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Code

1 state-made rates

2 prior approval without a deemer provision 3

4 file-and-use (file on or before effective date)

5 use-and-file (file within specified period after effective date) 6 filing only (no time period specified)

7 flex rating (prior approval of change outside of permissible range) 8 file-and-use or use and file in a competitive market

State Rating Law 1 Rating Law 2 Rating Law 3

Alabama 3:1972-2005 Alaska 3:1972-2005 3:2005 Arizona 3:1972-1980 5:1981-2005 Arkansas 3:1972-1979 4:1980-2005 California 6:1972-1988 3:1989-2005 Colorado 5:1972-1983 4:1984-2005 Connecticut 3:1972-1983,1994-1999 4:2000-2005 Delaware 2:1972-2005 Florida 3:1972-1974,1987-2005 4:1975-1986 Georgia 4:1972-1987 3:1988-2005 Hawaii 3:1972-2005 Idaho 5:1972-2005 Illinois 5:1972-2005 Indiana 4:1972-2005 Iowa 3:1972-1987 8:1988-2005 Kansas 3:1972-2005 Kentucky 3:1972-1982 8:1983-2005 Louisiana 3:1972-2003 7:2004-2005 Maine 3:1972-2005 Maryland 3:1972-1984,1990-1998 4:1985-2005 Massachusetts 1:1972-2005 Michigan 3:1972-1980 8:1981-2005 Minnesota 4:1972-2005 Mississippi 3:1972-2005 Missouri 5:1972-2005 Montana 6:1972-2005 Nebraska 3:1972-2005 Nevada 4:1972-1989 2:1990-2005 New Hampshire 2:1972-2003 3:2004-2005 New Jersey 2:1972-2003 7: 2004 - New Mexico 3:1972-1975,1988-2005 4:1976-1987 New York 4:1972 2:1973-1995 7:1996-2005 North Carolina 2:1972-1976 3:1977-2005 North Dakota 3:1972-2005 Ohio 4:1972-2005 Oklahoma 3:1972-2005 Oregon 4:1972-2005 Pennsylvania 3:1972-2005 Rhode Island 3:1972-2005 South Carolina 3:1972-1998 7: 1999-2005 South Dakota 3:1972-1979 8:1980-2005 Tennessee 3:1972-2005 Texas 2:1972-2003 4:2004-2005 Utah 3:1972 5:1973-2005 Vermont 3:1972-1984 8:1985-2005 Virginia 3:1972-1973 4:1974-1989 8:1990-2005 Washington 3:1972-2005 West Virginia 3:1972-2005 3:2005 Wisconsin 5:1972-2005 5:2005 Wyoming 3:1972-1983 8:1984-2005

* - Rates are deemed approved if no regulatory action within a specified period;includes states that required prior approval of deviations from bureau rates and Alabama's modified prior approval law,which requires prior approval of changes in expense and profit loadings.

prior approval with a deemer provision*

Appendix A

Types of Rating Laws by State,1972-2005

Table displays for the rating law in force for each state. Sources: Harrington (2002) and American Insurance Association (2005)

Variable

Intercept 0.035

(0.905)

Percent Private Sector Employees in Insurance Industry -41.069 ***

(12.020)

Ave. Loss Per Car in State to Ave. Loss Per Car in Nation 0.351

(0.377)

Lagged(Percent Car Years in Residual Market) 6.617 ***

(1.283)

Lagged(Percentage Increase in Ave. Loss Per Car) 1.115

(0.721)

Percent Premiums by Direct Writers -1.172 *

(0.621)

Indicator = 1 if commissioner is elected 1.200 ***

(0.142)

Percent Liability Losses Incurred in No-fault Coverage -0.757

(0.512)

Liberal Ideology Index 0.007 ***

(0.003)

Real Per Capita Income ($2004) 0.000

(0.000)

Population Density 0.001 ***

(0.000)

Percent Miles Driven in Urban Areas 1.327 ***

(0.446)

Poverty Rate 0.009

(0.022)

Log-Likelihood Function Value -448.82

Pseudo R-Squared 20.84%

***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Probit Regression Results of the Choice of