Herramientas para el desarrollo de sistemas de apoyo a la toma de decisiones

Modern day terrorism carried out in the UK since 2003 has been almost the exclusive domain of British born and raised fundamentalist Sunni Muslims. This includes the four men responsible for the unprecedented 7th July 2005 suicide bombing in London. Subsequent enquiries into the attack revealed the extent to which the men responsible all held deep fundamentalist views. Like other British Muslims who have pursued terrorism, these men were actively engaged in promoting political narratives and carrying out activities designed to further their religious beliefs. Since the early 1990’s, hundreds of British Muslim men have loosely networked in order to form what this author defines as the Islamic fundamentalist Movement. From within this socio-political environment, a minority of those involved have later crossed the line and pursued terrorism. Well established within academic discourse is the proposition that while not all Islamic fundamentalists become terrorists, all Islamic terrorists are principally fundamentalists.

Since 2005, fundamentalism has declined in favour of the term extremism

when referring to British Muslims who commit Terrorism. A survey of relevant discourse suggests the media, politicians, and academia denounces these men as

extremist terrorists. In part, this is due to the failure of the moderate project to adequately challenge fundamentalism. In turn, this had led to greater use of the word “extremism” to describe more than mere acts of terrorism. Since 2014, policy makers consider fundamentalist Muslims who reject atheism, democracy, and freedom of speech as extremists. W This contemporary descriptive entirely fails to capture the importance of Islam and how terrorists commonly refer to themselves as fundamentalists. Since the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013, the government has broadened the definition of extremism in order to clamp down on the politics and activities of fundamentalists. Historically, the only persons considered extreme were those who supported the Islamic right of self-defence and refused to condone terrorism. Since 2013, however, extremism now refers to any Muslim who rejects liberal concepts such as freedom of religion, democracy, and human rights. In order to adequately capture the religious and political nature of bombing campaigns

undertaken by British Muslims as well as the way in which government has sought to delegitimize any perceived justification, a more accurate label suggested in this thesis would be extreme fundamentalists. Acknowledgement is thus given to the deep level of religiosity as well as recognition that we are referring specifically to those fundamentalists who have crossed the line and adopted an extremist standpoint, such that they are willing to carry out acts of terrorism.

Speaking in the House of Commons in 2013, British conservative politician Ken Clarke stated that in the aftermath of 9/11, the government and its international partners were suddenly adapting to a completely new scale and type of threat from

fundamentalist religious extremists.56 Linguistically, this speech demonstrates that within the British Government, politicians deemed Muslims willing to carry out terrorism as both fundamentalists and extremist. In 2008, the National Council of Resistance of Iran submitted written evidence to a select committee on Foreign Affairs. The organisation stated clearly, ‘terrorism has been the main instrument of the Iranian regime in pursuit of its expansionist ideology. Islamic fundamentalism inspired terrorism now poses the greatest threat to peace and stability around the world’. 57 This statement offers further evidence of how the fundamentalist label is widely used amongst policy makers within the discourse on terrorism.

Writing in the aftermath of the 1993 Al-Qaeda terrorist attack in New York, academic Sadik Al-Azm argued in favour of using the term Islamic fundamentalism to describe the ideology of those responsible. By referring to the terrorists as fundamentalists, Al-Azm implied the core principles of Islam condoned violence. In advocating the epistemological legitimacy, scientific integrity and critical applicability of the term Islamic fundamentalism, Al-Azm points to its liberal use in books, summaries and introductions produced by a prominent Egyptian compiler and editor of armed insurrectionary Islamist publications. He notes how it is ‘used in a

56 _{House of Commons, ‘Transcript of commons debate 19}th _{December 2013’,}

Hansard Online,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131219/debtext/13 1219-0002.htm#13121959000001, (accessed 29th September 2014)

57 _{Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Written evidence submitted by the National} Council of Resistance of Iran, UK Representative Office’, UK Parliament, 2nd _March 2008, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-

office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/142/142we03.htm, (accessed 29th September 2014)

very matter of fact way and without further apologies, hesitations or reservations’.58 In further support of his contention, Al-Azm cites a widely reported statement issued by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) - the group responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981. The author of the statement claims the underlying ideology of EIJ derives from a ‘fundamentalist call for a return to the understanding and doctrine of the good predecessors in an age where corruption prevails’. 59 The group’s manifesto states the purpose of the organisation is to, ‘show and recall the legitimate religious foundations and fundamentals which should never escape the attention of any Islamic movement’. 60

Collectively, these statements support use of the term “fundamentalism” to describe insurgent groups which emerged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. In his final remarks, Al-Azm agrees stating that it is entirely reasonable to conclude that referring to these groups as fundamentalist is both accurate and correct. At a meeting in Cairo in February 1995, three Middle Eastern leaders claimed to have been the target of Islamic fundamentalists. Hosni Mubarak, Yasser Arafat, and Isaac Rabin, stated publically that “Sunni terrorists” had tried to assassinate each of them. 61 _This narrative greatly strengthens the proposition that terrorism carried out by Muslims since the early 1990s has emerged from the global Islamic fundamentalist movement. More recently, approximately 63% of organisations proscribed by the British government in 2003 can be suitably described as “Islamic fundamentalists”.62

Almost exclusively, extreme fundamentalists point to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as being their primary motivation. A war deemed illegal even by western standards, fundamentalists judge it a neo-colonialist attempt to secure the country’s natural resources. Comments by former American President, George Bush, in which he inadvertently used the word crusade, left little doubt the invasion of Iraq was also

58 _{S. Al-Azm, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critique Outline of} Problems, Ideas and Approaches’, South Asia Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 1, 1993, p.96. 59_Ibid.

60_Ibid.

61 _{D Pipes, ‘There are no moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam’, National}

Interest, 1995, http://www.danielpipes.org/274/there-are-no-moderates-dealing-with- fundamentalist-islam, (accessed 9th _{October 2014)}

62 _{Home Office, Proscribed terror groups or organizations,UK Parliament, 12}th _July 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or- organisations--2, (accessed 9th October 2014)

part of the long running campaign to subjugate Islam and prevent the re-establishment of a Caliphate. As the post-war occupation of Iraq continued to destabilise the country, division occurred amongst British fundamentalist Muslims. While the majority remained bound by a covenant of security, a minority claimed the British Government had broken this peace treaty and were now at war with Islam. Consequently, a small number of fundamentalists in the UK determined that terrorism was now the only way to fight back against the coalition. As a tactic in asymmetric conflict, terrorism empowered those who felt compelled to fight back against western aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslims with previously no interest in attacking the UK, who abhorred violence against non-combatants, appear to have renegotiated with their ethics. Events in Fallujah, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib conflated with policies of targeted assassination, extra-ordinary rendition and the most controversial of all “enhanced integration” were sufficient reasons for fundamentalists to begin plotting attacks against fellow citizens.

Terrorists in Northern Ireland typically belonged to well-established paramilitary organisations with access to weapons, explosives, and expert military training. In contrast, British Muslims growing up in the west enjoy little organised logistical support. Through the collective movement of likeminded fundamentalists around the UK, terrorists have been able to rely on others to facilitate introductions and help raise finance. Upon making the decision to act, fundamentalists provided the necessary connections to obtain training and operational support. Until 2007, Al- Qaeda (ALQ) played a significant role in this process. Because of increasing drone strikes, ALQ has significantly declined as a sponsor of terrorism in the UK. In the next chapter, we formally introduce the Islamic fundamentalist movement. The researcher uses this label to describe the organisation, politics, and activities of British fundamentalist Muslims since the mid-1990s. Tracing the origins of fundamentalism to 1930s Egypt, we show how after a lengthy period of inactivity due to western led suppression, the movement re-emerged in post-Soviet Afghanistan and arrived in the UK shortly thereafter. British Muslims responsible for acts of extreme violence against western hostages during the Syrian civil war are a direct by-product of the UK fundamentalist movement. In September 2014, fundamentalist preachers in the UK who promoted the mindset which led hundreds of British Muslims to join the war in Syria, made a direct plea for them to release one hostage in particular. Controversial fundamentalist cleric Shaykh Haitham Al Haddad, a Judge for the Sharia Council in

London, warned that the execution of Mr Henning would be “haram” – forbidden according to Sharia Law.63

63 _{N. Culzac, ‘UK Imams call on ‘immediate and unconditional’ release of Alan} Henning from hands of Isis’, The Independent Online, 20th _{September 2014,} http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-imams-call-on-immediate- and-unconditional-release-of-alan-henning-from-hands-of-isis-9745735.html, (accessed 29th September 2014)

Chapter Two – Origins and Rise of Islamic