Hipótesis General Planteamiento de hipótesis

For social transfer programs to fulfill their intended objectives, the benefits that they provide must be both adequate and context specific (Siddiki et al. 2014). As a result, the first benefit determination issue to be decided is whether benefits should be provided in cash or in kind. Cash transfers allow beneficiaries to decide how best to meet their individual needs (Hanlon 2010). However, in-kind transfers may be best suited for individuals living in extreme poverty. A study performed by the International Food Policy Research Institute in 2009 found that the poorest households tend to prefer in-kind transfers provided in the form of food over cash transfers, and that preference for cash transfers grows as beneficiary income increases (Ahmed et al. 2009). If in-kind transfers are chosen, the assets provided must be appropriate to the intended beneficiaries. Asset transfers suitable for informal sector workers include food, livestock, manufacturing inputs, or land for a workspace. Cost is likewise a consideration when deciding between cash or in-kind transfers. The administrative cost of cash transfers is significantly lower than it is for in-kind transfers, a factor that, in turn, facilitates implementation of cash transfer schemes (Hanlon 2010). Trade-offs among adequacy, acceptability, and affordability inevitably come into play in determining the actual size of the transfer to be provided. Adequacy refers to ensuring that the value of the transfer is sufficient to meet program objectives. In this regard, a benefit level set too low inadequately mitigates income insecurity and poverty reduction, whereas a benefit value set too high constrains coverage, as it limits the number of potential beneficiaries. As a result of such trade-offs, decisions regarding benefit levels are largely normative and political in nature. Regardless of the level set, adjustments for inflation are necessary if the purchasing power of the transfer is to be maintained.

Program funding issues often make determining an appropriate benefit level for informal sector workers particularly difficult. While social transfer pilot programs are often funded by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) or development partners, the expanded forms of government-provided social transfer programs tend to be tax-funded, although informal sector activity makes no contribution to the tax base. Given that the informal economy comprises a substantial share of total economic activity in many developing countries, noncontributory social transfer programs may seem either impossible or unsustainable. Creating adequate fiscal space in a government budget to fund such programs therefore requires some innovation. Alternatives for achieving this objective include

reallocating public expenditure, increasing the operational efficiency of other government programs or reducing their administrative costs, and seeking assistance from development agencies.

In cases in which fiscal capacity varies widely, funding from the central government may be an option, particularly if the latter sets national guidelines. For example, both the transfer amount and eligibility threshold for the People’s Republic of China’s Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) are determined at the local level, although both must fall within broad national guidelines. The benefit amounts provided depend on the financial capacity of the local government concerned; the level of benefits provided is thus often lower in poor, rural areas than it is in wealthier, urban centers, an outcome that impacts interregional poverty incidence (Golan, Sicular, and Umapathi 2014). Programs of this type may thus benefit from national oversight in ensuring that social protection initiatives reach their intended objectives.

Conditionality

Conditional cash transfers offer benefits on the condition that beneficiaries comply with certain requirements such as school attendance, nutritional outcomes, or visits to a health care provider. The expectation is that these requirements will induce broader development impacts than a cash or asset transfer in isolation. While conditional cash transfers have been proven to be effective, whether conditionality is responsible for this outcome remains unclear (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In fact, any of the components of conditional cash transfers may be responsible for this positive outcome—the cash benefit itself, increased investment in human capital or social services, improved awareness of the prospects for economic advance, denying benefits in the face of noncompliance, or even effective program monitoring.6

Conditional cash transfers have been widely used in Southeast Asia, primarily for childhood development. For example, investment in children’s education and health and maternal health services are conditions of receiving benefits under the 4Ps of the Philippines. A 2012 impact assessment of the program found measurable increases in the use of health services by mothers and their children as well as school enrollment, perhaps indicating the benefit of linking conditions to cash benefit receipt (Chaudhury, Friedman, and Onishi 2013).

If programs that target informal sector workers incorporate conditionality into their design, the conditions stipulated should facilitate achievement of outcomes beneficial to this group. Examples include school attendance by

6 _{When individuals know that their compliance is being monitored, they often change their behavior}

beneficiary children, participating in skills development courses, or maintaining a safe workspace, since all of these mitigate the risks and vulnerabilities faced daily by informal sector workers. Investment in the education of children and adults builds skills and expands employment opportunities, thus ensuring better livelihoods for the beneficiaries and their children. Making social transfers conditional on workplace safety could be equally beneficial for self-employed and home-based workers who operate unsafe work environments as a means of cutting costs. However, regardless of their beneficial impact, the monitoring and enforcement costs of administering such restrictions on benefits may be prohibitive, particularly in the informal sector. Nevertheless, targeting the specific vulnerabilities and risks faced by informal workers with conditionalities may result in investment in more productive and less harmful employment and business endeavors.