Herramientas de Seguridad

This thesis examines EU-Russia relations through the prism of the energy relationship between the parties. In light of its policy relevance, energy is a good case for understanding how a deeper discursive contest underpins the mere technical aspects of the relationship. In other words, this thesis considers the energy relationship between the EU and Russia as more than a conflict over technical issues. It is rather an identity- based issue that ultimately reveals a contestation for hegemony over the construction of ‘Europe’ as a political project. In particular, the aim is to investigate EU-Russia energy relations through a critical constructivist / post-structuralist lens and consequently infer what such an approach can tell us about the broader dimension of the EU-Russia relationship. In order to adequately locate the thesis, a specific literature review of EU- Russia energy relations needs to be explored.

The mainstream literature on the EU-Russia energy relationship can be divided into two groups. The first examines the nature of the energy relationship under the liberal prism of interdependence. In particular, the interdependence paradigm has been primarily applied to EU–Russia gas relationship described as a field where actors have a common interest in cooperation, with this seen as likely to spill over beyond energy relations into other fields. The EU’s 2004 enlargement – that included eight states from Central and Eastern Europe historically dependent on Russian energy – indicates that the degree of

interdependence has increased.134 From this perspective, for some, such as the Russian politician and diplomat Sergey Yastrzhembsky135, interdependence is positive for both Russia – that depends on stable long-term European demand – and for the EU – that depends on Russia’s stable supply. From this perspective, interdependence means that energy is a common platform that can only consolidate the strategic relationship between the EU and Russia and trigger win-win cooperation. Energy cooperation is seen as a mutually beneficial partnership likely to promote cooperation in other fields.136 Given that the two actors have no better options for the time being – Russia lacks more preferable markets, while the EU lacks alternative sources – they try to support and promote their energy relationship in order to continue to benefit from it.137 In this respect, for Monaghan and Montanaro-Jankovski138, the EU’s relationship with Russia is reciprocal and mutually supportive, since neither party has an interest in losing the other, which represents a crucial factor of their respective energy and economic security.

However, contrary to neoliberal expectations, the prospect of increased EU dependence on Russian energy has also created fears in the EU that the Kremlin could exploit this vulnerability as a diplomatic leverage. These concerns became evident in January 2006 when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and consequently also to Member States (MS) of the EU since Ukraine is a transit country for Russian supplies to Western Europe. As a result, Russia’s reliability has been strongly questioned by the EU, which, as a result, put increasing emphasis on the need to diversify energy imports from non- Russian sources. The choice to diversify sources has been justified by arguing that a situation of overreliance on one exporter creates concerns related to energy security, which instead is more reliable if imports diversify. Concerns, however, also came from Moscow who became more aware of its increased overreliance on the EU market. In this light, the ‘shadow on the future’ and the spill-over effect hypothesised by (neo)liberals do not seem to have occurred as a result of the mutual energy               

134 _{D., Johnson, EU-Russia Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?, Government and Opposition,}

Vol.40, No. 2, 2004, pp.256-277

135 _{K., Barysch, eds., Pipelines, Politics and Power. The Future of EU-Russia Energy Relations, London:}

Centre for European Reforms, 2008

136 _{A., Piebalgs, Win-Win Co-operation is Possible in Energy, in Barysch, Pipelines, Politics and Power,}

pp. 53-59

137 _{F., Proedrou, The EU-Russia Energy Approach under the Prism of Interdependence, European} Security, Vol.16, No 3-4, Sept-Dec. 2007, pp. 329-355

138 _{A., Monaghan, and L., Montanaro-Jankovski, EU–Russia Energy Relations: The Need for Active} Engagement, EPC Issue Paper No.45, 2006

interdependence. Rather, interdependence creates problems and anxieties and is actually having the opposite effect of inscribing actors’ positions in confrontational terms: the EU’s diversification may undermine Russia’s position as the main exporter in the EU’s market, whereas Russian concern about overreliance may undermine the EU’s security of supply.

Drawing from the liberal-inspired ‘transitionalist’ strand, a further strand of the literature on EU-Russia energy relations positions the EU’s liberal approach to energy policy as the term of reference from which Russia has recently moved away. The energy crisis and tensions derive from Russia’s detachment from the EU’s liberal standards. According to Kaveshnikov, the dissimilar nature of energy markets and economic interests on both sides ultimately generates such disengagement.139 The assumption of such a strand is that Russia has opted for state intervention and control of natural resources, thus deviating from the EU’s model of energy governance, that is, a liberalised energy market. In this light, Russian nationalism – which downplayed the principle of an open market in energy governance – puts at risk the established international energy market institutions and the EU’s energy security.140 Generally, these explanations suggest that Russia should return to liberal energy governance in order to ‘normalise’ its energy relations with the EU.141

Overall, the EU’s liberal energy governance stands as the reference point against which the validity of Russian energy governance is measured. As a result, authors of this strand assume the liberal market approach as the dominant/preferred model of energy governance. It follows, that the impact of Russia’s energy practices and governance on the interaction is neglected. This characterises the relationship as static and unilateral with no attention to how a change of actors’ positions and their energy governance               

139 _{N. Kaveshnikov, The Issue of Energy Security in Relations Between Russia and the European Union,} European Security, Vol. 19, 2010, p. 598

140 _{A. Correlje, and C., van der Linde, Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European perspective,} Energy Policy, Vol.34, Issue 5, 2006, pp. 532–543

See also D., Finon, and C., Locatelli, Russian and European Gas and Interdependence: Could Contractual Trade Channel Geopolitics?, Energy Policy, Vol.36, No.1, 2008, pp. 423–442

See also D., Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, 2006, pp. 69-82, quoted by C., Kuzemko, (in press), Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 2013, p. 59

141 _{F., Erixon, Europe's Energy Dependency and Russia's Commercial Assertiveness, The European}

Centre for International Political Economy, Policy Brief No. 07/2008, quoted by Kuzemko, (2013), Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relation, p. 59

See also E.F., van der Meulen, Gas Supply and EU-Russia Relations, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, Issue 51, July 2009, pp. 833-856

occurs as a result of interaction. Rather, emphasis is put on material factors such as the EU’s declining oil and gas production and Russia’s large reserves. In other words, authors tend to overlook the implications of the energy relationship on the broader level of EU-Russia relations. Rather, they focus too much on describing the reasons behind the partners’ disagreements over technical issues related to energy.

Other existing accounts are located between rationalism (especially neoliberalism) and conventional constructivism. They maintain the assumption that the EU’s liberal approach to energy policy is the benchmark from which Russia is moving away. But, they provide an historical background to explain the origin of such an assumption, and conclude that the actors simply hold different understandings of energy security. In a historical perspective, Russian development in its energy policy is measured against the Western (EU/US) liberal principle that became dominant after the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s. The implication of this reading is that the liberal model of energy governance as it has emerged during the post-Cold War period, reinforced the EU’s position and image as a ‘teacher’ – that prefers economic over political logics – and, in turn, determines the Russian position as a ‘learner’ that instead, still tends to prioritise (geo)political calculations.

The dominance of liberal principles allowed the EU to sit on the privileged side in the post-Cold War negotiations with Russia on a number of fields, including energy.142 Therefore, such dominance contributed to the creation of a rule maker/rule taker dichotomy.143 The EU’s privileged position as ‘teacher’ explains why energy-related policies – such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue (ED) – have been read by some as evidence of the EU’s objective to introduce pro-market and liberal principles into Russia.144 Similarly, Russia’s privatisation of its energy sector in the 1990s is, therefore, seen as the effort of a ‘learner’ to learn this               

142 _{H., Haukkala, Lost in Translation? Why the EU Has Failed to Influence Russia's Development,} Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61, No.10, 2009, p.1762, quoted by Kuzemko, Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations , p. 73

See also R., Youngs, The EU’s Role in World Politics: A Retreat from Liberal Internationalism, Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, quoted by Kuzemko, Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations, p.73 

143 _{See T., Romanova, The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue, Journal of Contemporary} European Studies, Vol.16, No.2, 2008, p. 220 

144 _{H., Haukkala, The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU's Russia Policy, Ulkopoliittinen}

Instituutti (UPI) Working Papers 52, 2005, quoted by Kuzemko, Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations, p.63

See also Romanova, The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue, quoted by Kuzemko,Ideas Power and Change: Explaining EU–Russia Energy Relations, p.63 

lesson. This distinction provided the basis to assume that the EU and Russia are ultimately two different actors that understand energy security along different logics. Russia aims to have energy relations with the EU based on the principle of reciprocity in access to the market and mutual guarantees. For Russia, energy security is part of its national and foreign policy and it is fundamental for its post-Cold War reconstruction. This view does not match with the EU’s holistic aim of establishing a wider European energy market based on market values and rules – such as energy efficiency and liberalisation – already advanced within the EU.145 As such, progress or dissatisfaction related to their energy relations arises from the radically different understanding of energy that the EU and Russia hold. For Hadfield, such a difference is at the basis of the failure of common projects and policies.146

However, these readings fail to consider that the liberal paradigm might no longer be the dominant one. As such, the tendency to make such an assumption contributes to making these approaches static and one-sided. Little attention is, in fact, paid to analyse how Russia has been able to challenge the alleged dominance of the liberal approach to energy. The identity construction process – the EU as ‘teacher’ and Russia as ‘learner’ – is analysed only in the direction of the EU that, as a liberal-inspired actor, determines Russia’s position as a ‘learner’. As such, the constitutive power of the outside (e.g. Russia) on Self’s identity (e.g. EU) is not taken into account. In other words, the degree of internal discursive contestation – especially on the Russian side – and Russia’s ‘othering’ of the EU is largely understated.

Regarding the different understandings of energy security held by these actors, a kind of state-centric perspective is here adopted since the two actors are connected through their identity claims. The unstable and fluid nature of identity and its claims is lacking. From this perspective, it can be argued that this strand of the energy literature draws from conventional constructivism.

In addition, these works devote little time to the reflection on what EU-Russia energy relations may mean for the political construction of Europe and for the EU-Russia relationship beyond the ‘teacher’/‘learner’ dichotomy.147

145 _{Romanova, The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue, p.229}

146 _{A., Hadfield, EU-Russia Energy Relations: Aggregation and Aggravation, Journal of Contemporary} European Studies, Vol.16, No. 2, 2008, pp. 231-248

147 _{Other conventional constructivist approaches go beyond the issue of interdependency and different}

models of governance and acknowledge the impact of the external Russian challenges (Other) as a key factor that determines the EU-Russia energy relations. For example, the fact that Russia, through Gazprom, ran rings around the EU with building bilateral links with individual EU members can be

Moving to a realist reading of EU-Russia energy relations, some works inspired by the neo-classical realism focus on the impact of domestic intervening variables on the decision of a state’s foreign energy policies. As such, in order to provide a complete picture of the energy relationship, internal policies of the EU and Russia should also be taken into account.148 Other neorealist-inspired approaches stress that Russia’s pragmatic approach reveals a zero-sum understanding of its energy relations with the EU. Thus, Russia uses its energy exports for political and security purposes especially in its relations with ex-Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics in order to counter-balance the EU’s political expansion.149

Generally speaking, these accounts only describe ‘why’ the tension arises (conflict of interests) and do not explore ‘how’ it was politically constructed and produced. The alleged tension is assumed and not problematised. In addition, issues related to actors’ identities are neglected.

To address this gap, Lisa Pick150 deconstructs the perspective of the existing literature, which describes a situation where the EU aims to trigger changes in Russia by projecting its liberalised and rule based agenda (social constructivism); while Russia operates as a neo-realist actor exploiting its energy exports for political reasons. However, while – through a critical approach – she deconstructs the assumed difference proposed by the existing literature, Pick does not adequately engage in discourse analysis. Thus she fails to look at how actors’ views emerge as a result of discursive contestation over competing discourses. In a way, she sticks to a critical perspective without adding the post-structuralism focus on how various discourses compete to emerge as ‘dominant’.

                                       considered as an example of external challenge. See, for example, Helm, D., The Russian Dimension and

Europe’s External Energy Policy, 2007. Available from:

http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/sites/default/files/Russian_dimension.pdf Accessed 28/01/2013

148 _{A.R., Spanjer, The Impact of a New Regulatory Focus on Current Gas Regulation: The Case of} Unbundling, Papers and Proceedings of the 9th European Conference of the International, 2009.

Association for Energy Economics, 10–13 June, Florence, Italy.

See also N., Simonia, Energy Animosity-Reality or Construct, Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 6, No.3, 2008, pp.128-134

149 _{See for example K. Barysch, (2007), Light, M. (2008), K.C. Smith, (2004) quoted by L., Pick, EU-}

Russia energy relations: A critical analysis, POLIS Journal, Vol. 7, Summer 2012, p.323 150 _{Pick, EU-Russia energy relations: A critical analysis}

From this perspective, another strand of the literature on EU-Russia energy relations started to move away from strict rationalist and conventional constructivist accounts to explanations that focused on the discursive dimension of such a complex relationship. Since these discourse-based approaches are the main contenders of this study, it is necessary to further detail their arguments and limitations as a way to understand how this study fits in.

Policy paradigms such as ‘Kuwaitisation’ and ‘Liberalisation’ have been used to explain Russia’s energy policy151 in general, and competing foreign energy paradigms within the EU-Russia context.152 ‘Kuwaitisation’ refers to a situation in which Russia derives a comparative advantage from exploitation of its natural resources. An alternative paradigm of ‘Liberalisation’ postulates that economic liberalisation through market forces and the removal of state restrictions represent the only means for Russia to develop. In this light, Russia’s internal debate over production sharing agreements (PSAs) and the ECT proposed by the EU have been characterised by the opposition of these two paradigms: Kuwaitisation versus Liberalisation.153

With reference to the understanding of EU’s energy policy, other works focused on internal discourses to understand what the European Commission (EC), EU Parliament and MSs mean by energy security. The focus on the main discourses of institutions provided the basis to understand where energy policies (interests) arise. It also demonstrated why specific discourses of the EC and the European Parliament about energy were not able to mobilise support and become dominant.154 Similarly, Kuzemko155 focuses on the degree of ideological contestation occurring within and between the EU institutions. Such an analysis enables one to problematise the common representation of the EU as a liberal market energy actor.

In studying EU-Russia energy relations through discourses, Khasson evaluates the influence and clashes of the main EU discourses: the first focuses on the need to integrate Russia, the second on the need to securitise energy supply through               

151 _{P., Rutland, Oil Politics and Foreign Policy in D., Lane, eds, The Political Economy of Russian Oil,}

Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp 163-188

152 _{Johnson, EU-Russia Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?, p.256} 

153 _{P., Rutland, Oil Politics and Foreign Policy in D., Lane, eds, The Political Economy of Russian Oil,}

Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp 163-188

154 _{M., Natorski, and A., Herranz Surralles, Securitizing Moves to Nowhere? The Framing of the}

European Union’s Energy Policy, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol.4, No2, 2008, pp71- 89

diversification. The author notes that, following the recent supply crisis, the securitisation discourse currently dominates the EU’s internal debate but at the same time it obstructs the integrative process occurring in the context of the EU-Russia ED.156

These discourse-based approaches overcome the materialism of rationalism by focusing on social factors such as discourses. They also go beyond the state-centrism of conventional constructivism since they investigate the degree of discursive contestation occurring within the actors’ internal debate. However, these energy debates are one- sided; they are either investigated within the EU or within Russia. The role of the Self/Other discursive encounter in the policy field of energy is neglected. As a result, the constitutive role of outside is understated.

As such, Kratochvil and Tichy157 combine the two perspectives by focusing on the speeches of both the Russian and EU policymakers. The texts and speeches analysed present ‘regularity’ around common themes. This enables the authors to construct three