in increasing yield 35 had led the states to establish the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 36, with a "permanent Secretariat" (actually one official and two typists on part-time secondment from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) in London. The Commission, which consisted of one voting Commissioner from each member state, met only once per year 3^. Its area of concern was larger than that of the Permanent Commission, in that it covered the whole of the ICES area, that is, the North Atlantic North of 36 degrees North between 42 degrees West and 51 degrees East, excluding the Baltic, the Mediterranean and certain small areas. The Commission incorporated the Permanent Commission, and enjoyed a wider mandate than the latter, being empowered to recommend closed seasons, closed areas and the prescription or proscription of fishing gear, all measures tackling growth rather than recruitment
overfishing. Provision was also made for any other
non-discriminatory conservation measures agreed upon and ratified by two-thirds of the states 3®. The area was to be divided into three regions, each with a Regional Conmittee.
The FCO placed great faith in the NEAFC regime, both because it had presided over a considerable increase in aggregate catch and because it involved functional co-operation between government departments directly concerned with fisheries, thus safeguarding the High Seas from coastal state extensions without the excessive interference by diplomats which might bring wider foreign or economic policy considerations into play. Since the narrow limits regime was to the FCO's preference, this functional co-operation accorded special advantages to the UK. In addition to providing the Secretariat, the UK acted as repository for all treaties relevant to the Commission.
The British government, therefore, responded warmly to NEAFC initiatives, and the UK was the first state to ratify the NEAFC Convention, as it had been for the Treaty on Overfishing which preceded it.
By 1967, despite the NEAFC1s spectacular success in expanding the catch, certain deficiencies were becoming apparent in its operation. Mesh size regulations had not prevented large by-catches of undersized fish of species other than the target species, and had been shown to benefit the smallest species available for capture, since only its juveniles ran no risk of entrapment in a net intended for another species. The larger the adult form of a species, the greater the number of nets of which its juveniles could fall foul. The young of the largest food fish, like cod and haddock, ran the risk of capture in every net save those actually set for their parents. Mesh size regulations thus contributed to a decline in food fish stocks and a rise of stocks of species too small for useful exploitation for human consumption ("trash species"), like sandeels and sprats. This in turn provided the stimulus for a rapid expansion of "industrial" fishing, especially from the mid-1960s onwards (see Figure 9.2), with new, smaller meshes and even worse by-catches. Also, the growth in catches in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged fishermen from Spain, Portugal, the USSR and Bulgaria, who had not previously fished in the NE Atlantic, to begin doing so. These damaging effects were not obvious in 1967, because the limits of annual yield for many species had not yet been reached, and because a succession of mild Springs in the 1960s favoured larval survival.
The Coimiission had thus proved a useful body in expanding catches
while stocks were plentiful, but could not be so when catch reductions were required to save threatened stocks. There was no incentive for any signatory state unilaterally to stop its nationals from fishing such a stock, while other states might permit their nationals to continue. The Commission could do little to prevent non-signatory states from fishing in its area, because the bulk of it was High Seas. The only way to bring these newly-entrant states under the Convention was to recognise their right to a share of the catch. This had the effect of making reductions in effort still more difficult to achieve. Also, any NEAFC initiative could be sabotaged by the objections of any three member states, a provision which discouraged radical new initiatives
This inability to protect stocks was beginning to point to impending disaster in herring, although few other stocks appeared to be in danger. Two extremely valuable stocks of herring, which might in their prime have yielded a sustainable annual catch of two million tonnes, were on the point of collapse. Fishing the East Anglian stock ceased in 1967, to be followed by the Atlanto-Scandian the following year. In addition, the Arcto-Scandian cod stocks had narrowly escaped collapse during the late 1950s and early 1960s, because fishing was not reduced in the face of poor recruitment As the Corrmission's decision-making body consisted of state representatives rather than scientists, there was no means of translating ICES evidence on recruitment into changes in catch levels. Even had there been such a system, the NEAFC would have been faced with two difficult problems: that of distributing the allowable catch between states, and that of ensuring that fishermen complied with undertakings made in the NEAFC. Policing was solely in the hands of flag states, the only international limitation upon
state independence being a clause in the 1882 Fisheries Convention requiring vessels on fishery protection duties to fly a blue and yellow pennant . Most member states showed little enthusiasm for a system which would permit states to search each others' fishing vessels, and although states were begining to denounce the Fisheries Convention there was no rush to embrace a system of joint enforcement. The Commission was thus wholly dependent upon flag-state policing The framework for joint enforcement was agreed upon in the NEAFC in 1967, but ratification was long denied by states for whom the general principle of freedom of navigation was more important than effective conservation of fish stocks.
Fisheries in the North-Western Atlantic were regulated by the International Comnission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). This Commission had been established in 1949 by a meeting of representatives of the principal states fishing the area The North-West Atlantic's most important coastal states, the USA and Canada, were enthusiastic supporters, having co-operated extremely successfully in the regulation of Pacific halibut before the War. As originally constituted, ICNAF's area of operations was divided into five sub-areas. Subsequent reorganisation had increased this number to six by 1967 (see figure 5.1). Each sub-area had a panel representing those states whose nationals habitually fished there, the UK being represented on the panels for sub-areas One (West Coast of Greenland) and Three (Grand Banks). Each sub-area was further sub-divided because of the localised nature of stocks. ICNAF enjoyed the following advantages which the NEAFC lacked, and by the mid-1960s was a much more experienced and effective body than its counterpart. Firstly the Commission was responsible for obtaining and collating its own scientific information ^ : this strengthened
the power of scientists to influence decisions. Secondly ICNAF had begun work with a fairly ambitious programme, whereas the NEAFC had slowly evolved from the Permanent Commission. Thirdly although both Conmissions were empowered to establish overall catch limits on the
Neither Treaty had, however, foreseen a necessity for this overall catch to be allocated as quotas between states.
ICNAF also took a broader view of its task than the NEAFC, and the
consisted of thirteen states, ten of them also being members of the NEAFC (see Figure 5.2). Policing had been internationalised, a protocol of 1965 permitting the Commission on its own initiative to make proposals for national and international measures of control on the High Seas. It had been agreed that from 1969 onwards states would be able to inspect each others' vessels 4®.
Britain was also represented on the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, which since 1952 had been involved in the interchange
approval of two-thirds of member states 45, in the case of the NEAFC any member state could refuse to abide by agreed catch limits 4®.
Convention had been extended to molluscs in 1961 4^ and to hood and harp seals in 1963 4®. By January 1967 the Commission's membership
1st January 1967
NEAFC only Both Ccnmissions ICNAF only
Belgium Ireland Denmark France Canada Italy USA Netherlands Sweden Iceland Norway Poland
Federal Republic of Germany
Portugal Spain USSR UR
no importance to the British fishing industry, membership being exercised on behalf of UK colonies in the Mediterranean. After the independence of Malta in 1964, membership served no purpose and the UK withdrew from the Council in 1968
In 1967 there was little dissatisfaction with either the NEAFC or ICNAF except among some marine biologists. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is difficult to see why the experience of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was not seen as a portent for that of the NEAFC. The establishment of the IWC in 1946 had been prompted by the same motives and scientific work which inspired the Fisheries Commissions. The avowed purpose of the Whaling Commission was to ensure a whale catch at MSY ^ , and its membership consisted of all states . engaged in whaling at the time of its establishment. By 1967 the Commission had shown itself to be totally ineffective in preventing a continuous decline of stocks for almost every species. Whaling by UK citizens had ceased; British membership had been primarily maintained in order to reduce the allowable catch, a goal shared by the majority of the members. However, decisions had to obtain agreement of three-quarters of the members present and voting. Thus the minority of members still engaged in whaling, and hoping at least to amortise the capital invested in their fleets, were able to set catch levels substantially above those recommended by the scientists. In the absence of agreement at an annual meeting there was an ever-present danger that whaling countries would denounce the Convention, so even in a situation of declining stocks it was the majority who wished to lower allowable catches greatly, rather than the still-whaling minority, who were under greater pressure to come to terms. Hiis situation was to be mirrored in the NEAFC in the early 1970s, and the power of a minority of IWC-member states
determined to protect the investments of their nationals was a precursor of wrangles in the NEAFC about industrial fishing for herring and about High Seas salmon-fishing. The NEAFC was also to experience another IWC problem, that of its own enlargement. As more states joined the Commissions they had to be allocated shares of the catch and the problem of obtaining agreement became compounded by the growing number of states involved. Moreover the new members had only recently attained the capacity to exploit the stocks in question and therefore were not keen to reduce their catch. This problem was an extremely grave one for the IWC, to the extent that the proportion of members voting for a complete ban on whaling was to decline during the 1970s, despite an unmitigated decline in whale stocks.
A sumnary of UK policy on international fisheries questions in 1967
The fishing industry performed three main roles for British government. Two of these were economic: to supply food to a state heavily dependent upon food imports, and to provide work in some regions which offered few alternative sources of employment. These two roles were primarily the concern of MAFF and the Ministry of Labour respectively. The industry's third role was performed by the distant-water industry alone. By asserting the right of UK citizens to fish close to the shores of other states, it strengthened the hand of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office in their high policy concern that a maximal interpretation of High Seas freedoms should be maintained in international law.
The question of fisheries limits was regarded by the Foreign Office as too vital for UK policy as a whole to allow any other government Department a share in international negotiations on the issue. In
1967 this fact was not important in determining policy outcomes, since the interpretation of the national interest held by the Foreign Office was also endorsed by the Ministry of Defence, MAFF, and the Board of Trade. There was common agreement between them that the United Kingdom should endeavour to maintain the narrowest possible limits to national jurisdiction. If extensions had to be conceded, then this should be done simultaneously by as many states as possible, in order to minimise international disputes and to ensure a predictable international environment.
In keeping with the concept of maximum state freedoms on the High Seas, all policing of fishing and related activities beyond fisheries limits should be undertaken at the behest of flag states. Inter-state co-operation should take the form of intergovernmental contacts between specialised government agencies bound by mutual undertakings to constrain their nationals according to agreements formulated. The only exception was the ICNAF Joint Enforcement Scheme, whereby, under circumstances of complete reciprocity and non-discrimination, the UK had relaxed its preference for flag-state enforcement. The maintenance of fish stocks was to be ensured by this intergovernmental activity, bolstered by scientific advice, and the Fisheries Commissions were the appropriate decision-making bodies. Rights and duties appertained to states, international persons, rather than to individuals. For this reason foreign access to fish stocks within national fisheries limits was to be determined by reference to historic rights, that is, whether or not any citizens of another state had habitually fished in an area. This implied that states could not limit the aggregate fishing effort of other states enjoying historic rights within their fisheries limits but beyond the territorial sea, although they could prevent encroachment
by newly-entrant states. For the UK this zone lay between the three and twelve-mile limits.
The Foreign Office did not concern itself with the economics of the fishing fleet. The common view of the Board of Trade, MAFF and the Ministry of Labour was that government subsidies were proper and necessary. One type of subsidy was the shouldering by government of some responsibilities for research, and was regarded as permanent. The perishable nature of the catch and uncertain fishing prospects had forced such a development in the early 1930s, and proper scientific information about fish stocks was vital if the free seas policy was to be reconciled with the biological realities of fish populations. Postwar economic losses had added another type of subsidy, refined by the Fleck Committee, which was meant to improve the efficiency of fish catching and processing. The prevailing opinion in Whitehall was that when the fleet was "modern" and "competitive" this subsidy would no longer be necessary.
On the question of anadromous fish, there was general agreement that government policy should seek to maximise the run of fish, and there was a clear determination in the Foreign Office and MAFF that the key to the protection of British salmon outside British fisheries limits lay with ICNAF and NEAFC. The distribution of the anadromous catch among UK domestic interests was to be in accordance with internal economic and political pressures, and in 1967 there was no clear government policy as to the action which should be taken.
Summary of Part II
imperatives. In 1967 the fisheries regimes holding sway over the fishing grounds of interest to the UK were not primarily designed with these imperatives in mind, but were formulated in order to minimise state interference with High Seas freedoms. That is not to say that the regimes were wholly inappropriate for the management of fisheries. HMG had played a leading part in the institution of functional intergovernmental Fisheries Garnissions. However, these Commissions were hampered by the flag state authority central to the concept of the High Seas, and were therefore insufficiently authoritative to ensure the adjustments necessary in fishing effort in response to stock changes.
The structure of Whitehall ensured that the UK did not use its authority to help create a strong and authoritative system of fisheries management. Fisheries was a relatively low economic and strategic priority when compared to other principal uses of the sea, and policy on issues of relevance to fisheries questions were subordinated to other interests, notably that of freedom of navigation. The principal domestic importance of fisheries was its contribution to employment, and the latter could more easily be maintained by subsidies than by a new maritime regime predicated on the nature of fisheries and inimical to more vital UK marine interests.
The fisheries "sponsoring departments" occupied a weak position within the Whitehall structure. This problem was compounded by the fact that the message which the fishing industry conveyed to them was confused by the organisational fragmentation of the industry and by the lack of congruence of the interests of the inshore and the "deep sea" sections of the industry. Parliamentary activity on fisheries
questions was often inappropriate and ill thought out, with no partisan differences. While several MPs were dependent upon the votes of fish-processing workers there were few constituencies where fishermen constituted a sizable proportion of the electorate. These constituencies mostly centred around the home ports of the deep sea fleet, with the votes dependent upon the inshore fleet being distributed between many more ports.
The international regime rested largely upon the Geneva Conventions of 1958, and was based upon a maximal area of High Seas and a narrow band of coastal state control. The fisheries comnissions were attempts to reconcile the legal regime for the freedom of fishing and the biological imperative for catch limitations, and had met with considerable success in times of expanding catches, following the stock gains of the Second World War, but promised to be less successful in times of falling stocks. No mechanisms existed to limit fishing effort or capacity, and thus the scene was set for economic losses and stock decline. These problems were exacerbated by the willingness of governments, including that of the UK, to use subsidies to render their fishing industries' economics less shaky, thus building in overcapacity.
These uncertainties were intensified by a mounting tendency for