Increased identity awareness + decreased pressure decreased rights conflict?
“If ascension to the EU also remains a plausible possibility, Kurds in Turkey could reasonably expect increasing protections and recognition of their identity as Kurds,
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which would in turn leave fewer Kurds feeling that recourse to arms was necessary or justified” (Romano 2006: 165). The development in the later years, however, shows that EU accession is no longer in sight for Turkey. Recent events and riots in Turkey’s western provinces point to a more tense relationship between Kurds and Turks (Ensaroglu & Kurban 2011: 8-9).
“(W)ithout [EU membership] perspective, Turkey won't move. And Europe will have less and less leverage which is the case now, on Turkey's overall transformation”
(Aktar 2012 [interview]). Having seen that the respondents identify that the Kurdish identity indeed has risen, and that the EU has played a role in this respect - what can be seen as the challenges of the ethnic identity actually rising, combined with the weakening of EU leverage? Without being directly asked, all the professors recognized increasing problems in the relations between Kurds and Turks. Increasing polarization, discrimination and visibility of the Kurds were elements emphasized. According to Kizilkan-Kisacik (2010: 33), EU pressure has indirectly led to more discriminatory views on the Kurds, as they are now recognized as a group. Importantly, “the acceptance of an ethnic category within a civil discourse can be used for inclusion and equality as well as for exclusion and differentiation” (Somer 2005: 618). Could this be seen in the interviews?
5.8.1. Increased polarization
“An awakening of and politization of Kurdish identity in Turkey cannot be undone in the short term, if ever. Especially the Kurdish youth who came of age at the height of the PKK insurgency seem unlikely to ever assimilate to a Turkish ethnie. On the contrary, they could be expected to harbor radicalized views, derived from the conflict they witnessed around them as they grew up” (Romano 2006: 164). Murat Somer (2012 [interview]) claims that in terms of recognition of the Kurdish issue and the existence of a separate Kurdish identity, Kurds are definitely better off. The recognition of the Kurds has good sides – however also demonstrates a growing antagonism. Now, more young people are stating openly their ethnic background. The Turkish society today can be seen as more differentiated and more polarized, with some places in Turkey seeing an increased ghettoization. This is causing a higher
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potential of ethnic conflict. Kirisci (2011: 340-342) also recognizes a growing polarization in the Turkish society after 2006-2007, coinciding with the rise of Turkish nationalism. This he explains by domestic factors such as the increase in PKK attacks, tension with the Kurds in Northern Iraq, however emphasizing that “[the] drift into nationalism and polarization also needs to be seen in light of the deterioration in Turkey-EU relations”.
“(…) racism, Turkish – well, how can I describe it? The people being against Kurdish people is increasing (…) If you're Kurdish people from Eastern part of Turkey, you are accused of being potential criminals faithless people, like belonging to a terrorist organization. And they just want to discriminate us” (Reswan 2012 [interview]).
This element of polarization was to some extent reflected in the interviews, where the interviewees recognized increased tension between the youth of Kurdish and of Turkish origin.
5.8.2. Discrimination and ethnic identity
Many of the interviewees mentioned discrimination as a factor of their dissatisfaction with Turkish policies. The types of discrimination varied from “Kurds being put into jail more often”, to places in Turkey with more racism and the little chance for Kurds to get high positions in workplaces. A special emphasis was put on the afore-mentioned KCK case.
“The freedom of expression in Turkey is quite low. There are many Kurdish, especially of Kurdish origin, in the prison, and these KCK operations, they are […], excuse for getting the Kurdish journalists into the prison” (Ferhat 2012 [interview]).
“Before 1 – 1,5 years there were nothing like KCK. And now, the Kurdish politicians and the Kurdish thinkers are put into prison as if they are members of a terrorist organization. They were just put into jail without any interrogaing, or something. And for example, the right to get education and defend yourself before the court in the mother tongue, it's just overlooked and ignored” (Merdan 2012 [interview]).
“I know still they [the police] are listening my phone, talks, copying my message, my talking. So, if you said something, there are examples. “Bring bread”. They said “This is code. You didn't mean this bread. You meant weapons or something like that”. It's
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ridiculous! And they arrested people because of this situation. They, if they want, they can create the clues, to make a bond between you and KCK. And actually, I don't know what's the KCK, what are they doing. Two months, three years ago, it's impossible that they can arrest so many people in an action” (Efo 2012 [interview]). The interviewees generally emphasized frustration with the police and police actions.
More specifically, the situation in the workplace seemed to be a topic of discrimination. As one of the trade union members emphasized: “Back then, the workers (…) who were attempting getting their rights were accused of being Communist. (…) Now, the employers are just using the same methods for the Kurdish people. “Merdan” is one of the best representatives in this area. But before the elections, there were gossips, rumours, against “Merdan” saying that he is a Communist and a Kurd or Alevi” (Reswan 2012 [interview]).
When asked about this, Merdan responds: “I was going for the upper management, but they were advocating, promoting nationalists. Just this discourse. And they were also looking into ethnic or political background of people, and just going for the nationalistic agenda, so the people from particular background could not be in the upper management” (Merdan 2012 [interview]). The issue of discrimination was repeatedly mentioned in the interviews, and there was no mentioning of the situation improving within the later years.
5.8.3. Assimilated v non-assimilated Kurds
“Today, there are more Kurds living in Istanbul than in any other part of the Kurdish regions. Now, if tomorrow there would be an attempt to come to a modus vivendi with the Kurds, there would be a great disagreement between those who are established and living here and the others “over there” (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]).
The interviewees seemed to agree that there is a difference between Kurds who have been assimilated and Kurds who have resisted assimilation. The discussions in the trade union, for instance, found that the people getting jobs in the upper management would be “Sunni Islam, conservative nationalistic and racist outlook. For example, Kurdish people who share the same opinions [i.e. assimilated Kurds (…) can be in the upper management. (…) If a Kurd was pro them, there's no problem» (Reswan 2012
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[interview]). This corresponds to the feeling of discrimination if you are a Kurd openly stating your ethnic identity. According to Romano (2006:4), in Turkey there is hardly any discrimination against Kurds who assimilate to the dominant – Turkish – culture.
All these statements emphasize the young Kurds’ feelings of frustration and a sense they are being discriminated against. When feeling frustrated about for instance cultural or linguistic cleavages, this gives room for mobilization based on identity (Varshny 2003: 93), again reinforcing the challenges of a more prominent Kurdish identity.