 Transport White Paper. Vigar concludes that by the end of the period 1987-2001 the ‘predict and provide’ paradigm had largely been replaced. Furthermore, the full range of ecological concerns arising from continued growth in mobility had become firmly embedded in policy discussions, a noticeable shift compared with the previous decade. However, strong elements of the ‘predict and provide’ approach continue to linger in the minds and practices of transport policy actors (Vigar, 2002, p. 185, 2000, p. 30). According to Vigar the new story lines associated with ecological conditions and demand side management did not became fully institutionalized as transport policy largely remained under the dominant influence of congestion issues (Vigar, 2002, p. 184). Nevertheless, Vigar does conclude that the ‘predict and provide’ paradigm has run its course, with the new paradigm still lacking coherence. Finally, he concludes that one of the key issues remaining is the deeply rooted cultural resistance within transport policy against attempts to change travel behaviour. At the end of this chapter I will discuss in some more detail to the roots of this cultural resistance within transport and mobility policies.