In this section, descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are featured. We start by displaying the results of basic univariate statistics (mean and frequencies) and continue with the analysis of bivariate associations between the independent variables and the dependent variable (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3).
Beginning with social structure, the average ethnic fractionalization is 0.6 (this index varies from 0-1), with more layered societies being the former British colonies of Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups (among which Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3,5%, Tiv 2,5%). The dominant religious views are Muslim (50%) and Christian (40%) and the official language is English (but there are over 500 indigenous languages; e.g. Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani) (see Nigeria CIA Factbook sheet). Zambia’s population is mainly constituted by Africans (99,5%) (73 ethnic groups including Bemba, Tonga, Chewa, Lozi, Nsenga, Tumbuka, Ngoni, Lala, Kaonde, Lunda, and other African groups); between 50%-75%, of the population is Christian and 24%-49% is Muslim and Hindu. There are eight official languages (Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Kaonde, Luvale and English) and several other dialects (see Zambia CIA Factbook sheet). On the opposite side, the Creole societies of Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Seychelles are the least fragmented ones. Sao Tome and Principe is mostly constituted by mestiços, forros (descendants of freed slaves), tongas (children of serviçais born in the islands), and Europeans (primarily Portuguese) and the overwhelming majority of the population is
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To create the lagged dependent variable from the original variable named PSIindex we used the following command: generate PSIindexlag = PSIindex [_n-1].
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Catholic (70%) and speaks Portuguese (official language) (see Sao Tome and Principe CIA Factbook sheet). The Cape Verdean population is mainly Creole (71%) and African (28%), pertains to Roman Catholic religion, and speaks Creolo (a blend of Portuguese and West African words) and Portuguese (official language) (see Cape Verde CIA Factbook sheet). The Seychellois people are a mixture of French, African, Indian, Chinese, and Arab. They are mostly Roman Catholic (82,3%), and 91,8% speak Creole and English (official language) (see Seychelles CIA Factbook sheet)70.
On average, the number of years since the introduction of multiparty elections is 14 years, whereas the durability of polities is 12 years (see Table 4.2). While for some countries these values are identical, in several others they vary and this variance has two sources. In the first place, we find differences which result from the way time and polity durability were calculated. For instance, Botswana and Mauritius are the two longest lasting democracies in Africa. They introduced multiparty elections in the aftermath of independence and remain uninterrupted democracies hitherto, thus both polities are durable. Yet, there is a difference in the number of years of the two variables. This happens because, while “time” counts the years from the onset of multipartism, “durable” starts counting from the first year after independence (1967 for Botswana and 1969 for Mauritius). Secondly, and most importantly, we find differences which result from a discontinuity in the rules of the polity; namely in Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia. We next provide two examples.
In Guinea-Bissau, elections and democratic tasks have been interrupted by several episodes of intense political conflict between the Head of State and the military junta, and peace has been threatened on several occasions (Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009). In the wake of the first multiparty elections in 1994, civil war broke out after the army chief of staff, General Ansumane Mané, was dismissed by President Joao Bernardo Vieira in June 1998. The Abuja peace accord signed on 1 November 1998 put an end to five months of rebellion and presidential and legislative elections were scheduled for March 1999. In February 1999, a temporary government of national unity headed by Prime Minister Francisco Fadul took office and three months later another action led by General Mane, ousted President Vieira. The military junta named National Assembly Speaker Maladan Bacai Sanhá Interim President and established a timetable for the return of democratic governance. In the 1999/2000 elections, Kumba Yala was declared Head of State (in the second round)
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only to be overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Verussuni Correia Seabra on 14 September 2003. Guinea-Bissau’s return to constitutional rule was completed in July 2005 with the holding of presidential elections won by Joao Bernardo “Nino” Vieira. Rivalry between President Nino Vieira and the head of the Armed Forces, General Baptista Tagme Na Wai, resulted, however, in the assassinations of both men on consecutive days (see Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009; Guinea-Bissau IPU Parline and Polity IV Country Report 201071.). More recently, a military conflict (in 2010) and two coups, one attempted and another effective (in 2011 and 2012, respectively) have occurred.
In Lesotho, political order has also been destabilized by several violent revolts since the first general election between 27 and 29 March 1993. The post electoral crisis in 1993-94, as well as in 1998, resulted from discontentment of the opposition parties in face of the government’s general fraud and electoral malpractice. In both contexts a more violent form of contestation took place, namely disgruntled army factions also joined opposition parties in military actions. Unlike what happened in 1993-94, in 1998 the King did not take an active role in the opposition campaign, and violence was only effectively controlled with the intervention of troops from Botswana and South Africa and with the LCD’s compromise to organize a new poll within 18 months. In order to pave the way for these elections, an Interim Political Authority (IPA) was established in December 1998. It consisted of two members from each of the country’s twelve main political parties, and it was empowered to make significant reforms in the political system by functioning as a parallel government. The elections of 2002 were again won by the LCD, only this time without violent reaction to the results (see Lesotho IPU Parline and Polity IV Country Report 201072). Conversely, countries like Namibia, Seychelles, Cape Verde and Mozambique have been characterized by stable polities from the onset of multipartism. It should be noted, though, that stable does not mean absence of political conflict, but simply that the political conflict did not result in changes in authority patterns, which is what Polity IV “durable” measures.
Considering the institutional variables; semipresidential regimes are the most frequent form of government (N = 9), followed by the presidential (N = 6) and the parliamentary forms (N = 4)73. This distribution largely reflects the regional situation, as more than half of the
71 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/GuineaBissau2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013). 72
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Lesotho2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013).
73 In Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia, elections for the presidency and the parliament were always held in concurrency. During shorter periods this was also the case of The Gambia (until 1996), Guinea-Bissau (until 2004), Senegal (until 1988) and Seychelles (until 1998). In all other cases – except for Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa which are parliamentarian – the two elections are held separately.
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states in Sub-Saharan Africa are semipresidential (Elgie 2007). This institutional landscape has been linked with the colonial background of the countries. In fact, van Cranenburgh (2003) has shown that countries with British background tended to follow, in most cases, the Westminster parliamentary model; while those with French background were mostly inspired by the prototype of the French Fifth Republic, consequently adopting semipresidential regimes with strong presidents. An institutional resemblance is also found among former Portuguese colonies that adopted semipresidential regimes (Lobo and Neto 2009; Neto and Lobo 2014).
In the majority of countries (for instance Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania) the forms of government have been largely stable since they were introduced. In a few cases, however, there have been attempts to amend certain dispositions. The case of Senegal is one of complete change. The country had a presidential regime until 7 January 2001 when it adopted a semipresidential constitutional framework. In other countries, changes (attempted or successful) have mostly aimed at extending the presidential mandate (Vencovsky 2007). For example, Presidents Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Sam Nujoma of Namibia were able to secure constitutional amendments that allowed them to stand for a third term in office, and they eventually won the subsequent election (Vencovsky 2007, 17), while the Presidents of Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), Malawi (Elson Bakili Muluzi) and Zambia (Frederick Chiluba) were less fortunate since they saw their attempts of constitutional amendment blocked by the parliament and they also faced contestation from civil society (Vencovsky 2007, 18-19). In Sao Tome and Principe, the National Assembly started a process of constitutional amendment aimed at reducing the powers of the president and at strengthening the powers of the government and the parliament in 2001 (Seibert 2009). Part of the revised Constitution was approved in 2003 in the aftermath of long political crisis between the incumbent President Fradique Menezes, who wanted to hold a popular referendum on the new constitutional text, and the political parties represented at the parliament, which considered that there was no need of submitting constitutional amendments to referendum (Ibid.).
Laws regulating parties’ access to funding/finance are more or less widespread in the sample. As Table 4.2 displays, Benin (11) and Cape Verde (10) are the countries where dispositions for public funding, regulations of spending; and reporting, oversight and sanctions are more detailed. Countries with no public funding at all – Botswana, Guinea- Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia – still have minimal provisions regarding free or subsidized access to media for political parties, bans on vote buying and on state resources
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being used in favor or against a political party or candidate. The section in which regulation seems to be missing is on reporting spending as, in almost half of the countries, there are no provisions demanding the periodical report of finances – some examples are Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia.
Regarding party system fragmentation, the average number of electoral parties (ENEP) for the 19 countries analyzed is 3, which is a strikingly low number, especially when compared to other recently-democratized countries. In the case of post-Communist Europe, there are, on average, 28 effective parties competing in parliamentary elections (Tavits 2005). Thus, this aggregate indicator alone seems to confirm the distinctive nature of African party systems in what concerns its low levels of fragmentation (e.g. Salih 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Carbone 2005). Yet there is some cross-country variation. The overwhelming majority of the countries (N = 14) are below the observed average, with more extreme cases being Seychelles and The Gambia, where the mean ENEP is approximately 2. Only five countries score above this figure. These are the following, in ascendant order of fragmentation: Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau and Benin. The latter has the most fragmented party system with average ENEP of 9.
Concerning party age, the results indicate that African political parties are fairly old (mean = 24 years) when compared with the ones competing in post-Communist elections (mean = 7 years) (Tavits 2005). Older political parties are found in the Seychelles (25 years), Cape Verde (30 years), Malawi (30 years), Senegal (32 years), Namibia (35 years), Mozambique (36 years), Mauritius (41 years) and South Africa (50 years). The latter’s, ANC is the oldest political party in Africa. Founded in 1912, it was the major contributor to the end of the apartheid regime and, since 1994 it is the country’s dominant party. In Mauritius, the major political parties are also the oldest ones, namely the PT, the PMSD and the MMM founded, respectively in 1936, 1955 and 1969. These parties have been able to elect representatives in nearly all elections since 1976 and had the opportunity to lead the country, by turns and in coalition governments as well. In the remaining 11 countries, the age of political parties ranges between three years (Burkina Faso) and 24 years (Lesotho). Burkina Faso is the country with the youngest political parties in the parliament with the CDP and the ADF-RDA, having been founded in 1996 and 1998, respectively.
Economic performance is operationalized by variables that portray the state of the economy at the time of election (GDP and inflation). The interpretation of the results must, however, be inserted in the long term. It is known that in most African countries the «[...] policy focus of the post-independence years» was «[...] state control of the ‘commanding
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heights’: to ensure balanced growth and income equality» (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1999, 275). Notwithstanding, the failure of this model and the economic crisis of the 1970s led many countries to adopt structural adjustment policies in the early 1980s, which in many cases signified wide privatization of state owned companies and the contraction of public spending (Ibid.). After this period, and with the democratic opening, the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa have done much better in several indicators that measure human welfare (infant mortality, literacy, school enrollment etc.) and economic development (GDP per capita, annual growth) (Sender 1999). Despite the fact that the poorest countries in the world are situated in this continent, World Bank data shows that the economy is performing better than in the first years of independence and, generally, resisting the 2008 world crisis. In fact, between 1995 and 2012, GDP averaged 5% in Sub-Saharan African countries (Kaberuka et al. 2011, 17).
The 19 countries in our sample also record an annual GDP growth of 5%. Performing better than this average are the economies of Senegal (5,1%), Sao Tome and Principe (5,3%), Malawi (5,4%), Namibia (5,6%), Ghana (5,6%), Seychelles (5,8%), Zambia (6,1%), Botswana (6,5%), Cape Verde (6,8%), Tanzania (6,8%), Mozambique (7,5%) and Nigeria (7,9%). In the remaining seven countries, the GDP average growth per year is lower than 5%. South Africa, the continent’s biggest economy74
, has the lowest GDP growth rates (mean = 1.7%), when compared to other economies in the southern region of Africa (e.g. Tanzania and Mozambique), even though this situation has improved since 1994. According to du Plessis and Smit (2007):
South Africa’s real economic growth rate averaged 3,1 percent (1,1 percent in per capita terms) during the period 1995-2004 [...]. This represented a substantial improvement on the 0,8 percent average growth rate (- 1.3 percent in per capita terms) registered in the decade from 1985-1994. Although this was a welcome improvement, South Africa’s growth performance remained relatively low by world standards [...] (du Plessis and Smit 2007, 3).
Neighbor Nigeria, in turn, has the fastest GDP growth, being also one most developed economies in Africa (average GDP per capita is 1046.414 US$). The GDP increased from 1,1%, in 1999 to nearly 7% in 2011 and reached its peak in 2003 (10%). The main booster of
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The average GPD per capita in the period covered is 4512,042 US$. In 2010 South Africa was invited by the BRIC countries to join the group.
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the economy is the oil industry; the country was rated the 12th largest producer of petroleum products in the world in 2012.
Regarding inflation rates, the mean value is 10% annual change. Fourteen countries have lower percentages while five have higher ones. Within the first group, rates are inferior to 4% in four countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Seychelles) whilst in the remaining cases inflation ranges between 4,1% (Benin) and 9,7% (Lesotho). Rates above 10% are found in Nigeria (10,1%), Zambia (20,5%), Malawi (21,5%), Ghana (24,7%) and Sao Tome and Principe (28,0).
Electoral participation, as the percentage of voter turnout, has been mentioned before in this dissertation. In Chapter II we saw that countries like Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Senegal had the lowest turnout averages (below 60%) in lower house elections, while electorates of Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa, figured amid the most participative ones (above 80%). In Chapter III, we coupled levels of institutionalization, democratic performance and turnout in a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis that delivered three outcomes of institutionalization: adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization. In this chapter, we focus on turnout changes from one election to the next. Table 4.2 shows that five countries – Mauritius (2,2%), Seychelles (3,9%), South Africa (5,2%), Lesotho (7,8%) and Benin (8,6%) – have a relatively stable share of voters across elections (less than 10% change), whereas nine countries exhibit changes from 11% to 16%. These are, in ascending order, Botswana, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. Finally, five countries register more than 16% of change in voter turnout – Guinea-Bissau (16,1%), Senegal (16,2%), Namibia (18,1%), Mozambique (19,9%) and Ghana (20,1%).
Table 4.2 also includes data for the number of presidents, the type of electoral system and the quality of PSI, which are the control variables. Since the latter has already been extensively analyzed in the previous chapter (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4) we will focus solely on the first two variables. Starting with the number of presidents, we find that in some countries there is limited turnover – Burkina Faso (1), The Gambia (2), Mozambique (2), Namibia (2), Seychelles (2) and Tanzania (2) – while in others there has been more alternation in the position of the Head of State – Ghana (4), Lesotho (4), South Africa (4), Zambia (4), Guinea- Bissau, (6) and Mauritius (6). In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré has been the country sole Head of State since December 1991 after successfully changing the Constitution to be able to run for a third mandate. Blaise Compaoré seized power in 1987 after a coup d’état in which Captain Thomas Sankara, who had established a Marxist–Leninist regime in 1983, was killed
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(Grotz 1999), thus he has been in power for more than 20 years now. In Mozambique Frelimo’s leaders Joaquim Chissano (1994-2005) and Armando Guebuza (2005- to present) were elected for two consecutive terms each. In Namibia Sam Nujoma (1990-2005) and Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 -to present) have succeeded in presidency. As his counterpart in Burkina Faso, Sam Nujoma was also able to change the Constitution so as to be allowed to compete in the subsequent election.
In Sao Tome and Principe the relationship between the president and the cabinet has been hostile from the outset of the first multiparty elections in 1991 (Seibert 2009). In fact, between 1991 and 2004 five political conflicts resulted in the dismissal of the prime minister – these occurred in 1992, 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2004 (Ibid.). The presidents’ position has also been threatened. Since 1991, the country has known three Heads of State, Miguel Trovoada (1991-1995; 1995-2001), Fradique Menezes (2001-2003; 2011) and Manuel Pinto da Costa (since 2011) who have occasionally been challenged by the military (in 1996 and in 2003).
Zambia’ context is rather different as, unlike in Sao Tome and Principe; there has never been a situation of cohabitation between president and cabinet, since the same party controls both the presidency and the parliament. The first democratically elected president was Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002). When his attempt to run for a third mandate failed, he backed Levy Mwanawasa who had been his Vice-President until 1994 and had lost the run to party presidency in 1996. Levy Mwanawasa was elected in the 2001 election and his tenure lasted until his death in 2008. Subsequently, Rupiah Banda served his first term as acting president (29 June 2008 – 2 November 2008) and his second term as popularly elected president after the 30 October 2008 election. In the following general elections, held in 2011, Michael Sata was elected president, in a contest that also marked the first alternation in power in 20 years.
In Malawi, one president also died in office, Bingu wa Mutharika, who had been nominated by previous president Elson Bakili Muluzi (in office between 1994-2004) as his successor. Mutharika’s first term in office was between 2004 and 2008 and the second between 2008 and 2012. When he died, Joyce Banda, who had served alongside Mutharika as Vice-President for DPP, was sworn president, following constitutional provisions that stipulated that when the president dies the Vice-President must automatically assume power. This was not a pacific succession as Joyce Banda seized power as the leader of the People’s Party; a party she formed after having been expelled from DPP in 2011.
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Table 4.2 – Summary statistics for the independent variables
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES CONTROL VARIABLES
Time (years) Polity durability (years) Turnout change (average, %) Ethnicity (0-1) Form of Gov. ENEP (average) Party Age (average, years) Party funding/ finance (0-11) GDP growth (average, %) Inflation (average, %) No. Presidents Electoral system Quality of PSI Benin 20 20 8,6 0,7 PR 9 9 11 4,1 4,1 3 PR Inad.
Botswana 40 43 11,2 0,5 PAR 2 23 6 6,5 9,6 4 MAJ Adeq.
Burkina Faso 15 17 12,7 0,7 SPRE 3 6 7 3,9 1,7 1 PR Over
Cape Verde 20 20 11,4 0,2 SPRE 2 30 10 6,8 5,3 3 PR Adeq.
Gambia, The 41 27 14,5 0,6 PR 2 14 4 1,9 9,7 2 MAJ Over
Ghana 16 7 20,1 0,7 SPRE 2 10 7 5,6 24,7 4 MAJ Inad.
Guinea-Bissau 14 4 16,1 0,7 SPRE 4 21 8 3,9 3,1 6 PR Inad.
Lesotho 14 5 7,8 0,4 PAR 3 24 6 3,7 9,7 4 MAJ & MIX Inad.
Malawi 15 15 15 0,7 PR 4 30 3 5,4 21,5 3 MAJ Inad.
Mauritius 34 42 2,2 0,5 PAR 2 41 5 4,7 6,6 6 MAJ Adeq.
Mozambique 15 15 19,9 0,7 SPRE 2 36 8 7,5 6,3 2 PR Over
Namibia 20 19 18,1 0,7 SPRE 2 35 3 5,6 8,1 2 PR Adeq.
Nigeria 19 12 15,7 0,8 PR 3 12 8 7,9 10,1 3 MAJ Over
Sao Tome and Principe 19 19 12,2 0,1 SPRE 3 19 5 5,3 28 3 PR Inad.
Senegal 14 20 16,2 0,5 SPRE 3 32 5 5,1 3,3 3 MIX Over
Seychelles 18 18 3,9 0,2 PR 2 25 7 5,8 2,7 2 MIX Adeq.
South Africa 15 15 5,2 0,8 PAR 2 50 4 1,7 4,6 4 PR Adeq.
Tanzania 15 15 12,3 0,8 SPRE 2 24 9 6,8 6,5 2 MAJ Over
Zambia 20 10 15,7 0,8 PR 4 20 4 6,1 20,5 4 MAJ Inad.
Notes: Acronym for form of government: PAR = Parliamentary, SPRE = Semipresidential and PR = Presidential; Acronym for electoral system: PR = Proportional, MAJ = Majoritarian and MIX = Mixed; abbreviation for quality of PSI: Inad. = Inadequate institutionalization, Adeq. = adequate institutionalization, Over. = overinstitutionalization.