must necessarily be connected to an agent's subjective motivational set (or her S, for short). An agent's reasons explain her actions, and something could not serve to explain the agent's actions if it could not motivate her, since it is not possible for an agent to make an intentional act without having a motivation to do that act. Consequently, anything which could not motivate the agent could not serve to explain the agent's
actions. Purported reasons which have no connection to an agent's S are external reasons, since they are external to an agent's S. According to Williams, external reasons are not, in fact, reasons, however, since an agent cannot act on them.
Williams argues that the connection between the agent's reasons and the agent's S does not have to be based on the agent's actual S, however. Something is a reason for an agent if there were to be a connection to the hypothetical S the agent would have if the agent deliberated soundly. However, he stipulates that such a connection must be “fairly close and immediate” in order to count as a reason (Williams, 1981: 103).
Dancy's explanatory constraint is a constraint that any theory of the relationship between normative and motivating reasons must be able to show how normative reasons can contribute to the explanation of an action (Dancy, 2000: 101). The explanatory constraint, if not based on Williams' reasons internalism, is at least inspired by some of the same considerations as reasons internalism. The idea in both cases is that, for something to be a reason, it must serve to explain an agent's action. Reasons internalism, however, is much more constraining than the explanatory constraint, because of Williams' insistence that for something to count as a reason for an agent, that something must have at least a fairly close and immediate connection, via sound deliberation, to an agent's S. Dancy's
explanatory constraint contains no such stipulation. As a result, even if a theory of the relationship between normative and motivating reasons meets the explanatory constraint, it still might not satisfy Williams' reasons internalism. A theory of the relationship between normative reasons and motivating reasons might be able to show how some proposed normative reason is able to contribute to the explanation of an action, but not be able to provide a connection between that normative reason and an agent's S, or between
the normative reason and the agent's relatively similar hypothetical S, were the agent to deliberate soundly.
Williams' argument presents a problem for Dancy, in that anti-psychological reasons are independent of an agent's psychological states, and thus are independent of an agent's S. Anti-psychological reasons are thus relatively external,69 as far as reasons go, and according to Williams' argument, cannot actually be reasons. The aim of Williams' argument is to show that realist positions, according to which certain moral facts are supposed to be reasons for all agents, are not possible. Dancy's position, which holds that reasons are objective facts, certainly runs afoul of Williams' argument. Dancy's position does meet the explanatory constraint, because any normative reason, from the agent's side of his epistemic filter, is capable of contributing to an explanation of an agent's action. His position will not satisfy Williams' internalism, however.
In chapter 1, I argued that Williams' emphasis on the (counterfactual) connection between an agent's reasons and an agent's S does not need to be as tight as Williams' claims for a position to be reasons internalist. The connection between an agent's reasons and an agent's S does not need to be close or immediate, or even based on sound deliberation, for there to be a connection between an agent's S and an agent's reasons. All that is essential to reasons internalism is that there is some connection between an agent's S and an agent's reasons, and that connection does not need to be based on sound deliberation. And, in chapter 1, I argued that any theory of reasons is capable of providing a counter- factual connection to an agent's hypothetical S in order to count potential reasons as internal, rather than external, reasons.
That being said, the claim that any theory of reasons can potentially provide an internalist connection between an hypothetical S of an agent and the agent's purported reasons does not address the underlying concern that makes reasons internalism plausible. What is right about reasons internalism is that reasons, including normative reasons, must have
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Keeping in mind that, in chapter 1, I established that it is a mistake to think of reasons as being either internal or external, but it is better to think of them as existing on a internal/external spectrum, being either more or less internal (or external) in nature. Dancy's reasons, however, are pretty far along on the external end of the spectrum.
some role in explaining an agent's actions. The rest of Williams' position, such as the emphasis on sound deliberative routes that are close and immediate to the agent's actual S, is in fact Williams' own position and not essential to the general claim that for
something to be a reason, it must have some role in explaining an agent's actions. The problem that reasons internalism presents for realism generally, and thus for Dancy's anti- psychological position, is to explain how objective reasons can be shown to necessarily have some role in explaining an agent's actions. It does not require the particular features of Williams' position, no matter how compelling his position is, to present that challenge. However, that challenge is also expressed by Dancy's explanatory constraint. As such, the explanatory constraint looks like a better standard that theories of reasons need to meet, since it captures what is essential to reasons internalism without assuming Williams' particular position. Since Dancy's theory of reasons meets the explanatory constraint, the fact that his theory runs afoul of Williams' more stringent reasons internalism is not a concern.