Herramientas del sistema Lean

This chapter has argued that the Chinese military is aggressively pursuing technology-assisted training, primarily because of the efficiencies it offers to an institution operating in a relatively resource- constrained environment. The use of simulations allows units to maintain and even raise skill levels while reducing wear and tear on equipment and possible physical risks to personnel. The use of online coordination exercises permits the PLA to exercise different units from different services across vast geographic divides, knitting together the elements of integrated joint operations described in the military’s campaign literature. Finally, the use of online OPFOR exercises facilitates realistic training against high- tech adversaries, pushing PLA units to operate in a hostile environment with noncooperative targets. All of these activities offer the possibility of increasing the military’s operational performance on a modern military battlefield.

The implications of the PLA’s focus on technology- assisted training for the United States are more complicated, but can be divided into intelligence and operational categories. On the intelligence front, the PLA focus on simulation and virtual training may undermine our ability to collect against Chinese exercises and analyze the relative progress of the military in achieving training benchmarks, since the online exercises do not provide the same level of robust external indicators as field exercises. Often, the only external indicators of online or virtual training are newspaper or journal accounts describing the initiative, and these sources suffer from lack of detail, brevity, bias in favor of putting a positive spin on a new effort,

Operationally, the use of simulation and online exercises creates the danger of strategic surprise in the level of Chinese capabilities or integration, though it is debatable whether the Chinese Communist leadership would be as risk-acceptant of a conflict with a high- tech power like the United States based solely on performance in simulations and online training. At the end of the day, the PLA needs to prove its combat power in the field against real adversaries, not electrons on a screen. Still, comfortable assumptions about lack of PLA capability to knit together elements of the joint warzone campaign plan or command structure, based on lack of evidence of physical exercising of the various moving parts from around the country, may prove to be overly optimistic. For this reason, greater study and scrutiny of PLA simulations, gaming and online exercises is warranted.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. China’s National Defense in 2006, Beijing: State Council Information Office, December 2006.

2. The remainder of this paragraph is taken from Huang Guozhu, Cao Zhi, and Xu Zhuangzhi, “Speed Up the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics: PLA Deputies Discuss National Defense and Armed Forces Modernization,”

Xinhua, March 12, 2004.

3. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department of the Academy of Military Science, “Strive to Promote Historic Changes in Military Training,” Jiefangjun Bao, July 11, 2006.

4 . Huang Guozhu, Cao Zhi, and Xu Zhuangzhi.

5 . Xu Hongsheng, “In Search of Road To Informationization of Mechanized Units,” Zhanyou Bao, August 24, 2006.

6 . Ibid.

7. Wang Wenjie and Ding Haiming, “Hu Jintao Emphasizes When Inspecting a Group Army of Jinan Military Region and Meeting Cadres At and Above Divisional Level of Units Stationed at Weifang: Resolutely Carry out the Sacred Tasks Given Us by the Party and People in the New Century and New Phase,” Jiefangjun

Bao, April 15, 2005, p. 1.

8. Cao Zhi, “Hu Jintao Emphasizes Importance of Reform and Innovation in Promoting Development of Military Training,”

Xinhua, June 27, 2006.

9. Ibid.

10. Zhong Xun, “The Strategic Policy Decision for Invigorating Military Training and Strengthening the Army in the New Period of the New Century: On the Scientific Connotations and Epoch-Making Significance of Transforming Military Training,”

Jiefangjun Bao, November 28, 2006, p. 1.

11. Wang Shibin, “During His Meeting With Personnel Attending Special Training on Conducting Military Training Under Informatized Conditions, Guo Boxiong, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Called for Taking the Scientific Development Concept as the Guide and Actively Pushing for Military Training Transformation,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 18, 2007, p. 1.

12. Xin Shihong, “Delegate Liang Guanglie Speaks at Sub- Session of National People’s Congress,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 6, 2007, p. 1.

13. Xinhua contributing commentator, “The Inevitable Choice for the People’s Army in Effectively Carrying out its Historic Mission: Written at the Close of the All-Army Military Training Conference,” Xinhua, June 27, 2006.

14. Zhong Xun, “The Strategic Policy Decision for Invigorating Military Training,” p. 1.

15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.

22. Xinhua contributing commentator, “The Inevitable Choice.”

23. Commentator’s article, “Conscientiously Guarantee the Central Status of Military Training: First on Launching a New Upsurge in Military Training,” Kongjun Bao, July 15, 2006, p. 1.

24. Jiefangjun Bao, January 17, 2005, and January 18, 2006. 25. Jiefangjun Bao, 3 January 2006.

26. “PRC General Staff Department Issues New Year Military Training Directive,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 12, 2007.

27. Guo Jia and Xu Zhuangzhi, “People’s Liberation Army’s Military Training Undergoes Historic Transformation With Focus on Informatization,” Xinhua, February 23, 2007.

28. Pan Jinkuan, “Exploring Methods of Military Training Under Informatized Conditions,” Zhanyou Bao, September 22, 2006.

29. Zhong Xun, “The Strategic Policy Decision for Invigorating Military Training,” p. 1.

30. Zhong Xun, “Deepening Military Training Content Reform From a Scientific Approach,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 9, 2007, p. 1.

31. Ibid.

32. Ma Dezu and Yang Chunyuan, “Joint Operations Exercise by Students Graduating from Air Force Command Academy,”

Kongjun Bao, March 10, 2007, p. 4.

33. Cao Shuxin, “Exploring Ways to Change Campaign Training Under Informatized Conditions,” Jiefangjun Bao, December 26, 2006, p. 6.

34. Kang Fashun and He Tianjin, “Sidelights on the Second Artillery Military Training Conference,” Huojianbing Bao, August 18, 2006, p. 2.

35. Wang Yongxiao, Cao Jienbing, and Tao Shelan, “Second Artillery Uses Science and Technology to Strengthen Forces: Rapid Missile Strike Capability Makes New Strides,” Zhongguo

Xinwen She, July 23, 2007.

36. Ibid.

37. Feng Chunmei, “Put the Scientific Development Concept in Command of Running Schools and Training Personnel: A Record of Implementing the Scientific Development Concept by the Command College of the Second Artillery Corps,” Renmin

wang, July 11, 2007.

38. Wang Yongxiao, Cao Jienbing, and Tao Shelan.

39. Wang Yongxiao, “Report from the Training Ground of China’s Strategic Missile Force,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 28, 2006, p. 3.

40. Yu Zengshuang and Liu Yidai, “Eyewitness Account of Command Academy Graduate Students’ Online Confrontational Exercise,” Huojianbing Bao, April 11, 2007, p. 2.

41. Tian Qiang and Zhou Jiawang, “Chinese Army Aviation Strengthens Coordinated Operation Command Capability,”

Zhongguo Xinwen She, July 3, 2007.

42. Ibid.

43. “ZXS Details Flight Training Facilities at PLA Army Aviation Flight and Command Simulation Training Center,”

Zhongguo Xinwen She, July 9, 2007.

44. Liu Yueshan, Luo Hongxiao, and Guo Jiaxue, “Quantifying Combat Effectiveness: The Pace of Troop Informatization Picks Up,” Wen Wei Po, July 17, 2007.

45. Ibid.

46. Ma Dezu and Yang Chunyuan, p. 4. 47. Ibid.

48. Liu Jian, “Submarine Academy Emphasizes Teaching and Training Under Complex and Emergency Conditions,” Renmin

Haijun, 15 December 2006, p.1. 49. Ibid. 50. Cao Shuxin. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid.

58. Li Xuanliang and Wu Dengfeng, “PLA Launched Vigorous Campaign To Promote Military Training; Overall Combat Capability in Informatized Defensive Operations Given New Boost,” Xinhua, June 23, 2006.

59. Shao Min and Lu Ping, “Adjusting Content, Coming Up With Innovative Modes, and Constructing Platforms: A Certain Armored Division Uses Training on New Equipment To Transform Unit Training,” Renmin Qianxian, July 17, 2007, p. 1.

60. Zhang Jinyu, “Flight Simulation Training Covers All Types of Combat Planes,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2006.

61. Yu Lei and Hong Wenjun, “Flyer’s Permit Now Needed for New Training: Chengdu Military Region Air Force Regiment Links Quality of Simulation Training with Qualification for Actual Flight Training,” Jiefangjun Bao, July 30, 2007, p. 2.

62. Lu Feng, Lu Xi, and Wang Bin, “Watching Chengdu Military Region Air Force Conduct Online OPFORs Exercise to Research Carrying Out Missions Under Informatized Conditions, Part 1,” Kongjun Bao, August 31, 2006, p. 1.

63. Yang Xiaoyong and Li Ping, “Armored Regiment’s Command and Staff Conduct Online Exercise, a Battle Under Complex Electromagnetic Conditions,” Renmin Qianxian, January 12, 2007, p. 1.

64. Li Gencheng, Peng Jiu, and Zhang Lei, “PRC Magazine Profiles PLA Navy SSF Submarine Damage Control Training,”

Xiandai Junshi, June 1-30, 2007, pp. 7-9.

65. Cao Jieyu and Li Yibao, “East Sea Fleet Submarine Detachment’s ‘Chief Petty Officer’ Corps Swims Out of the ‘Dragon King’s Palace’,” Renmin Haijun, May 1, 2006, p. 1.

66. Zhang Jianqi and Kui Zhang, “Unit Uses Simulation Devices to Improve the Quality of Training,” Qianwei Bao, May 20, 2007, p. 2.

67. Gao Zhiwen and Pan Li, “Computer Simulation Operations Increasingly Realistic; Second Artillery New Simulators Improve

68. Wang Bing and Zhou Jun, “The Warship and Vessel Simulation Training Center of a Patrol Boat Battalion Is Sweating over Military Training,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 23, 2007, p. 1.

69. Bi Ren and Ding Haiming, “PLA Tanks in Intense Confrontation in Desert Exercise,” Zhongguo Quofang Bao, September 19, 2006, p. 5.

70. Wu Xincheng, “Special Report: Prospect of PLA Air Force Development and Deployment,” Kanwa Defense Review, January 1, 2007.

71. Lu Xi and Lu Feng, “A Set of Software Enlivens the Exercise: Eyewitness Account of the Confrontation Exercises by the Chengdu Military Region Air Force Units,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 1, 2006, p. 1.

72. Sun Yipo, Zhuang Sujun, and Jiang Shuyi: “Sturdy and Improved Platform: Chronicle of ‘A Group of People’ at the Qingdao Garrison Command’s Party Committee Improving Their Informatized Combat and Command Capabilities.”

73. Hu Xiaoyu, “Flight Training No Longer ‘Relies on the Sky,’ the Subject Is No Longer ‘One Size Fits All’: Proportion of the Troops Belonging to the Chengdu Air Force Doing Online Tactical Training Reaches 80 Percent,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 1, 2007.

74. Xia Junyou, “Scientifically Organize Realistic Online OPFOR Exercises,” Qianwei Bao, 3 July 2006, p.1.

75. Ibid. 76. Ibid.

77. The description of this exercise and all quotes are taken from Lu Feng, Lu Xi, and Wang Bin, p. 1.

79. Chen Mei and Mu Lin, “Guangzhou Military Region Air Force Missile Brigade Steps Up Training in Simulated Complex Electromagnetic Environments,” Kongjun Bao, March 13, 2007, p. 2.

80. Cao Shuxin. 81. Ibid.

SELECTED CHINESE MILITARY TRAINING