After the French No-Vote on the Constitution in May 2005, the emphasis of the debates, I will endeavour to show in the following, changes from a value-based one towards more strategic, geopolitical concerns about political expediency and efficacy. The continued US/Europe discussion, which will be briefly summarized, serves to illustrate this point. Thereafter I will return towards the theme of European enlargement in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitution by the French electorate.
25
Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Y a-t-il des fondations morales de l’Europe?’,Esprit, 326 (2006), 106- 120.
The vexation about alleged American imperialism is still evident during 2005-06 in Esprit. However, now the discussion of the topic pertains more to questions of exerting diplomatic and military power, rather than to which European values might provide a counterweight towards American hegemony. For example, one Esprit editorial from 2006 alleges that the French No-Vote has again left Europe in a weakened position, marked by a lack of clear leadership and political will. Even so, out of this crisis a new European foreign policy must be born: “l’opposition aux États-Unis devait être l’acte fondateur d’une diplomatie européenne autonome”.26This imperative is to create “après la fin de guerre froide, une autre organisation du système international” (p. 4), which will bring about greater equilibrium in the international system, a view echoed in an extensive article from 2005 by Hassner and Tertrais.27 The authors emphasize the need for a stronger, more concerted European foreign policy, based on the premise that the rejection of the Constitutional treaty has left Europe in a state of paralysis. Europe’s goal now must lie in creating a viable counterbalance to the US within the framework of international institutions. So while the idea remains facing up to undue American influence on the world stage and strengthening Europe’s voice, the emphasis is now firmly placed onto a more efficient European diplomacy, and enhanced military power.
This is evident also in the debate about Europe’s borders and future enlargement, a topic which is pushed back onto the agenda after the No-Vote, not least because for Esprit the two topics are inseparably intertwined. Since the Constitutional Treaty supposedly signified the completion of the European project after 1989, the rejection of the Constitution consequently constitutes in an analysis of Padis, a “référendum rétrospectif sur l’élargissement européen” and what is more also a “référendum anticipé sur l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union.”28 Thus the protest registered by the voters also implies a rejection of enlargement processes at large. Another editorial from 2005 – with the revealing title ‘Pour une autolimitation du projet européen’ – formulates the
26
Éditorial, ‘International: la césure de 2005’,Esprit, 321 (2006), 3-5 (p. 3). 27
Pierre Hassner, Bruno Tertrais, ‘Nouvelles puissances, nouvelles menaces’, Esprit, 322 (2006), 59-73.
28
challenge as follows: “Si le traité constitutionnel est désormais caduc, l’enjeu qu’il représentait, lui, demeure d’actualité: il nous faut désormais penser l’autolimitation du projet européen.”29
This call for a discussion of Europe’s self-limitations is no mean feat, for as we ascertained in the previous section, Europe in Esprit’s discourse becomes strongly identified with universalist concepts and values, and ideals of openness. The problem, therefore, is how and where to draw its borders. The political scientist Helene Sjursen has pointed to this dilemma in reference to the enlargement debates: “the moral appeal of the universalist dimension makes it difficult to draw a line where Enlargement should stop. Universalist, moral principles […] give no guidance in terms of drawing borders.”30
The question for Esprit is how to respond to the challenge of defining borders without compromising Europe’s theoretical openness, and without completely diluting Europe’s claims to universalism. The journal achieves this by discussing current and future enlargements from a more narrowly defined political view that bypasses the “value” criterion, whilst maintaining the idea of a core Europe.
This “core” Europe, is the one created in 2004 with the enlargement of the ten Eastern European countries which represent the “true” Europe. Every subsequent enlargement, including Turkey, must be treated as a strategy for more political clout and/or enhanced security. These enlargements have no subsequent influence on the “real” Europe, which will remain unchanged. This stance is developed in a text by Christian Lequesne, which deals with French worries over the drawing of European boundaries.31 Lequesne concludes that France must realise that European enlargement is the only option in a post-Cold War world. If Europe does not seize the chance of bringing countries like Turkey and the Ukraine into its political sphere of influence, these countries will look to the US instead. Although future enlargement will slow the pace of internal 29
Éditorial, ‘Pour une autolimitation du projet européen’,Esprit, 318 (2005), 3-4 (p. 4).
30
Helene Sjursen, ‘Enlargement in Perspective: The EU’s Quest for Identity’, RECON Online Working Paper, 2007/15
<http://reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html> [accessed 12 February 2008].
31
Christian Lequesne, ‘Sur les craintes françaises d’une Europe espace’, Esprit, 322 (2006), 28-35.
reform, it is in Europe’s interest to build up its links with countries with which it shares joint interests. Europe needs to be “ouvert aux demandes d’adhésion d’une périphérie qui se démocratise et avec laquelle on a intérêt à bâtir en commun” (p. 35). Lequesne’s position also underlies an article on the topic Ukraine as a possible candidate country for EU membership.32 The main thrust of the article contends that it would be in Europe’s interest to develop closer ties with the Ukraine because it would increase Europe’s leverage in Russian affairs, rather than revolving around issues of common values or shared cultural affinities.
Michel Foucher, a professor of political geography, expands on these ideas in a detailed and long investigation into the concept of borders and frontiers.33 He acknowledges that representations of “européanité” include aspects such as “influence des cartes mentales, poids des solidarités historiques et des voisinages familiers […]” (p. 87). Yet he points out that with the accession of the ten member countries of 2004, circumstances have changed. “Depuis 2004 l’Union ne s’étend plus aux acteurs d’un long passé directement commun mais à d’autres nations, plus ou moins consolidées, qui se trouvent, spatialement, en position de périphéries” (p. 91). Foucher introduces here the idea of the European peripheries, and new zones of European influences and neighbourhood agreements, which will determine Europe’s future enlargement. He concludes that while the “cœur européen” (p. 91) is constituted by what was reunited with the “rupture libératrice et heureuse de 1989” (p. 91), Europe has to maintain its principal openness in order to structure its relations with the outside world, to act as an “exemple vertueux” for modern statehood and a “vecteur innovant de diffusion de la modernité” (p. 91).
Of course the three texts can be read as indications simply of a more sober and realistic discourse about Europe, after the French electorate has voted against what the Constitution was supposed to represent in Esprit’s view. Even so, I would maintain that these texts also demonstrate the thin line which
Esprit is walking between trying to come up with a satisfactory answer as to 32
Grygoriy Nemyria, ‘L’Ukraine et l’Europe: l’histoire reprend’,Esprit, 312 (2005), 52-64. 33
Michel Foucher,’L’Union politique européenne: un territoire, des frontières, des horizons’, Esprit, 329 (2006), 86-115.
what Europe’s borders are, while also maintaining the principal element of openness and “universality” which Europe is supposed to project: while Europe’s “cœur” is clearly demarcated by shared history and commonalities, it must continue to extend towards other countries its enlightening and modernising influence.