Heurística para priorización de proyectos

E m m anuel agrees w ith W arren th at developm ent im plies industrialization, b u t he is critical of the claims the latter makes for his em p irical m aterial, an d for 'ju m p in g to the u n w a rra n te d conclusion that industrialization and developm ent are one and the sam e thing' (Emmanuel, 1974: 63).

"The very fact that m anufacturing labour and m anufacturing output, as percentages of total labour force and total output, are roughly the same in A rgentina as in the USA, 25.1% and 28% as against 26.5% and 28%, and considerably higher than that, 41.4% and 38%, in H ong Kong, proves in m y view th at in d u stria liz a tio n (sic) is by itself n o t a good gauge of developm ent; for it w ould logically compel W arren to adm it that A rgentina is as highly developed as the USA, and H ong Kong 50% m ore so!" (Emmanuel, 1974: 63).

Em m anuel continues to argue (with figures) and show that w here W arren in co rrectly saw a ro b u st d e v elo p in g T hird W orld industrialization and the advance of productive forces, there was only 'backw ard industry' and 'backw ard agriculture' (Emm anuel, 1974: 66). H e uses the same aggregate totals of T hird W orld industrial production over a specified period that W arren uses, b u t u n lik e W arren he in tro d u ces a lab o u r p ro d u c tiv ity m easu re (defined sim ply as the ratio of total o u tp u t to the total num ber of employees). Thus o u tp u t per person was $592 in 'underdeveloped' countries, $3,760 in OECD countries and $7,180 in USA (Emmanuel, 1974: 66). Furtherm ore considering th at grow th per head as an indicator of th e developm ent of the p roductive forces has m ore im portance th a n W arren is w illing to assign it, Em m anuel finds that the gap betw een 'underdeveloped' countries and the developed ones has been w idening. The difference in per capita levels had w idened from 1:6 in 1900 to 1:13.2 in 1970 (Emmanuel, 1974: 71).

W arren (1973: 10) tells us that "the m ost relevant single indicator of the d eg ree to w hich a large or m edium -sized econom y is constructing m o d ern productive forces is the p ro p o rtio n of the

active population em ployed in m odern m anufacturing as com pared to that em ployed in backw ard agriculture. H e then refers us to a portion of his figures which shows the proportion of m anufacturing w orkers to the total active population. D espite show ing a m uch higher p ro p o rtio n in developed countries across the b o ard , he th in k s th a t the fig u res are an 'a b so lu te ly c ru cial', p o sitiv e indication of the progress m ade in som e T hird W orld countries (W arren, 1973: 10). Yet on exam ining the figures critically one notices that W arren does not indicate the proportion of people still in agriculture. Em m anuel finds this to be an im portant omission. If in clu d ed , the gap b etw een d e v elo p ed c o u n tries an d the 'underdeveloped' ones w ould be far w ider. Thus m anufacturing labour force as a percentage of total population for the period that both w riters w ork w ith w ould be 28.5 for OECD countries (less Turkey) and 10% for the rest of the w orld (less Eastern Europe). But a g ric u ltu ral lab o u r force as a p ercen tag e of th e to tal active population w ould be 11.6 and 68.7% respectively (Emmanuel, 1974: 70).

E m m anuel's critique strengthens the arg u m en t th at W arren's em pirical evidence is the w rong source of com m entary on w hether there has been any significant developm ent in the Third W orld. It m erely show s th at the Third W orld was not stagnant in the period under study. Indeed it is difficult to see how a social phenom enon can experience an absolute standstill for any m eaningful length of time. It w ould therefore be ridiculous for W arren to m arshall a m ass of figures m erely to dem onstrate this sim ple (and therefore tautological) point if it were not for w hat we suggest is his greater w orry - nam ely that, anti-dependence and anti-im perialist notions contain the 'd an g er' of an au tark ic shut-off from capital. The

keenness on guarding against this 'danger', we suggest, leads him to infer more from his figures than they permit.

At the surface Emmanuel's critique of Warren appears to state only that 'underdeveloped' countries are in fact less developed than the developed countries (which is tautological), that the former's growth is inadequate, and that the gap between the two sets of countries is either as wide as, or is getting wider than, it used to be. What is more, Emmanuel is using similar cross-national data to argue this. It is on the surface a simple difference, built around the interpretation of figures. But in reality they differ on a central conceptual issue of development, and it is this which influences their differing conclusions even if made from the same set of figures.

Warren's concept of development appears to be limited to the notion of the development of 'productive forces', and his understanding of this notion seems to be simply the quantitative increase in material things.4 For Warren the 'human factor' is not an issue in the present era; it is moral and socialist, perhaps relevant in the future. What matters now is simply the increase in (the technical) productive forces irrespective of, for example, whether there is exploitation or not (Warren, 1973; Warren, 1980).

Emmanuel on the other hand is appreciative of the role played by the technical productive forces without conceding to the tendency to see them as ends in themselves (Emmanuel, 1974: 64).

To elaborate, he states that labour productivity is a key to development, and that productivity is achieved through the intensification and spread of mechanization and workers' skills. The increase in mechanization and workers' skills, however, does not come from the production of machines in specified branches as

is often assu m ed , b u t from th e u tilisatio n of m achines an d technicians in any branch w hatsoever, including th at in w hich m achines are produced (Emm anuel, 1974: 64-66). Thus although industrialization is preferable to backw ard agriculture (Emmanuel, 1974: 70), the appearance of factories alone does not enhance the capacity to m eet the goals of developm ent, nor does it become a good indicator of developm ent by itself, the goals of developm ent are stated by Em m anuel in a general w ay to be the attainm ent of w h at in d u stria liz ed societies have come to reg ard as stan d ard consum ption levels of v arious goods an d services (Em m anuel, 1972: 370; 1974: 62-65).

This view of d ev elopm ent p ro v id es som e affinity betw een Em m anuel and dependence theorists, as well as w ith a num ber of others concerned as it w ere w ith 'the quality of life'. There is another aspect to this affinity w ith dependence theorists, of course. It is the popularly perceived Third W orldism considered portrayed by the theses of his w ritings, especially that of unequal exchange to which we referred earlier in C hapter One.

Em m anuel's purpose in the book (Emmanuel, 1972) was, am ong o th ers, to explain w hy 'u n d e rd e v e lo p e d ' co u n tries w ere n o t narrow ing 'the gap'. Its message w as that they w ere not narrow ing the gap because their w orkers w ere paid below the value of their labour-pow er, leading to low er prices for Third W orld- produced com m odities. This thesis was reco u n ted th ro u g h o u t the book, th o u g h E m m a n u e l d id n o t th e n see th e s o lu tio n to 'u n d erd ev elo p m en t' as being the im p ro v em en t of the term s of trade (Emmanuel, 1972: 371). In the articles (Emmanuel, 1974; 1976) which came later the explanation was repeated, but in addition, the im portance of capital (including technology) was bro u g h t to the

fore. The argument of these articles was that lower incomes in the Third World would not attract capital, which is crucial in development, and if the Third World continues to be starved of capital, productivity will not rise and incomes will be kept low. In one of the articles (Emmanuel, 1976) he exhorts the Third World to attract those with capital, identified as the transnational corporations, and attacks those who are anti-capital, perceived to be mainly the dependence theorists.

It can be said that, because Emmanuel retains the unequal exchange explanation of 'underdevelopment', and because he is concerned with the 'quality of life' in the Third World even though in the purely underconsumptionist sense of the magnitude of incomes, he still has some affinity with the dependence outlook in the articles too. However, for those who believe as he now does, that the dependence outlook is anti- capital, his articles finally show him abandoning the 'Third Worldist' stance. This may be the more accurate interpretation, particularly since in the articles, Emmanuel himself makes it clear that his real adversaries are dependence theorists. Taking it for the moment that this is the interpretation of his writings that matters, for the purpose of comparison and summary we can note the following. It is the view of both Warren and Emmanuel that capital is crucial to the Third World due to its ability to bring about development there. With Warren it is already doing so. With Emmanuel it remains only a potential force.

Both Warren and Emmanuel use extensively the quantitative empirical approach to make their points. But whereas Warren's attempt to make an alternative statement derives exclusively from his figures, Emmanuel's does not.

Below we examine a fully conceptual critique of dependence with its own alternative framework.

2.3. A conceptual refutation of dependence: The 'merchant capital’